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25	Energy/Environment; Karen Christian, General Counsel; Jerry
24	Deputy Staff Director; Allie Bury, Legislative Clerk,
23	Staff present: Ray Baum, Staff Director; Mike Bloomquist,
22	Dingell, Matsui, and Pallone (ex officio).
21	Carter, Walden (ex officio), Tonko, Ruiz, Peters, Green, DeGette,
20	Murphy, Blackburn, Olson, Johnson, Flores, Hudson, Walberg,
19	Members present: Representatives Shimkus, McKinley, Barton,
18	[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
17	Room 2123 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Shimkus
16	The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
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12	Washington, D.C.
11	Committee on Energy and Commerce
10	Subcommittee on Environment
9	House of Representatives
8	TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2017
7	CONCERNS FROM THE 2017 HURRICANE SEASON
6	RESPONSE AND RECOVERY TO ENVIRONMENTAL
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	Couri, Chief Environmental Advisor; Wyatt Ellertson, Research
	Associate, Energy/Environment; Adam Fromm, Director of Outreach
	and Coalitions; Theresa Gambo, Human Resources/Office
	Administrator; Jordan Haverly, Policy Coordinator, Environment;
	A.T. Johnston, Senior Policy Advisor, Energy; Mary Martin, Deputy
	Chief Counsel, Energy & Environment; Alex Miller, Video
	Production Aide and Press Assistant; Tina Richards, Counsel,
	Environment; Dan Schneider, Press Secretary; Hamlin Wade, Special
	Advisor, External Affairs; Everett Winnick, Director of
	Information Technology; Andy Zach, Senior Professional Staff
	Member, Environment; Jeff Carroll, Minority Staff Director;
	Jacqueline Cohen, Minority Chief Environment Counsel; Caitlin
	Haberman, Minority Professional Staff Member; Rick Kessler,
	Minority Senior Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and
	Environment; Jon Monger, Minority Counsel; Alexander Ratner,
	Minority Policy Analyst; Andrew Souvall, Minority Director of
	Communications, Outreach and Member Services; Tuley Wright,
	Minority Energy and Environment Policy Advisor; C.J. Young,
	Minority Press Secretary; and Catherine Zander, Minority
l	Environment Fellow.

Mr. Shimkus. We will ask staff to close the back door, please, and ask the committee to now come to order, and I will recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement.

I want to thank all our witnesses for joining us today. We are especially grateful for those of you who have traveled significant distances to be with us today to share your stories about the hurricanes that tore through our country this fall and about the impact of those hurricanes on the environment.

We know that many of you are still in the trenches of dealing with the response and recovery efforts, so your willingness to take the time to be here today does not go unnoticed.

This fall, the continental United States and some United States territories in the Caribbean experienced severe weather from five hurricanes, including extensive damage due to landfall from four storms.

Hurricane Harvey impacted Texas and Louisiana; Hurricane Irma hit Florida, Georgia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; Hurricane Maria, again, hit Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; and Tropical Storm Nate impacted Louisiana and Mississippi.

The Energy and Commerce Committee is conducting a series of hearings to look at the response and recovery efforts conducted during this hurricane season so we can figure out what went well

and what we could we have done better, what we need to do is going -- and what we need to do going forward.

We are also focused on what Congress can do to assist the impacted communities as they work to get back on their feet.

Today we are focused on the environmental impacts of these hurricanes and the response efforts. No two hurricanes are alike and a storm's individual characteristics like the speed, intensity, and amount of precipitation, play a large role in the extent of the storm's impact on natural resources and the environment.

For example, as we will hear from several of our witnesses,
Hurricane Harvey may have significantly
impacted several Superfund sites in Houston because of the record
rainfall and flooding.

Likewise, in Puerto Rico, Hurricanes Irma and Maria uncovered the intensified issues associated with aging and inefficient energy infrastructure, contaminated sites that are rapidly multiplying, landfills that are already overflowing, and possibly the most contaminated drinking water supply in the United States.

Residents across the island are still without power and reliable source of -- and a reliable source of drinking water. Many are drinking potentially contaminated water because water purification systems have largely failed in the wake of the storm, and in the municipality of Dorado citizens resorted to drinking

well water from Superfund sites.

Today, we will look at the response efforts by the

Environmental Protection Agency and the states for the impacted
communities. We will consider environmental issues in the
hurricane-impacted communities such as the availability of clean
drinking water, the potential for air
releases, the impact on Superfund sites and solid and hazardous
waste disposal facilities, and risk management and emergency
response plans.

We hope to hear from the affected EPA regional administrators about their efforts, what they accomplished, what remains to be done, and what can be done better in the future and how Congress can assist.

We will also hear from several private sector witnesses from academia as well as people who are serving in the boots-on-the ground roles in Texas and Puerto Rico, and people who can weigh in on what needs to be done regarding the drinking water systems in the affected communities.

Again, I thank all our witnesses for being here. I hope the discussions will start today about the response and recovery efforts, the National Response Framework, and about whether statutory or other changes need to be made.

We will adjust the beginning as we continue to oversee and assist the federal and state governments as they carry out the response and recovery efforts for the communities impacted by the

hurricanes.

And before I yield back my time, I am going to yield 30 seconds to Marsha Blackburn.

Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome our witnesses. So pleased that everyone is here. There are so many different aspects to preventing, planning for, responding to the natural disasters, as the chairman has said, and these events are taking a toll on our communities, also on our nation.

And so much is involved in it -- today, the environmental aspects, but also looking at the health aspects and we know that they all have to work hand in hand.

I have got a piece of legislation, H.R. 1876, the Good Samaritan Health Professionals Act, that deals with that one component of making certain that people are cared for appropriately.

But we thank you for being here. We want to do what is right, we want to be helpful to the process, and we want to make certain that citizens are cared for in these situations.

And I yield back.

Mr. Shimkus. Gentlelady yields back her time to me, and before I turn to the ranking member I also want to mention that we will have sitting in with us Jenniffer Gonzalez, who is the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico. She's going to be sitting at the dais but per committee rule she can't ask questions. She

146 can't make an opening statement. But when she comes I will make 147 sure I recognize her. 148 With that, I yield back my time and yield five minutes to 149 the ranking member, Mr. Tonko, for five minutes. 150 Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Tonko. 151 It is important that we are holding this hearing and I thank 152 you for doing that. I was sad to hear the news that our friend, the former ranking 153 member of this subcommittee and the current ranking member of our 154 155 Health Subcommittee, Gene Green, will be retiring at the end of 156 the 115th Congress. I know Gene was here a few moments ago. But I want to thank 157 him for his friendship and know that he will -- and I certainly 158 159 know that he will be fighting for disaster assistance for Houstonians for the next 13 months. So we wish him well. 160 And I thank all of our witnesses for being here. It is great 161 162 to have EPA witnesses join us on this very important topic. 163 hope Administrator Pruitt will appear before the subcommittee at 164 some point in the near future as well. I want to especially take this opportunity to welcome 165 166 Administrator Peter Lopez. Mr. Lopez and I have worked together for many years. His former Assembly district overlapped a 167 portion of New York's 20th Congressional District. 168 169 Our constituents were hit hard by Hurricane Irene and 170 Tropical Storm Lee, and we well know that disasters don't

discriminate.

Peter, you are an outstanding public servant and I wish you well in your new role and it is great to have you at the witness table today.

Mother Nature does not discriminate. She doesn't care if you are a Republican or a Democrat, and our government must be ready to respond to help everyone get back on their feet.

So I hope you can take the lessons learned over the years both in the response and recovery efforts and apply them to assist our fellow Americans in need now.

We know the recovery effort will be long. But, sadly, in Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands the response effort is still underway.

Far too many Americans continue to live without electricity or safe drinking water and that is simply unacceptable.

On today's panels we will hear about the work done in the aftermath of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, to address environmental concerns.

EPA plays an important role in disaster response by assessing and restoring water systems and Superfund sites, responding to chemical and oil spills, and monitoring air quality.

I know there will be a wide variety of issues addressed today including Superfund, chemical safety, air emissions, and debris management.

I am particularly concerned about water systems, which we

196 know are often aging and in disrepair, even without the stress 197 of a disaster. 198 There are legitimate questions as to whether state revolving 199 fund loans are the most appropriate vehicle to get communities 200 back on their feet following such devastation. 201 In Texas and in Florida, flood waters were contaminated with 202 bacteria and toxins. Water included high concentrations of E. 203 coli as well as elevated levels of lead, arsenic, and other heavy 204 metals. In Puerto Rico, we have heard stories of people drinking from 205 206 and bathing in contaminated rivers. There have been a number of 207 reported cases of leptospirosis. The media even reported people using a well located -- a well 208 209 located on Superfund site, which only after the fact was determined to meet federal drinking water standards. 210 These examples show the direness of the circumstances that 211 212 Americans faced following these disasters -- no power, no clean 213 water, and driven to acts of desperation. These hurricanes should serve as a reminder that EPA is one 214 of our nation's most essential public health agencies. 215 216 important work to do as recovery for these disasters begins. 217 But the drastic proposed reduction to EPA's budget, personnel, and environmental safeguards will make it harder to 218 219 fulfil its mission including supporting disaster response and 220 disaster recovery.

221 Preserving a strong EPA is critical to the health of 222 Americans. These storms have made that clear. A robust EPA will 223 make communities more resilient. 224 For example, today we will hear about the risks posed to 225 Superfund sites by disasters and the work EPA has done to assess these sites both before and after storms. 226 227 But the best and perhaps only way to mitigate the risks to 228 these sites is through actual remediation. Reducing funding to 229 the Superfund program will not make cleanups happen any quicker 230 and will not make sites less vulnerable to storms. 231 I would also be remiss if I did not mention climate change 232 and the role EPA should be playing in addressing that threat. Ιf we continue to ignore climate change, increasingly severe 233 234 disasters will become the new normal and we can expect many more 235 hearings like this one in the future. 236 I hope we can work together to ensure EPA has the resources 237 necessary to support disaster response efforts and make our 238 communities more resilient to disasters before they occur. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and yield 239 back and, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 240 241 Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman yields back the time. 242 The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Walden, for five minutes. 243 244 The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. 245 Today marks the third hearing our committee has held to

246 examine the response and recovery efforts for the hurricanes that 247 ravaged our communities along the Gulf Coast and our island 248 territories in the Caribbean. 249 And I would note for the committee in response to our concern 250 about the situations especially in the island territories we will 251 be having a congressional delegation -- a pretty high level 252 limited seating capacity trip -- to Puerto Rico and the Virgin 253 Islands coming up most likely early next month to have -- get a 254 firsthand look at the situation. You will get more information 255 as we go along. 256 257 258 259

Hurricane response and recovery deals with human tragedy. These storms didn't just damage property and displace residents. They delayed dreams and fundamentally altered the lives and fortunes of millions of Americans in ways big and small.

While we cannot undo the damage of these storms we can work to ensure the federal government is diligently doing its job to aid recovery and not making it harder to get that job done.

Public health risks typically associated with natural disasters including drinking water contamination and the leeching of hazardous waste are varied and include heightened risk of infectious disease, as you all know.

These risks can be particularly dangerous for vulnerable populations such as individuals with immuno suppressed and the elderly and infants, clearly.

Our job this morning is to better understand who in the

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context of environmental concerns that bear on public policy is engaging in the tough work to help speed recovery, what they are doing or not doing to make hurricane victims lives better and the challenges they face, when will something resembling normalcy return and where are the resources coming from to make recovery a reality and what private efforts can be leveraged. So it is all the who, what, when, where, and why and how.

We also need to determine whether the federal presence is helping or hurting that recovery and, if so, how do we -- how do we change things that need to be changed.

Some of the areas we hope to cover today will have to go unaddressed for now. We had hoped to have a Puerto Rico solid waste official testify via video conference about the situation on the ground there.

Last week, she confirmed she would testify but then, unfortunately, power went down on the island and our ability to communicate with her was lost.

We also hoped to hear from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency about its work leading response efforts and improving
funding for recovery activities. But they were unable to find
someone who could testify. Pretty remarkable.

We will continue working with FEMA to ensure these questions are answered so we can feel confident in both statutory authority and administrative practice, support rational decision making, and promote the needs on the ground.

296 That said, I want to welcome our witnesses today. 297 for being here. Some of you have come great distances but each 298 of you has important lessons for our committee to learn and we 299 appreciate your participation. 300 I am confident that in the midst of all this bad news you 301 will provide us some stories of dedication, innovation, gumption, 302 acts of personal sacrifice, kindness, and courage. 303 These should inspire us to be equally fearless and committed 304 in our work ahead. And in this committee and its broad 305 jurisdiction we do roll up our sleeves and search for solutions 306 to the various challenges that present themselves after a major 307 disaster and we want to make sure the agencies under our jurisdiction are well prepared, responding appropriately, and 308 309 that lives are improving as a result. 310 311 312

If not, we want to know about it so that we can fix it. I expect that this will be an excellent hearing for us to identify vulnerabilities and assess what is needed to better prepare and respond to this and future storms and disasters.

So thank you for being here. We look forward to working with I know the former chairman of the committee, the vice chairman, has a special announcement he'd like to make now about some of our folks in the audience who are with us today.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield to the gentleman from Texas the remainder of my time, Mr. Barton.

Mr. Barton. Well, I thank you, Chairman Walden. Thank you,

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321 Chairman Shimkus and Mr. Tonko, for holding this hearing. 322 I had the privilege way back when -- have been a White House 323 fellow under President Reagan back in 1981 and part of 1982 and 324 today I have the current class of White House fellows on their 325 visit to the Hill. 326 They are in the back lefthand corner. They are 14 of the 327 best and brightest young Americans. They work for Cabinet 328 secretaries or agency heads. They are full of vim and vinegar 329 and I told them they are in the best committee in the House. So 330 we want to welcome our White House fellows and wish them the very 331 best in the years ahead. 332 [Applause.] I also want to welcome our two Texas witnesses, Dr. Shaw and 333 334 Mr. Sam Coleman. Mr. Coleman is the acting administrator -regional administrator, Region 6, at EPA in Dallas, and Dr. Brian 335 336 Shaw is head of the TCEQ down in Austin, Texas. They are both 337 good men and good friends of mine. We welcome them to the 338 committee. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 339 Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman yields back his time. 340 341 The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full 342 committee, Mr. Pallone. Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 343 344 Environmental impacts from this season's hurricanes have 345 wreaked havoc and continue to threaten public health in serious and unacceptable ways.

The federal government's response to these hurricanes has been disorganized and in the instance of both Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands it has been too little and too late and we must step up our efforts.

Two weeks ago, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing focused on energy infrastructure recovery efforts, which is a central and ongoing concern, and last week we saw a major setback in the recovery of the electric grid in Puerto Rico when a repair transmission line failed.

And today, more than two months after Hurricane Maria, more than half of the island is still without power and that is adversely affecting everything from health care to access to safe drinking water.

This lack of electricity puts lives at risk and must be addressed. Unfortunately, at this point, it does not appear that any agency within the federal government is standing up and taking full control of this effort.

The Army Corps and FEMA say the other is in charge and that is unacceptable. Someone needs to take the lead now.

This is also far from the only challenge facing communities in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

First and foremost is the lack of safe drinking water. This has been a problem in all of the areas affected by these hurricanes and it continues to threaten lives.

371 The severity of these issues show the weaknesses in our 372 drinking water infrastructure and how important it is for our 373 drinking water systems to be more resilient to extreme weather 374 and climate change. 375 Drinking water infrastructure has been a priority for this 376 subcommittee this year and an issue that we have worked on together, and several of the provisions included in the 377 378 committee's bipartisan drinking water bill could have helped 379 water systems prepare for these storms. 380 But I think we are learning that we need to do even more and 381 that we need to provide more resources to these affected areas, and I hope that we can continue to work together in a bipartisan 382 manner to address the concerns we hear about today. 383 384 Superfund sites also pose serious risks when natural 385 disasters strike. Several of these dangerous sites were damaged 386 during this hurricane season and we are still struggling to 387 understand the health impacts of that damage. 388 An extreme -- as extreme weather events become more frequent, 389 390 and thoroughly.

it is even more important that we clean up Superfund sites quickly

With greater funding for Superfund cleanups we might have avoided some of the damage we have seen and, again, I hope my Republican colleagues will join me in working to address this issue as well.

And these hurricanes have also led to significant air

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396 pollution with real public health impacts. In Texas, we saw an 397 accidental release of benzene at the Valero refinery and a 398 dangerous series of chemical fires at the Arkema plant. 399 In Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, we continue to see 400 dangerously high air emissions from diesel generators which could 401 worsen dramatically as debris management efforts being in 402 earnest. 403 And if we can't get the power turned back on soon, if we can't 404 get safe drinking water out to our citizens, more Americans are 405 going to die. This is a humanitarian crisis and we must do 406 everything we can to fix it. 407 As Congress prepares the next emergency spending bill, we need to consider all these environmental concerns and do what is 408 409 necessary to protect human health and the public welfare. 410 We can and should be doing more to increase access to safe 411 drinking water, to secure and remediate Superfund sites, and to 412 limit air pollution. 413 So I just want to thank the witnesses who traveled here today from Texas, Puerto Rico, from the Virgin Islands and from Georgia, 414 and, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from you. 415 I don't know if any of our Democratic members want the time. 416 417 If not, I will yield back. Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman yields back his time. 418 419 We want to thank all our witnesses for being here today and 420 taking the time to testify before the subcommittee.

421 Today's witnesses will have an opportunity to give an opening 422 statement followed by a round of questions from the members. 423 course, your full statements are going to be submitted for the 424 record. 425 Our first witness panel for today's hearing will include Mr. 426 Peter Lopez, Regional Administration, Region 2, Environmental 427 Protection Agency; Mr. Trey Glenn, Regional Administrator, Region 428 4, of the Environmental Protection Agency; Mr. Sam Coleman, Acting 429 Regional Administrator, Region 6, Environmental Protection 430 Agency; and Dr. Brian Shaw, chairman of the Texas Department of 431 Environmental Quality. 432 And with that, we will turn first to Mr. Lopez. You have 433 five minutes, sir. 434 Welcome.

435 STATEMENTS OF PETER LOPEZ, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. 436 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 2; TREY GLENN, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 4; 437 438 SAM COLEMAN, ACTING REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 439 PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 6; DR. BRYAN SHAW, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS 440 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 441 442 STATEMENT OF MR. LOPEZ 443 Thank you, Chairman Shimkus and Chairman Walden, 444 Ranking Members Tonko and Pallone, and fellow Energy and Commerce 445 Committee members. 446 I am Pete Lopez. I am the regional administrator for Region 447 2, which includes all of New York, New Jersey, the Virgin Islands, 448 and eight federally recognized Indian nations. 449 It is a privilege to join you today on this important conversation and my testimony today, please understand, is a 450 451 snapshot of what's happening as a result of Hurricanes Irma and 452 Maria. Please understand that we are very much in an emergency 453 454 response mode and that the testimony we offer today is subject 455 to change on a daily basis. So we are doing our best here. 456 Just to preface, in my years as a member of the state 457 legislature, I was intensely involved in a response very similar

So in upstate New York in 2011, we were ravaged by Hurricane

to what's happened in the Caribbean.

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460 Irene and Tropical Storm Lee. Mr. Tonko and I were partners there 461 working on this issue. 462 In this instance, my parents were homeless. My family was 463 homeless. We had eight feet of water in my village. A similar 464 situation with infrastructure, communications, power grids. The 465 socioeconomic conditions very much the same. 466 If you understand New York geography, northern Appalachia. 467 So what we found -- and this is a critical issue for the committee 468 and for the administration -- is that the more disadvantaged the 469 community, the more painful and slow the recovery. So I just -- I can't understate that message and I just wanted 470 471 to bring it to the committee's conscious thought. 472 Recently, I had a chance to travel to Puerto Rico and it was 473 with my colleague, Deputy McCabe, who is with me today, and I was 474 struck by the incredible destruction, and I have to tell you that the sights, the sounds, the smells were all too familiar. 475 And as with Irene and Lee, I also have family on the islands 476 477 in the Arecibo and Camuy area. Lopez family corderos are there as well and we are very concerned about their safety. 478 The focus of the trip was not just to be on the ground but 479 480 to connect. We met with leaders. We met with leaders of the territories and the Commonwealth, local officials, and our main 481 goal was to connect with them, to identify problems and issues 482

So we are very committed and I have to say the experience

and really help them problem solve.

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485 was both sobering but also galvanizing. I found that my colleagues on the ground are very passionate about the work they 486 487 are doing and treat individuals as subjects, not objects. 488 concerned about individual families, communities, and the 489 integrity of the entire population. 490 As was noted by some of the introductory remarks, a major 491 challenges remains with the power grid and here, as you can 492 imagine, virtually everything relies on electricity.

> So whether it is pollution controls at Superfund sites, drinking water and wastewater system operation, all of those things are challenged.

Our response has been working with FEMA and Army Corps to place strategically-placed generators at key locations. challenge, of course, that it provides an alternate power source but the reliability in the long term is at risk here.

So they require fuel and even the generators themselves are subject to mechanical failure. So as we try to run around the island we are challenged with the electricity issue.

Just want to say in their defense for both FEMA and Army Corps, their job is unprecedented, and I don't want to draw too much of a parallel to Europe after World War II where we talk about the Marshall Plan and off script a little, but the challenges on the island are unique.

So in defense of our colleagues with FEMA and Army Corps, their job is extraordinary.

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510 EPA has about 325 employees and contractors on the ground 511 and in the Virgin Islands. We hope to have that number increased 512 to about 400 in December. 513 In your testimony you'll see greater detail on the status 514 of power plants -- excuse me, drinking water facilities, hazardous 515 waste facilities, wastewater treatment, Superfund sites, 516 hazardous debris, comingled debris, and sunken vessels. You'll 517 see all that in front of you in your testimony. 518 Just as a quick note, we made great progress. We still face a number of changes -- challenges. The power -- outside of the 519 520 power we have been dealing with waste -- medical waste that has been building up due to logistical limitations. 521 522 Many roads are still impassable and, as you know, weather 523 conditions have further compromised with mudslides and flooding. That includes area flooding, chronic flooding, as well as 524 525 destruction to other property. 526 So accessibility on the island is an ongoing challenge. 527 Humanitarian aid -- we have stepped out of our comfort zone and where we are the first responders we are bringing additional 528 529 humanitarian aid with our staff as we go into the mountainous 530 terrain. So looking to the future, quickly, we know there are unique 531 challenges. The issue of backup power, we heard reference to what 532 533 do we do for the future. Having backup power and supplies on the

island is critical.

535	Positioning those supplies in key areas, particularly with
536	storms advancing, would be very helpful. And, again, we know
537	there are opportunities for improvement always but we welcome the
538	committee's engagement and thank you for this opportunity to be
539	here with you.
540	Thank you so much, Chairman.
541	[The prepared statement of Mr. Lopez follows:]
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544 Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman's time has expired. And let me for -- just for the record ask the regional 545 546 administrators to state where the headquarters is and remind our 547 colleagues what states that they represent. We did this in the 548 Energy Sub and I think that is just helpful to keep that all in 549 perspective. 550 So with that, so Mr. Lopez, what are the states and, 551 obviously, protectorates that you cover? 552 Mr. Lopez. Yes, Chairman. 553 So New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and 554 eight recognized Indian nations -- tribes and we are headquartered at -- in Broadway, New York City -- 290 Broadway. 555 Mr. Shimkus. So let me now turn to Mr. Glenn, Region 4 556 557 administrator.

## STATEMENT OF MR. GLENN

Mr. Glenn. Good morning. Mr. Chairman and esteemed members of this committee, I am Trey Glenn, regional administrator for EPA Region 4, which comprises eight southeastern states.

That is Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Kentucky, and we also have six federally-recognized tribes.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the impacts of Hurricane Irma and EPA's response and recovery efforts and to continue the productive discussion that we had last month with the subcommittee.

I have been on the job a little over two months now and I can honestly say that I am in awe of the caliber and expertise and dedication of the regional staff.

These environmental professionals work each day to meet EPA's mission of protecting human health and the environment and this commitment was demonstrated consistently throughout the EPA's response to the devastating hurricanes we experienced this past season.

The 2017 hurricane season was indeed unprecedented in the number and intensity of major storms that impacted the United States and the U.S. territories. The damage from these hurricanes is still being assessed. The recovery will continue for the foreseeable future.

583 EPA Region 4 is fully engaged in a number of response and 584 recovery activities and we are working in close coordination with 585 our federal, state, local, and tribal partners as well as 586 businesses and local communities. 587 The core of our emergency response program in Region 4 588 consists of 28 on-the-scene coordinators and 57 additional staff 589 within a response support corps. 590 Prior to landfall of these storms, I personally reached out to the environmental directors of the four states that were in 591 592 the potential path of this storm to inform them of Region 4's 593 ability to assist if needed. 594 We also reached out to our tribal partners that might be 595 impacted by the storm and Florida was the only state that requested 596 EPA assistance relative to Hurricane Irma. 597 We deployed our Region 4 on-scene coordinator to provide direct coordination and planning support to the state. 598 provided a liaison to the FEMA regional response coordination 599 600 center and deployed EPA regional senior leaders to south Florida 601 and myself to Tallahassee. 602 We worked closely with EPA headquarters to issue fuel waivers 603 and no-action assurances to assist in not only the preparation 604 but also the response activities for these great storms. 605 We positioned 12 field hazard assessment teams for 606 deployment when and where needed. These teams were deployed at

Florida's request to provide oil and hazardous substance response

608 We further provided support to the state for orphan 609 container assessment and recovery, vessel pollution response and mitigation, and debris management technical support. 610 611 Region 4 also assisted with water and wastewater system 612 technical support. We coordinated with the state to monitor the 613 status of more than 1,600 community drinking water systems and 614 over 2,000 wastewater systems. 615 Concurrently, Florida also requested assistance in 616 contacting small noncommunity drinking water systems such as 617 schools and restaurants and the water division completed over 618 1,200 call-down assessments of those facilities. Our hazardous assessment team performed field assessments 619 at more than 200 chemical and oil storage facilities identified 620 621 as priorities. 622 We conducted reconnaissance for pollution incidents and 623 orphan containers and there were no significant storm-related 624 hazardous substance or oil pollution incidents in Region 4. 625 We also assisted with orphan container and vessel recovery 626 in the Florida Keys and deployed personnel to provide support to the state and assessment of disaster debris management sites. 627 628 Our operation in the Florida Keys continues as we speak. We 629 have collected more than 700 orphan containers that are stored 630 in a secure staging area for waste characterization and recycling 631 or disposal.

Our EPA team has recovered oil and hazardous materials for

more than 65 sunken or grounded vessels and moved these craft to land-based staging areas where they were transferred to the custody of the Florida Fish & Wildlife Commission.

Prior to landfall, we assessed vulnerabilities at all Superfund sites in Florida. We also deployed six teams to conduct boots-on-the-ground assessments of all national priority list sites and as a further measure we also deployed teams to assess these NPL sites in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, and all we found is that sites experienced very little impact from Hurricane Irma.

Post-landfall we worked with our state partners to ascertain the status of oil storage facilities required to maintain facility response plans as well as chemical facilities required to maintain risk management plans.

Overall, there were very minimal reports of oil and hazardous substance spills that could be attributed to the storm and only one of the RMP facilities contacted reported a hazardous substance release, the source of which was very quickly mitigated.

Moving forward, we continue to meet mission assignments under the response phase and have initiated recovery with FEMA and other federal partners under the national disaster recovery framework, and under this framework EPA supports federal partners primarily on community planning and capacity building, infrastructure systems and recovery and natural and cultural resources.

658 We are excited to have the opportunity to work with our federal, state, tribal, and local partners on this very innovative 659 660 initiative. 661 Again, I thank you for the opportunity to be here and share 662 with you what I consider to be a great example of cooperative 663 federalism to assure and restore public safety and recovery from 664 disaster. 665 I look forward to answering your questions that you have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Glenn follows:] 666 667 668 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*INSERT 2\*\*\*\*\*\*

Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time.

The chair now recognizes Mr. Sam Coleman, acting regional administrator of Region 6.

Sir, you are recognized.

## STATEMENT OF MR. COLEMAN

Mr. Coleman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and fellow committee members. I am Sam Coleman, acting regional administrator for EPA Region 6, which covers Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, and their 66 federally-recognized tribes. We are headquartered in Dallas, Texas in downtown.

Thank you for the privilege of joining you here today for this very important conversation. I am here to speak directly about EPA's response to the devastating impacts of Hurricane Harvey in Region 6 and our associated response activities.

As we have seen in the past three months, every disaster presents unique challenges. Hurricane Harvey hit Corpus Christi as a category four hurricane, then lingered over the Texas Gulf Coast, dropping more than 50 inches of rain in Harris and the surrounding counties, and this impacted over 7 million people.

EPA worked with Texas and local officials to assess more than 2,200 drinking water systems and more the 1,700 wastewater systems.

We retrieved over 950 loose containers and, according to FEMA, we worked with the state to make sure that over 20 million cubic yards so far of debris has been properly disposed of.

At one point, the Texas commissioner of environmental quality had over 500 people working on the response and EPA had over 250 people assisting the state in those response activities.

32 698 One of the most noteworthy aspects of the response to 699 Hurricane Harvey was the positive and collaborative relationship 700 between EPA and the state of Texas. 701 Because we worked very closely with the state agencies and 702 the governor's office, our collective strength of our efforts were 703 greater than the sum. 704 By augmenting state resources where needed and providing 705 some specialized monitoring capabilities, together we were able 706 to address many challenges prevented by Hurricane Harvey in a 707 timely manner. 708 After my 29 years of working at EPA and experiencing events 709 following Hurricane Katrina and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, I have learned a few key lessons regarding the response activities 710 711 to assure success. 712 I am going to go over a few of those. First is exercises -- our federal agency's plan for such catastrophic events by 713 714 conducting exercises to prepare. It is very apparent that these 715 practices lead us to discover our weaknesses and to have time to correct those efficiencies before the real emergency occurs. 716 It is difficult to prepare for such an event as devastating 717 718 as Hurricane Harvey. However, the state of Texas was as well prepared as I've seen and integrations of our organizations was 719 720 exceptional.

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Second is prior coordination. Because EPA has open

communication and a longstanding cooperative relationship with

721

our state counterparts and other emergency response agencies, it clears the path for success that benefits the citizens that are impacted by a disaster.

When a storm is imminent, EPA begins the coordination efforts before landfall. As soon as the storm passes, we have teams that are standing by to begin the assessment of drinking water and wastewater systems to begin evaluating the environmental integrity of impacted businesses, to begin investigating citizen complaints, and to respond to any reported spills or other damaged areas as well as sharing key information with the public.

Next is the experienced staff. An effective response infrastructure includes experienced first responders who are able to address unforeseen circumstances both swiftly and effectively.

Staff development during the preplanning time is of grave importance and should not be underestimated. Experienced responders are the first boots on the ground and they provide the most efficient assistance to communities.

And then, finally, is having the right equipment. EPA employed assets during Hurricane Harvey response to assist the responders that were not available elsewhere. EPA often responds to reports of environmental impacts from air emissions or from other plumes that may be dangerous to a community.

In response to these complaints and odors and fumes during Hurricane Harvey, EPA deployed a TAGA bus. TAGA stands for the trace atmospheric gas analyzer.

748 This is a mobile pollution detection vehicle that is able 749 to provide air quality results quickly by collecting constant 750 real-time data of outdoor air quality. 751 The TAGA bus monitored ambient air in the vicinity of 752 approximately 25 facilities and adjacent neighborhoods and during 753 that time they covered over 640 miles going back and forth in those 754 communities. 755 The results of this we were able to detect actionable 756 emissions to work -- then to work with those affected facilities 757 and to work with the state to make sure that they were properly 758 addressed. 759 There was also widespread coverage of the fires at the Arkema facility in Crosby, Texas. That facility housed volatile 760 761 chemicals that required refrigeration to prevent them from 762 self-igniting. When the facility lost power, the conditions deteriorated 763 764 at the facility, which required an evacuation of the facility and 765 surrounding areas. Ultimately, there was a series of fires that 766 were spontaneous combustion from those materials stored at the 767 site. 768 EPA used the ASPECT aircraft for air sampling above the 769 facility and in the nearby surrounding areas. ASPECT stands for the airborne spectral photometric environmental collection 770

And I know that is a mouthful but, basically, it is an

technology.

771

airplane that EPA rents that is packed full of EPA-owned monitoring equipment so that we can look into the plume to determine if there are harmful levels of chemicals or if there is any danger either downwind or in the communities surrounding the plant.

The ASPECT flew 28 flights over 112 hours -- 28 flights and over 112 hours, covering miles of pipeline. We looked at 134 risk management facilities and 456 drinking water plants and also 105 wastewater facilities in support of the Hurricane Harvey response.

The data was invaluable and assessed the risk quickly in responding appropriately to the emergency and the technology was not available through any other parties involved.

The third asset that we used was a mobile laboratory called PHILIS. PHILIS stands for the portable high through-put integrated laboratory identification system.

The PHILIS lab is a mobile laboratory that we deployed in Houston that allowed us to get 48-hour turnaround on volatile and semi-volatile samples.

This allowed us to quickly assess the conditions at all of the Superfund sites and also any other samples that we needed a quick turnaround.

If EPA did not have access to these tools, our response and the dissemination of information to the public would not have been as informative and robust. I believe that these EPA assets are

798 critical to effective preparedness and response. 799 EPA remains activated as an agency continues to respond to 800 Hurricanes Maria and Irma. The agency taps resources from our 801 sister regions during these times of great need. 802 I have seen the agency continue to grow in our capabilities, 803 learn from each response and apply lessons learned as we face new 804 challenges. 805 We are able to make more data available to the public. For 806 example, we use story boards as we presented this information to 807 the public so that they could understand what each sample meant 808 and how it impacted them personally. EPA will continue to develop more methods and improve our 809 responses by working with our state, local, and other federal 810 811 agency partners. 812 While the response has its own unique challenges, we want 813 to remain flexible to address the individual needs. 814 proud of the EPA and the other responders when called to duty in 815 these times of great need. 816 I am happy to answer any questions about the great work we've 817 done and look forward to continuing to serve. 818 Thank you. 819 [The prepared statement of Mr. Coleman follows:] 820 821 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*INSERT 3\*\*\*\*\*\*

822	Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
823	Now, last but not least is Dr. Shaw, chairman of the Texas
824	Department of Environmental Quality. You have five minutes, sir.
825	Welcome.

## STATEMENT OF MR. SHAW

Mr. Shaw. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Shimkus, Chairman Walden, and Ranking Member Tonko and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here.

For the record, my name is Bryan Shaw. I am the chairman of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and I am happy to discuss our response in recovery efforts related to Hurricane Harvey.

First, my agency's primary mission is to protect the public health and natural resources by ensuring that the air and water and waste are clean and disposed of safely.

This is a critical part of what we work to is fulfilling that mission in the aftermath of a disaster such as Hurricane Harvey.

While we recognize the many challenges that we face and the severity of the -- of the storm that we had, the key to making the response as successful as it was you have heard demonstrated through the cooperative nature that we have experienced both with our federal allies as well as other state and federal agencies in responding to the hurricane.

As was mentioned by Mr. Coleman, TCEQ deployed about 500 people dedicated to the Hurricane Harvey response. The 250 or so folks that worked from EPA to work hand in hand with us were critical to addressing one of the major issues we face and that is communication.

At the time that the storm rolls through it is very challenging to have the adequate communication and get information in a timely manner because, quite frankly, the local elected officials aren't always as prepared for a hurricane as we might want them to be because typically they are spaced out far enough that this is, in most cases, their first experience at dealing with a hurricane and when you have one of this magnitude it becomes even more critical in having a cooperative relationship between the state and federal agencies that respond.

It is critical both to providing that information as well as reassuring those local officials where help is and help is on the way.

This cooperation, I think, clearly demonstrates how well state and federal agencies can work together. We tend to work very well with EPA in previous natural disaster response but never better than we worked in this response and I think considering the unprecedented nature of the severity of the storm and, quite frankly, the fact that this storm sort of parked over Texas and dumped rain continually, it is — if you look at the tragic losses we had but in hindsight considering the severity of the storm, the state fared very well and that is attributable to the prior planning, it is attributable to the cooperative relationship we had amongst our different state agencies and, quite frankly, it is attributable to the resiliency and the good neighbors that we have in our state of Texas that we are blessed with that come to

the aid of their -- of their neighbor in time of crisis.

I think this fits very well into the Cooperative Federalism 2.0 effort that is underway and I think that is -- I applaud this committee for looking at finding ways to be able to ensure that the state and federal agencies are working together.

The Environmental Council of the States has a process underway called Cooperative Federalism 2.0 which is trying to incentivize and encourage us moving to that relationship that was demonstrated, and so I am very much encouraged by that.

I will talk briefly because I know we were running short on time from the standpoint of my allocated time but I want to touch on some of the issues that are ongoing.

Obviously, debris management is one of those issues that continues to be a challenge. This is often what I refer to as the slow tragedy associated with an event like this.

You see some of that initially when you see the debris from what is taken out through wind, the tornadoes associated with a hurricane, as well as the surge -- the storm surge.

But oftentimes the flood damage you don't see initially because those houses seem to be unaffected until you start seeing the residents return back and removing the debris from inside of the houses, getting the drywall out, moving it to the curbs and to the temporary sites.

And so it is critical that we move quickly to be able to help that happen because having those materials remain indoors leads

to mold and other types of biological contamination that can be poor for health as well as making it very difficult for communities to rebuild.

We move it quickly to the curb but you need to move it from there quickly because you have vector issues -- mice, rats, other things -- that can be there -- mosquitoes breeding. And so we want to make sure that we have that process moving along.

And then from the temporary site getting it into a landfill and making sure that we are providing for ultimately, environmental and health protections become very critical.

We are working probably most of our time at this point dealing with the ongoing tragedies and needs related to disposing of debris, working to quickly identify the temporary sites, ensure that we are working with those local officials not just to make sure that all the bureaucratic I's are dotted and T's are crossed but in making sure that we are both safe, protective, and ensuring that we don't have issues that will prevent them from getting reimbursement from those recovery efforts because those communities have already been hard hit from the loss of their tax base, their houses, and their businesses. And so we work very diligently to ensure that moves quickly.

So we are continuing to have success there but we will continue to have those calls that come as judges and mayors realize that the removal process is too slow and we work and continue to provide resources to help them both from a technical standpoint

as well as, when we can, providing physical labor and the expertise on the ground.

Air monitoring -- we have heard some discussion from Mr. Coleman so I won't go into a lot of detail other than to point out that we have a plan in place, our -- I call it our common sense approach where we make sure that prior to a storm's landfall we take down equipment that is going to likely be damaged or destroyed in a hurricane and then very quickly bring it back up.

That takes some time, especially when, in many cases, we had to wait until we had power restored to an area to be able to get air monitors in place.

We relied very heavily on our federal partners to be able to do sampling as we had case by case needs as well as deploying monitors that we could bring in to assess plumes and other issues associated with potential emissions from facilities.

I will quickly wrap with drinking water, wastewater issues. As was mentioned, we had a couple thousand drinking water systems that were in the path of the storm. We still have two of those that are inoperable. They are small systems and arrangements have been made to allow for them to have water brought in so those residents are getting their needs served.

But we still have 24 systems that are under boil water notice, some of that because of damage to the system and some of that because, frankly, they're still adjusting to the source water changes associated with the storm.

951 Wastewater and sewage, we still have three of those systems 952 that are inoperable compared to the 40 at the height of the 953 So it does take a good bit of time. process. 954 I will close with talking about our hazmat, and we do work 955 cooperatively but we take the lead with regard to identifying 956 containers that may be washed away or moved away during the storm. 957 And to date, we've had about almost 1,200 of those containers 958 that have been located and properly disposed of as well as dealing 959 with the spills associated with the storm. 960 So you can see that there is a broad range of issues that 961 have to be addressed and working cooperatively allows us the best 962 chance of being most responsive to our citizens. 963 And with that, I will thank you for the opportunity to visit 964 with you about this issue. We do have many resources available 965 on our website and I am happy to provide those web links as needed. Those are very helpful both in informing the public as well as 966 967 elected officials about resources that are available to them. 968 I am happy to answer questions. Thank you, sir. 969 [The prepared statement of Mr. Shaw follows:] 970 971 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*INSERT 4\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

972 Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. 973 And before I start with the opening question, I want to 974 recognize Jenniffer Gonzalez, the resident commissioner from 975 Puerto Rico. 976 She's here at a good time to hear the opening statements but 977 also, as I go to my first round of questioning, the first one is 978 going to go to Mr. Lopez. 979 So I recognize myself for five minutes for questions. 980 Lopez, there have been a number of press reports about people who 981 are without clean drinking water, drinking from a well on a 982 Superfund site in Dorado, Puerto Rico. Can you explain the situation there and whether it has been 983 984 resolved? 985 Mr. Lopez. Certainly, Chairman, and thank you for that 986 question. So, again, of course, there was a lot of attention to early 987 988 concerns of the individuals drinking from the wells. 989 reports were incorrect. So, in essence, there has been some understandable confusion 990 991 with the way the infrastructure is designed and operable in that 992 area. 993 So wells in question are sealed. They are not accessible. 994 Water has been made accessible through spigots at those well sites 995 that are part of the super aquifer tied to process infrastructure. 996 When we first learned about the concern, our first response,

of course, was humanitarian and we brought bottled water and had Army Corps bring water buffaloes to the sites because the main concern was we want to protect human health and safety, take them away from sites where we had any question, and make sure people had potable water.

From there we engaged in immediate sampling and from the results of the sampling we found chlorine residual from those spigots. Certainly, wells are not prone to have chlorine in them inherently and so our initial deduction was that that was treated water.

We have gone forward to do additional sampling and are doing full spectrum analysis. Thus far, our results reaffirm and process also reaffirm that along with the Department of Health from Puerto Rico that that is part of process water supply. They are not from the contaminated wells.

Mr. Shimkus. Are there any other places on the island where this issue may be an issue?

Mr. Lopez. Not to our knowledge and, again, the concern -- and just to highlight, Chairman, the concern with the Superfund site -- and this is part of the challenges -- Superfund site doesn't mean that every water source within the designated area is in question.

What it means in this case with the Dorado site we identified a target area -- we, at EPA -- just to monitor. So where sites were known to have contamination those sites have been locked

1022 Other sites we continue to test -- I say we, the Puerto down. 1023 Rico Department of Health -- PRASA -- on a regular basis to make 1024 sure that those supplies remain potable and within Safe Drinking 1025 Water Act thresholds. 1026 Mr. Shimkus. Was the Puerto Rican water utility the entity 1027 distributing water at the Dorado site? 1028 Mr. Lopez. The Puerto Rico Well Authority -- PRASA -- was 1029 not literally distributing the water. The areas in question were 1030 fenced and signed. There are spigots there and the sites were 1031 entered into and PRASA was not knowingly willingly distributing. 1032 But we -- again, our main concern there was to make sure that 1033 the water was safe and that is why we brought temporary water until 1034 we could ascertain the status of the true supply. 1035 Mr. Shimkus. So in your written statement, Mr. Lopez, when 1036 you -- in your written testimony you note that 20 of the 115 1037 drinking water plants are out of -- out of service. 1038 what are you doing to remedy the situation about people not having 1039 access to potable water in Puerto Rico? 1040 Well, our challenge, of course, Chairman, is we Mr. Lopez. 1041 So we determine where there are deficiencies, whether assess. 1042 it be collapse of trunk sewers, whether power be out, and then 1043 we work with Army Corps, which is mission assigned to work with 1044 PRASA to make the repairs. 1045 So funding is provided through the Stafford Act to help make 1046 necessary improvements. We continue to help provide advisories

to make necessary repairs as quickly as possible. 1048 1049 Mr. Shimkus. Let me, in my last minute and a half, turn to 1050 Mr. Shaw, or Dr. Shaw. My sister-in-law move out of Houston right 1051 before the storm. 1052 But she has a lot of friends back there and she visited over 1053 the weekend and it raises the point about waste management that 1054 you were referring to. 1055 On her return she showed a picture of her friend's house. 1056 About two and a half to three feet of drywall had been ripped out. 1057 I mean, still, the house will be -- take a year probably or I don't 1058 know how long to get it. But so that -- so when we see storm 1059 damage, which we have in tornado season, you see the initial pile 1060 of refuse on the streets. But then over time you're going to see 1061 the refuse from being torn out. They're probably going to be in 1062 dumpsters and they're going to be hauled someplace. 1063 So the question is, is there sufficient land -- landfill 1064 capacity with this hurricane debris? 1065 The answer -- the short answer is yes. 1066 are right, part of that process is moving from the house to the 1067 Usually there is about three passes of removing from the 1068 curb as well. So it is sort of a cyclical process. 1069 We looked at it very closely and initially estimates were 1070 quite high what the debris might be. 1071 The issue is we have enough capacity in those landfills in

to the population and, again, we are working with our partners

1072 The real challenges have been twofold. One, does it the areas. 1073 reduce the length of life of that landfill, which is obvious. 1074 The second part of that is sometimes those landfills, because 1075 they build them out in cells, they may not have a cell that is 1076 built out ready to receive all that debris, and so in some cases they may have to exceed their permitted height and we have a 1077 1078 process whereby they can apply to make that happen on an emergency 1079 basis. 1080 What will happen is following the passing of the storm they 1081 will either have to come in and remove that extra cap or they will 1082 have to go through a permit amendment to get approval to leave 1083 that landfill at a height that was higher than was permitted and 1084 then they can build out another cell, if you will, and move that 1085 waste or at least begin taking new waste. 1086 Mr. Shimkus. I am way over my time and I thank you for the 1087 answer. 1088 The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Tonko, for 1089 five minutes. 1090 Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Tonko. 1091 Administrator Lopez, as I mentioned earlier, the committee 1092 has heard alarming reports of people without access to safe 1093 drinking water in Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin 1094 Islands, and I heard the exchange with the chair here just moments 1095 ago.

Let's get a little deeper into the drinking water and

1097 wastewater system issue. Many remain inoperable. Can you help 1098 us understand what are the sources of those problems of 1099 inoperation? 1100 Mr. Lopez. Much of the problem lies with damaged sewer --1101 excuse me, water mains. We have damaged distribution lines. 1102 Power is a considerable issue. 1103 We, again, are working on generators but those generators 1104 do not always remain operable. So access is an issue. We have 1105 had plants that, because of mudslides or rain, river action, we 1106 have had them -- access to them denied. 1107 So at this point, 85 percent of the PRASA system users have 1108 water and PRASA represents about 97 percent of all the water supply 1109 to the island. 1110 There are additional water supply sources -- non-PRASA 1111 systems, very small sources. There are very -- there are about 1112 237 independent water treatment systems throughout the mountains. 1113 We are working with mission assignment, with nongovernmental 1114 operations to do work there. In some of those cases we are, again, 1115 trying to get those systems back and running. But power, in some 1116 case physical damage, in some case access. We also have debris 1117 In some case, intakes are clogged with debris and that 1118 has been a challenge for some of our operators. 1119 Mr. Tonko. And just what percent or whatever expression we 1120 can get from you is concerning electricity failure?

Oh, my gosh, I have -- I have some detail.

Mr. Lopez.

1121

So

1122 I can go through -- I have -- I have a number. I will just run 1123 through -- I have a list. Arecibo alternate power unit out of 1124 Esperanza, alternate power service out of Muñiz. Wе 1125 have quite a few. Most of it is power units. 1126 We do have waterline pipes broken. We do have some cases 1127 of water supply -- raw water supply clogged. But much of it is 1128 power and, again, we are using generators and other means to try 1129 to activate those systems. Some systems were flooded and they 1130 had to be reassessed even before power could be fully restored. 1131 And you had mentioned the infrastructure 1132 failure. What about source water contamination as an issue? Is 1133 that --1134 Mr. Lopez. We are -- of course, we are very concerned about 1135 it and I used a phrase Ms. Colon would understand, agua es vida 1136 -- water is life. So whether it be water for drinking, water for bathing, water 1137 1138 for washing your clothes, water for any purpose, we are all very 1139 concerned. 1140 We have been -- in terms of the contamination of water our role has been, first, direct resources to restore water and 1141 1142 systems to be operable. That's the main goal. With individual homes and families we are working with the 1143 1144 CDC, Puerto Rico Department of Health, and others to provide advisories. So boiled water advisories are in effect, have been 1145 1146 in effect.

1147	We are also warning people to be to avoid using these
1148	supplies for potable purposes. We have worked with the CDC to
1149	provide alternate disinfection where possible chlorine tablets
1150	and other alternate disinfection. So we are taking
1151	Mr. Tonko. Oh, go ahead.
1152	Mr. Lopez. As broadly as we can we are trying to respond.
1153	But the challenge is we can't control individual human behavior
1154	and people need water. So our main goal is get water to them as
1155	quickly as we can potable.
1156	Mr. Tonko. Peter, you had mentioned PRASA and with those
1157	independent systems those beyond PRASA are they continuing
1158	to struggle to provide safe drinking water?
1159	Mr. Lopez. They are. We are working with them and, again,
1160	it is case by case. Just mind you that a number of the systems
1161	are mountainous and access to them continues to be an issue.
1162	So we are working on assignment to get to them. But at this
1163	point, we had we have assessed bear with me a second. Just
1164	going to pull up my notes here on non-PRASA. There are 237
1165	independent community systems and we have assessed them all. But
1166	getting them all operational is a challenge.
1167	Mr. Tonko. And of those 237, which are operating?
1168	Mr. Lopez. Let me bear with me just a second. About 170
1169	of the 237 are operational.
1170	Mr. Tonko. Okay. Thank you.
1171	And is EPA testing water quality at small water systems?

1172	Mr. Lopez. We do. Well, the Department of Health let
1173	me say this the Department of Health for Puerto Rico is the
1174	authority. So our sampling is really not something we do as a
1175	norm.
1176	We did sample in the Dorado case where there were concerns
1177	about drinking from contaminated wells and there we wanted to do
1178	rear guard action for the Puerto Rico Department of Health.
1179	But Puerto Rico Department of Health maintains primacy with
1180	those with those sites.
1181	Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
1182	Mr. Chair, I yield back.
1183	Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman yields back his time.
1184	Chair now recognizes the gentleman the chairman of the
1185	full committee, Mr. Walden, for five minutes.
1186	The Chairman. And I thank the chairman and I thank, again,
1187	our witnesses for your testimony on all these issues our citizens
1188	face.
1189	I know, Mr. Lopez, you've talked a lot about the drinking
1190	water and we know when the power goes off the pumps don't run and
1191	purification doesn't work unless you get generators and all that.
1192	But I would like to move beyond that and ask about the ability
1193	to clean up Superfund sites. How is that being impacted along
1194	the way here?
1195	Mr. Lopez. So, Chairman, the Superfund sites were assessed
1196	they have been assessed routinely. They were assessed before

1197	the storm events Irma. They were assessed after Irma. They
1198	have been assessed after Maria.
1199	And much of those sites really are groundwater
1200	contamination. So they were not really moved by the storm. The
1201	issue for the storm and where there was damage were in terms of
1202	fencing and also pump and treat systems, which required power.
1203	So in those cases, we worked to restore those functions.
1204	That's what we've been working to do and the in terms of damage
1205	
1206	The Chairman. How
1207	Mr. Lopez. I am sorry, sir.
1208	The Chairman. How far along are you on that the Superfund
1209	site protection?
1210	Mr. Lopez. To my to my knowledge, that is things are
1211	locked down.
1212	The Chairman. Okay.
1213	Mr. Lopez. So if we've seen additional concerns for
1214	example, we found an orphan container that was removed but we
1215	are to lock those sites down, Chairman.
1216	The Chairman. Mm-hmm. All right. Is that true for the
1217	other sites, too? I mean, are we talking about issues in Houston
1218	or Florida? Are there any Superfund issues we need to be aware
1219	of?
1220	Mr. Coleman. With regards to Texas, there were 34 federal
1221	Superfund sites in the state of Texas. We have done the

1222 assessment of all. There was one site that we listed, the San 1223 Jacinto Waste Pits site, that did require some additional 1224 follow-up. 1225 We have been working with the responsible parties. 1226 have plans in place to both do repairs to that site and then there 1227 is some additional repairs on the river side of the site where 1228 there was scouring that the PRPs are in the process of placing 1229 some additional rock to stabilize that portion of the site. That 1230 is ongoing. 1231 The Chairman. All right. 1232 Mr. Shaw. And I would just add there is -- I believe there 1233 are 17 state Superfund sites and at those we worked very closely with EPA on both the federal and the state and secured the sites. 1234 1235 All those sites we're finding there was a release potentially 1236 from one that was a sheen that we saw on water and that has been 1237 dealt with. So but no offsite concerns at this point. Everything is locked down. 1238 1239 So can you call give us assurance then that The Chairman. 1240 when it comes to the issue of Superfund sites we are not 1241 contamination into drinking water, that these sites are secured best they can be, that you've got this under control? 1242 1243 Mr. Shaw. Yes, sir. 1244 Mr. Coleman. Yes, sir. 1245 Mr. Glenn. Yes, sir. 1246 Mr. Lopez. Yes, sir.

1247 The Chairman. Perfect. That's good news. I think that 1248 had a lot of us worried, including, I am sure, all of you. 1249 know, that is the most dangerous things we face. 1250 Beyond that, you know, as we -- as we keep hearing about the 1251 power going on and going off in Puerto Rico and we knew they had 1252 a bad grid to begin with, what should we be worried about here? 1253 What can we do to help here on that issue of power and how 1254 much of this is really the responsibility of the grid owner and 1255 the power provider in Puerto Rico? 1256 Mr. Lopez. Well, Chairman, again, I think part of the 1257 challenge is, as I mentioned in the my testimony, the system itself 1258 is old. 1259 The Chairman. Right. 1260 Mr. Lopez. And we heard testimony from Army Corps with the 1261 infrastructure -- Transportation Infrastructure Committee 1262 suggesting that their average age of power plants are much younger 1263 than Puerto Rico's. 1264 So we are dealing with a system that was old and challenged 1265 to begin with and I think part of our goal is, one, how do we put 1266 power back on but the long-term and --1267 The Chairman. Keep it on. 1268 -- and for Señora Colon [Speaking foreign Mr. Lopez. 1269 language] -- my family has that name as well -- how do we make sure that it is sustainable and survivable for future events. 1270 So 1271 that is an open question.

1272 The Chairman. And from what you have seen on the ground, 1273 again, on Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands especially, are there 1274 -- are there enough crews? Are the various agencies 1275 communicating well with each other? 1276 Are there gaps in that communication we should be aware of? 1277 It is always hard in these situations, I know, but --1278 So, Chairman, we work under a command and control Mr. Lopez. 1279 function. We work with our incident commanders. There's very 1280 close communication with FEMA, Army Corps, our other partners. 1281 Our regions have been providing support where we signal. 1282 have been very thankful to my colleagues here for their staff 1283 support as well. 1284 I would say that the communications are strong. 1285 challenge is making sure that we can get the resources when we 1286 need them. 1287 The other challenge which we have been working at is also 1288 making sure that we are working with the local authorities and 1289 respecting their process -- their decision making capability, and 1290 that is -- that means in some cases we have to put things in front 1291 of them and give them time, recognizing -- and this is the 1292 challenge for those in the situation -- if you have been in a storm 1293 event and you are under constant duress, we are rotating crews 1294 in and out routinely --1295 The Chairman. They are there --1296 -- they are working under constant duress. Mr. Lopez. So 1297 part of our challenge is helping support their decision making 1298 and give them time and support they need so they can be at peace 1299 with mission objectives and corrective action. 1300 The Chairman. Okay. Did you have something you wanted to 1301 Okay. -- no? 1302 My time has expired. Mr. Chairman, thank you all for the 1303 great work you and your teams and the teams from all the agencies 1304 are doing the best they can in these circumstances and we 1305 appreciate that. 1306 But, again, we want to know if there is a problem that you need help on or they need help on, and I know that our resident 1307 1308 commissioner has been terrific at bringing us all up to speed and 1309 keeping us up to speed. 1310 So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 1311 Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman's time has expired. 1312 The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full 1313 committee, Mr. Pallone, for five minutes. 1314 Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1315 Five years ago, Superstorm Sandy caused major damage to my 1316 congressional district including Superfund sites and water 1317 treatment facilities and we have seen even more of that with the 1318 latest hurricanes. So I would like to focus briefly on the importance of 1319 investing and making our environmental infrastructure more 1320 1321 resilient.

1322 In the aftermath of Sandy, I saw the importance of this 1323 firsthand when the storm badly damaged the Bay Shore Regional 1324 Sewage Authority, which treats the wastewater from a number of 1325 the towns in my district, and the authority completed a \$28 million 1326 project to rebuild the plant and make it more resilient to future 1327 storms. 1328 But I don't think we should have to wait for disasters to 1329 make our infrastructure more resilient. So let me ask Mr. Lopez, 1330 what can EPA do to help communities in Puerto Rico and the Virgin 1331 Islands improve their drinking water and wastewater infrastructure to make it more resilient? 1332 1333 Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Lopez. So part of the challenge is, again, part of it is the time 1334 1335 we are in. Under the Stafford Act, we are in response. So this is an emergency. So it is my understanding that Stafford Act 1336 1337 funding means you build in kind -- you replace in kind. 1338 So the issue is, and this goes back to you as our partner 1339 and our colleagues here, where do we signal programmatic and 1340 funding flexibility to allow other sorts of investment. 1341 Now, just as an example, with the nongovernmental allies that 1342 we have had with the nonprocess sites, we have been able to put 1343 solar systems in a few isolated incidents. 1344 Mr. Pallone. All right. 1345 Well, let me ask you this. Do you think that we need to 1346 invest more federal dollars though in environmental

1347 infrastructure in general as part of this recovery or is it just 1348 your concern that we are not focusing on long term? 1349 So I am a little bit above my pay grade, 1350 Congressman, but bear with me. So I am going to speak from the 1351 heart. 1352 So, effectively, it is a function of targeting dollars --1353 making sure dollars are reachable and also ensuring that the broad 1354 purposes can be served. 1355 So, again, we have many various funding streams. It is not 1356 generally one funding stream, like my colleague, Mr. Cochran 1357 knows. 1358 Mr. Pallone. Okay. So to answer your question, I think part of our 1359 1360 challenge here would be to look at funding streams, look at 1361 resources, ensure that we have maximum flexibility in their use. 1362 Part of this --1363 Mr. Pallone. Okay. And particularly the emphasis on 1364 looking at long-term rather than just short-term to fix things. 1365 I am just rushing through because I wanted to 1366 ask a question about the Superfund, too. As you know, Hurricane 1367 Harvey damaged a lot of Superfund sites in Texas including one 1368 site where hazardous dioxins were exposed and I think we should 1369 be doing more to limit the impact of severe weather on Superfund 1370 sites. 1371 So let me ask Mr. Coleman. You only briefly mentioned

1372 But is it -- it is a priority, I think, for a lot of 1373 Do you agree that more resources for Superfund communities. 1374 cleanups would mean few contaminated sites vulnerable to extreme 1375 weather? Mr. Coleman. 1376 So the site in Texas that you mentioned -- the 1377 San Jacinto Waste Pits site, is a site that is under EPA oversight 1378 but there are accountable responsible parties who are both 1379 responsible for the day to day security of the site as well as 1380 1381 Mr. Pallone. But my question is do you agree that more 1382 resources for Superfund cleanup would mean fewer contaminated 1383 sites vulnerable to extreme weather? You can just say yes or no. 1384 I mean, I just want to know if you think money or resources would 1385 make a difference. 1386 Well, we are working with the funds that are 1387 appropriated to make sure that those sites that require federal 1388 funding are cleaned up as expeditiously as possible. 1389 Mr. Pallone. All right. All right. 1390 Let me go back to Mr. Lopez. We heard troubling reports out 1391 of Puerto Rico, citizens drawing drinking water from a well on 1392 an unsecured Superfund site. What more could EPA do to protect 1393 public health from exposures to toxic sites after severe weather 1394 strikes? 1395 So, Chairman, as I was mentioning to your 1396 colleagues, the contamination in the groundwater was really not

1397 affected by the storms, to our knowledge. 1398 The issue was making sure that the mitigation methods that 1399 were in place were functioning as intended -- fencing, pump and 1400 treat seat systems. 1401 The -- in Dorado, the wells in question were not accessible. 1402 Power supplies had been disabled. There was no ability to pull 1403 water from the wells. So the source of water, again, was from 1404 the -- from PRASA, from the public --1405 Mr. Pallone. Do you think that we could do more to protect 1406 -- could EPA do more to protect public health from exposure to 1407 toxic sites after severe weather strikes or, again, this is just 1408 simply fixing damage? I mean, the concern I have is, again, what you said -- that 1409 1410 maybe we are just simply fixing damaged fences, blocking access 1411 to these sites. I mean, this goes back maybe to what you were But just --1412 saying before. 1413 So at those sites the wells were not accessible Mr. Lopez. 1414 of for public access, again, the groundwater contamination was 1415 there before the storm and remains and that is something we 1416 continue to work on. 1417 So our challenge is to mitigate -- again, track any plumes, 1418 for example, in the Dorado site. We are tracking a plume so we 1419 test water supplies. We test -- vigilance is really the issue 1420 here.

We remain vigilant and we certainly understand the

1422 importance of making sure that we are staying within Safe Drinking 1423 Water Act standards, keeping people under those threshold with 1424 their water supply. 1425 Mr. Pallone. All right. 1426 Mr. Lopez. So monitoring, continue testing -- those are --1427 and then mitigation remain the tools available to us. 1428 Mr. Pallone. All right. Thanks a lot. 1429 Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman's time expired. 1430 The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the 1431 subcommittee, Mr. McKinley, for five minutes. 1432 Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again 1433 for having this hearing on this. Let me skip from Region 2, 4, and 6 and move to Region 3 out 1434 1435 of Philadelphia. There's an area that -- the flooding that had 1436 taken place the hurricanes had an impact not only in Texas and 1437 Florida and Louisiana, along the coast, but it had a demonstrative 1438 effect in north central West Virginia, in eastern Ohio, northern 1439 West Virginia, western Maryland, western Pennsylvania in the 1440 streams. 1441 The water that -- the amount of water that came down during 1442 that period of time we washed out -- our streams were full of 1443 debris, full of items that should have been dredged, and as a 1444 result we had water lines lost, exposed. 1445 We had septic systems that were destroyed. We had water 1446 pumping stations that went down because of this. So I am just

1447 curious -- and we had loss of life in north central West Virginia 1448 as a result of this. 1449 So it is not just happening with hurricanes in the coastal areas that we are talking about -- the ravaging that took place. 1450 1451 It has had an effect on the central part of this country as well. 1452 So my question, when they try to get the dredging of these 1453 streams so that they can mitigate the potential loss, often we 1454 are hearing from the region -- the EPA is they won't give permits. 1455 They go through an extended permitting period. Either that, 1456 or FEMA steps in the way or an environmental group steps in the 1457 way. 1458 So if we are going to mitigate the potential loss and the environmental impact, what would you suggest that we do in other 1459 1460 areas to clean up our streams if the EPA continues to stand in 1461 the way of dredging? Any one of you? 1462 Yes, sir, I can help with that and, again, Yes. 1463 it is funny how life brings you -- moves you forward. 1464 So with Irene and Lee in northern Appalachia -- again, we 1465 are just north of you. I had Southern Tier. 1466 Susquehanna River Valley. We had the Catskill region. 1467 To answer your question, part of our challenge is, is as we 1468 get into these streams we have to be very careful because any 1469 impact upstream can have an impact downstream. 1470 In my home community, the urgent response was to just dig 1471 into streams and we wound up channelizing our streams. Water

1472 began flowing faster and destabilizing the stream banks and 1473 emergency evacuation routes were compromised. 1474 Short story is as we get in, we are working with NRCS, others 1475 -- DEC and New York State -- to try to look at it from a watershed 1476 basis. 1477 Some of it means restoring flood plains. Some of it means 1478 restoring the natural flow of the streams. Getting in to clear 1479 debris can be an ongoing mission but we also have to recognize 1480 that we have to give room for streams almost like a living organism 1481 to get rid of energy and to have a place --1482 Mr. McKinley. I understand. 1483 Mr. Lopez. So --1484 Mr. McKinley. But the EPA and FEMA are standing in the way 1485 of permitting to do that. We have got to -- we had -- at 1486 Follansbee, West Virginia, they have had a -- their stream is eight 1487 feet of gravel and sand have built up in that so as a result of 1488 this they had no capability of absorbing the amount of water that 1489 came down and homes were washed out as a results of this. 1490 Mr. Lopez. So -- so --1491 Mr. McKinley. So I am saying --1492 Mr. Lopez. You know, Chairman, respectively, I have Region 1493 2 so I am your neighbor in New York, in particular, similar 1494 topography. 1495 I can only tell you that the partnership there has been with 1496 the state agent. DEC has been the agent in charge. EPA has

1497 worked --1498 Mr. McKinley. The state keeps blaming the federal 1499 What -- where are we supposed to get through this 1500 so that we can mitigate the potential loss? 1501 We can eliminate a lot of these damages and the environmental 1502 impact if we could clean our streams out. But they -- other people 1503 keep blaming Region 3. 1504 Is there something you can suggest? Is it happening in other areas that you're seeing a more successful relationship to dredge 1505 1506 these --1507 Congressman, if I may, what I'd like to do with Mr. Lopez. your permission is take your information back to our headquarters 1508 1509 1510 Mr. McKinley. Please. 1511 -- see if we could research this issue for you. The other has to do also when Rick 1512 Mr. McKinley. Please. 1513 Perry say said that hitting a Category 4 which had such devastating 1514 effect on the petrochemical industry and has been suggesting that 1515 we build a secondary facility in Appalachia with a ethane storage 1516 facility in the north central eastern Ohio and western 1517 Pennsylvania. As a result, maybe we wouldn't have such loss of 1518 product if we had something other. 1519 So I really appreciate the fact that the commissioner and 1520 Pruitt all are working together to try to find a secondary source 1521 on this -- a supply.

1522 I think it would eliminate some problem because we know that 1523 when that hit -- Hurricane Harvey hit, out of the 23 cracker 1524 facilities in the -- in the Houston area 17 went down. 1525 So as a result, it had that ripple effect all across the 1526 country that people couldn't get resident supplies and companies 1527 had to reduce their workforce as a result of it. 1528 So I am hoping that we can continue to learn from this problem 1529 that has occurred and how we can have a secondary source, and we 1530 are not going to have both environmental impact and economic 1531 impact. 1532 I yield back. 1533 Gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Shimkus. 1534 The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 1535 Peters, for five minutes. 1536 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the 1537 witnesses for being here. 1538 You know, I think -- I spend a lot of time when I see these awful disasters come they -- they, obviously, cause a lot of 1539 1540 dislocation and tragedy. 1541 They also cost us a ton of money at the federal government 1542 for cleanup, and I think a lot about what you might have learned 1543 as part of the cleanup that you might advise us to invest in ahead 1544 of time. 1545 So what are the things that maybe you've observed that you 1546 think, boy, if the federal government had invested in this

1547 beforehand we would have saved a lot of money in the long run. 1548 Anything in general that you gentleman saw? Maybe Dr. Shaw? 1549 Mr. Shaw. Yes. Thank you. 1550 Certainly, that is part of what we -- we have an ongoing 1551 process of trying to do the lessons learned and to that end we 1552 are in our second week of our after action review to learn the 1553 right lessons from this. 1554 Part of what I think addresses your question is the fact that 1555 we have -- the governor has put together a commission to rebuild 1556 Texas and part of what we are looking at there is identifying what 1557 are those resilience issues, opportunities, and needs both to build back infrastructure but also what do you do -- what is that 1558 1559 next step you would do if you had additional funds or funds --1560 Mr. Peters. Anything in particular in mind right now? 1561 There are things like several -- sometimes it is 1562 a reservoir -- excuse me, a retention systems. We have dykes and 1563 levy systems that have been proposed and often are waiting on 1564 funding. 1565 Mr. Peters. Okay. 1566 Mr. Shaw. And so there are projects that had been approved 1567 and are just waiting on funding that would help to mitigate some 1568 of those flood issues. 1569 So those sorts of things are obvious and so we are trying 1570 to put together a better holistic package of what it looks like 1571 statewide but especially in the Hurricane Harvey impacted area.

1572 Mr. Peters. That seems wise to me. 1573 Before I leave you, Dr. Shaw, have you had -- we have had 1574 a lot of -- we have had issues with massive sewer spills that have 1575 flowed and come from Tijuana up into San Diego, which I represent. I wanted to see if you've had any experience in dealing with 1576 1577 clean water and health issues with the CDC or FDA in connection 1578 with the issues you face in Texas. 1579 Not specifically. Mr. Shaw. 1580 Mr. Peters. How has that been? 1581 Mr. Shaw. Not specifically CDC and FDA. We partner, 1582 obviously, with EPA very closely on our -- on our water quality 1583 issues but I've not had experiences with CDC and FDA on those 1584 issues. 1585 Mr. Peters. Okay. Maybe, Mr. Lopez, if you had any general responses to that 1586 1587 question about Puerto Rico. I had a specific one, but any general 1588 thoughts about what resiliency the federal government might be 1589 involved in building in so that we don't face the quantity of 1590 destruction that we saw this time next the wastewater --1591 Thank you, Congressman. Mr. Lopez. 1592 And, again, we mentioned a little bit about flexibility with 1593 funding to ensure that as rebuild occurs or as we move forward, 1594 because recognize that once we leave the response mode we head 1595 into recovery and that is going to be a very long conversation. 1596 And for any of my colleagues here we know that that is not

1597 That may be years, and that may include additional just months. 1598 rebuilding, reinvestment, flexibility of funding. 1599 The other thing that I was discussing with my colleague -my deputy, Ms. McCabe -- is the issue of, in that case, having 1600 1601 resources available or prepositioned, having --1602 Mr. Peters. Right. 1603 -- because of -- because of their isolation Mr. Lopez. 1604 having resources prepositioned would be very helpful. 1605 Mr. Peters. Let me go back a step, because you are still 1606 -- I think you are still -- you are still framing the response 1607 issue. Let me just --1608 We are very raw there. Yes, sir. Mr. Lopez. 1609 -- give you an example of something that I just 1610 read about, which is Tesla restoring power to the Children's 1611 Hospital in Puerto Rico with a solar and storage project. 1612 Now, it seems to me, I know -- I think that Puerto Rico burns 1613 bunker fuel, which is a logistical issue. You've got to get that 1614 -- you got to get there and, obviously, it speaks to the age of 1615 the power plant. 1616 You have got -- I mean, I am sure you had a grid issues that 1617 are affected by the wind. But it does seem to me -- what I noticed 1618 in Puerto Rico was after the storms stopped, the sun was shining, 1619 and had there been distributed energy through solar -- smart solar investments, things like hospitals would be up online ahead of 1620 1621 time.

1622	I would certainly suggest that that is something we ought
1623	to be thinking about in these island places which are so isolated
1624	you can't just send a truck of bunker fuel out there.
1625	Had we invested in solar in some of these facilities,
1626	particular the around the critical infrastructure like
1627	hospitals the Children's Hospital ahead of time, I think,
1628	you know, a lot of these people wouldn't wouldn't have been
1629	affected in the same tragic ways.
1630	I guess maybe I will turn to Mr. Glenn and Mr. Coleman.
1631	Do you have any sort of lessons learned in terms of pre-disaster
1632	investments we might be considering right now so that next time
1633	this happens we won't be so on our heels?
1634	Mr. Glenn. Well, I am fairly new to the federal government.
1635	I have been here two months
1636	Mr. Peters. Welcome.
1637	Mr. Glenn and prior to that in the private sector.
1638	Thank you. I am enjoying it. Here is what
1639	Mr. Peters. I enjoy it sometimes.
1640	[Laughter.]
1641	Mr. Glenn. Here is what I walked in and observed literally
1642	day one on this was the communications interaction and
1643	relationships that we had with our peers at the state level and
1644	at the local level as well.
1645	So the one lesson I learned was we cannot do enough
1646	coordination with our state and local and tribal partners to make

1647	sure that we know what their systems are, we know who the people
1648	are and we train together and work together so that we can respond
1649	to this and that is the huge takeaway I had from this for the
1650	relative to the impacts in our region.
1651	Mr. Peters. Thank you.
1652	Mr. Coleman, my time is expired but maybe someone else will
1653	as you the question.
1654	Thank you. I yield back.
1655	Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman yields back his time.
1656	The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Houston, Texas,
1657	Mr. Olson, for five minutes.
1658	Mr. Olson. I thank the chair.
1659	I would like to start out with a point of personal privilege.
1660	Yesterday we found out that
1661	Mr. Shimkus. Not again.
1662	Mr. Olson found out that a fellow Texan this is good.
1663	Not good but sad. A fellow Texan, Gene Green, announced this will
1664	be his last term in Congress.
1665	He is a dear friend, a great Texan. We will miss you, but
1666	thank you for your service, my friend.
1667	Welcome to our four witnesses. A special Texas Aggie howdy
1668	to Chairman Shaw, and my question will be for you, Chairman Shaw
1669	and you, Mr. Coleman.
1670	First of all, could both of you talk about the sorts of
1671	hazards you saw in the Houston area and all of the area impacted

by Harvey after Harvey left?

I know, for example, we had some pretty foul water that threatened with bacterial infections and we had debris piles that were magnets -- as mentioned, snakes, rates, other animals.

In fact, a young girl who lives in Texas 22 in Sienna Plantation was out working in Wharton, was bit by a copperhead snake in a pile of wet soaked clothes. So my question is do we know anything about how to respond to these threats with Harvey or was it just a larger scale of what you know you have to deal with when a storm hits like Harvey did?

Mr. Shaw. Thank you, Congressman.

Certainly, with regard to this event, it is -- a lot of the issues you see are common to a flood event but uncommon from this nature of the magnitude and the breadth of the impacted area.

So with regard to flood waters, anytime we have floodwaters that are going to inundate wastewater treatment plants you are going to have bacterial contamination and that is why our response cooperatively with the EPA was to provide information about how to deal with contamination from flood water.

With regard to the debris, certainly the magnitude of the debris is a challenge and it is exacerbated because of the fact that you have waste haulers, for example, that may have contracts up and down the coast and when you have -- the impacted area is up and down the coast you don't have enough resources there potentially to respond in a timely manner and it is just, you know,

1697 30-plus million cubic yards of debris is an awful lot of debris 1698 to deal with. 1699 And I would just say that during a natural Mr. Coleman. 1700 disaster or any type of disaster there are many, many hazards. Our goal really is to inform the public very quickly of how they 1701 1702 can best protect themselves while they are also trying to restore 1703 and recover their own property. 1704 With regards to flood waters, we really advise people to 1705 minimize their exposure because the waters are contaminated and 1706 there are many hazards associated with that. You mentioned some of the other things. People have to 1707 1708 really wear protective equipment and be completely vigilant as 1709 they work on their individual property to restore that. 1710 that is very, very important and we work closely with our state and local partners to make sure that that information is put into 1711 1712 the hands of every individual so that they understand what they 1713 have to deal with. 1714 Mr. Olson. You mentioned the constant threats out there. 1715 For example, a first responder in Missouri City had a flesh-eating 1716 Somehow, it got into his -- he had a little small cut virus. 1717 probably from working through a debris field and got exposed to 1718 So thank you, thank you for getting ahead of the that virus. 1719 curve. And you guys mentioned, I think -- if I quote you correctly, 1720 1721 Mr. Coleman, you said the coordination between you and Dr. Shaw 1722 was, quote, "exceptional," and I think it was on the ground and 1723 that is what -- that is my opinion as well. 1724 But I have concern. You said you prepared for that with exercise after exercise with TCEQ. How do you do that with a storm 1725 1726 like Harvey, a big storm like that, and also how about with three 1727 storms? 1728 You have Irma and Marie hit at that same time. Can you 1729 coordinate with different regions as opposed to TCEQ? I mean, 1730 boy, that is a big challenge, isn't it? 1731 Mr. Coleman. Yes, sir. It is a big challenge. 1732 very closely. There is an annual hurricane exercise that the state organizes that involves EPA, the Corps of Engineers, other 1733 state agencies as well where we really go through the game planning 1734 1735 as to who does what making sure we have all of the proper contact information, everybody knows what their lane is, and what 1736 1737 capabilities that they bring to the table. 1738 So we participate in that. We also work on a daily basis 1739 to deal with much smaller incidents with the state so that our 1740 staff and their staff know each other well and they work seamlessly 1741 together to respond to these incidents. 1742 Mr. Olson. Dr. Shaw, you want to add something to that? 1743 Yes. I would -- I would say that we actually --

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in one of those exercises we had the foresight to mock up a response

Harvey was a 4, making landfall just north of Corpus Christi,

to a Category 3 hurricane making landfall in Corpus Christi.

1744

1745

1747 but it points out the fact and the way I usually characterize the 1748 importance of these exercises is we need to make sure that whenever 1749 we show up for the real thing we are not making introductions to 1750 our colleagues and counterparts in other agencies. 1751 We already know who they are. We know them by face and by 1752 name, and so those exercises are priceless so that we can hit the 1753 ground running, not having to make introductions to try to figure 1754 out a game plan. We already have the game plan. We've already practiced it. 1755 1756 We begin implementation. 1757 Mr. Olson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I noticed my time has 1758 expired and I will close by saying at 9:54 this morning all four 1759 witnesses confirm they are happy my Houston Astros won the World 1760 Series title. 1761 I yield back. 1762 Mr. Shimkus. I hadn't heard that before so thanks for 1763 letting us know that. 1764 The chair now recognizes Mr. Green for five minutes. 1765 Well, I am proud of the Astros, too. Mr. Green. 1766 to thank our panel for being here and thank the chair and the 1767 ranking member for holding the hearing today on Hurricanes Harvey, 1768 Irma, and Maria. 1769 I also want to thank our panelists -- for the panel, 1770 particularly Administrator Coleman and Dr. Shaw, and I know the 1771 partnership that you've had between our regional office of EPA 1772 and the state has been -- even when I was in the legislature years 1773 ago. 1774 And I want to thank the EPA for the decision last month after 1775 our new administrator viewed the site to remove the cancer-causing 1776 dioxins out of the San Jacinto Waste Pits, and that is both on the north side of Interstate 10 and the south side of Interstate 1777 1778 And it is an important issue in east Harris County. 10. 1779 I have represented it off and on over the years, first as 1780 a state senator and then in Congress and I shared it with Ted Poe. 1781 Now I share it with Congressman Brian Babin. 1782 So we need to fully remove the contaminated soil and accelerate it with the recovery -- discovery of the damage and 1783 1784 the temporary cap during Hurricane Harvey. 1785 Administrator Coleman, what is the time line for EPA to begin 1786 the removal of the contaminated material from the San Jacinto 1787 Waste Pits? 1788 Mr. Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Green, for that question. 1789 So, as you know, we've issued the recommended decision in 1790 We are working with both the Justice Department and the 1791 responsible parties on this special notice and negotiating a 1792 consent decree that will facilitate the specific design and then 1793 removal. Specifically, we expect the negotiations to take six to 12 1794 1795 months in working with the responsible parties. The design 1796 activities can take as long as another six to 12 months and then the work will start.

So I can't give you a specific time frame because those negotiations are complex and do involve a number of issues that we have to work through with them.

So but that is generally what we expect to see.

Mr. Green. Okay. Well, I would hope you would provide information and EPA has been doing it to the constituents out there for, like I said, mostly Congressman Babin now. But I sure have a lot of people who go out and crab and fish right near those sites and I would -- we'd like to make sure they're not, well, consuming that but also to make it much more safer.

And so the process will take almost a year, and I understand the difference because the temporary cap is about a \$20 billion and then the permanent cap or the permanent removal is anywhere -- the latest estimate, I think, from EPA was almost \$120 billion.

Mr. Coleman. That is correct -- \$115 million to \$120 million.

Mr. Green. And so I expect the responsible parties have the option of going to the courthouse and making that decision. But I understood the original report from the regional office to the national office was really strong opinion on what needed to be done.

Our district also includes -- and this is in our district and has been forever, it seems like -- the U.S. oil recovery in Pasadena, Texas, it is actually on a -- near a bayou in Texas.

1822 Pete's gone but it is Vince Bayou coming through Pasadena and into 1823 the Houston ship channel or Buffalo Bayou. And many members of 1824 the public and local media voiced concern about that toxic 1825 material mitigating into the Vince Bayou. 1826 Was there any information from that site that it -- did any 1827 of that site bleed into the -- into Vince Bayou and ultimately 1828 Buffalo Bayou and the Houston ship channel? 1829 Mr. Coleman. Again, thank you for that question. 1830 As you know, the U.S. oil site consists of two nearly adjacent 1831 locations but they are separated by a road and they are different 1832 in elevation. 1833 So the former city of Pasadena wastewater treatment plant 1834 was flooded and because of the nature of what they did there, which 1835 was treat wastewater, we do recognize that there were probably 1836 some releases of things that were at that site. But we also know 1837 that they never stored hazardous waste or recycled oil on that 1838 portion of the site. 1839 The second portion of the site, which is located at a higher 1840 elevation, where they did process oils to recover, that site 1841 actually did not flood. 1842 It did, of course, sustain over 50 inches of rainfall. So 1843 some of the buildings which are in somewhat disrepair there was 1844 rainfall that entered the buildings. There was some -- we would call it storm water runoff that 1845 1846 occurred and we did assess Vince's Bayou. We looked very closely

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1847	at the receding waters and collected samples. We did not see that
1848	anything significant left that upper portion where the waste oil
1849	was processed.
1850	So we feel confident that Vince Bayou only received some
1851	runoff from that lower area that was the former Pasadena
1852	wastewater treatment plant.
1853	Mr. Green. Okay. Is there a viable
1854	Mr. Shimkus. Quickly, please.
1855	Mr. Green or responsible party for the U.S. oil site?
1856	Mr. Coleman. Yes, sir. We are working with the responsible
1857	parties. They say a group of investors who are actually working
1858	to both maintain stabilization of the site as well as working with
1859	us on a more thorough investigation and, ultimately, a cleanup
1860	of that site.
1861	Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1862	Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman's time has expired.
1863	The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
1864	Johnson, for five minutes.
1865	Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank
1866	you for joining us today.
1867	Mr. Lopez, prior to the hurricanes hitting Puerto Rico this
1868	season, most people would have characterized the municipal solid
1869	waste landfills as a mess even on a good day, with 19 of the 29
1870	landfills operating out of compliance with federal law.

So what's the status of the landfills in the -- in the wake

1872	of the hurricanes today?
1873	Mr. Lopez. So the landfill status, of course, as you
1874	mentioned, we had challenges and continue to be challenges on the
1875	island.
1876	Debris management, which is really the response, is a
1877	complicated undertaking. So there is pressure, of course, to put
1878	more material into the landfills.
1879	But what we are attempting to do, working with Army Corps
1880	and our partners, is to separate the waste streams and dispose
1881	of them in a fashion that relieves pressure on the landfills.
1882	So whether it be vegetative debris or hazardous medical waste
1883	any number of elements that could wind up in a landfill we
1884	are working aggressively to separate out and dispose of, working
1885	with the authorities in a proper fashion.
1886	Mr. Johnson. So are they still a mess?
1887	Mr. Lopez. So a landfill situation that existed prior to
1888	the hurricane remains
1889	Mr. Johnson. No. No. What are what's the status today?
1890	Mr. Lopez. So the landfills continue to operate as they did
1891	before. There has been no change in that.
1892	Our challenge incident challenge is handling the debris,
1893	keeping the landfills functioning but also handling the debris
1894	which could accumulate in the landfills if not properly
1895	intercepted.
1896	Mr. Johnson. Do you do you think that Puerto Rico should

1897 keep its delegation authority under Subtitle D? 1898 Ultimately, the -- and, again, we -- this will Mr. Lopez. 1899 be a longer-term conversation, Congressman. So our challenge 1900 will be to help support the local authorities. I feel that that 1901 is the appropriate thing to do. 1902 We want to support them, give them capability, help provide 1903 resources where we can and also address other ways other than 1904 landfilling to address their solid waste. 1905 But recognize that that is not EPA's function as a -- as a 1906 role. We don't usually do solid waste management. We defer to 1907 the local government authorities for the actual management of 1908 solid waste. Is it -- is it fair to say that current debris 1909 Mr. Johnson. 1910 removal since the hurricanes -- current debris removal is going 1911 to further overload the already filled capacity in those 1912 landfills? 1913 We are working to intercept it. There is a Mr. Lopez. 1914 danger -- there is always a possibility. But we are working very 1915 aggressively and thoughtfully with the leadership to identify 1916 waste streams and properly provide siting to separate them out 1917 and mitigate them appropriately. So there is always a potential 1918 but we are working to minimize the impact. 1919 Mr. Johnson. Okay. 1920 Mr. Coleman, in your testimony you write that while each 1921 response has its own unique challenges, we remain flexible to

address individual needs.

So as you indicated, things like geographical constraints, economic conditions, damage extent, and infrastructure vulnerabilities are all factors that shape federal agency response when a natural disaster strikes.

In other words, how we respond to Houston's challenges is clearly different than those of Puerto Rico's challenges. So how does the EPA currently ensure response efforts take these challenges and regional characteristics into consideration?

Mr. Coleman. So we work -- we have a national cadre of responders that work very closely together on training and that forms the baseline of how we respond.

As I mentioned, we have a set of technical assets -- the ASPECT, TAGA, PHILIS -- that also provide that specialized equipment. But then we work very closely with our state partners in each location as well as those other state agencies that we work with with our FEMA regional offices, with things called regional response teams that then do additional specialized training and facilitation as it relates to the specific incidents that may occur in different geographic areas.

So those multiple layers of training exercises, having the right equipment, allows us to then be adaptable and flexible in responding to all types of different disasters and events.

Mr. Johnson. Okay. Is there room for improvement?

Mr. Coleman. I believe that there's always room for

1947 improvement and, as Chairman Shaw indicated, the state does a 1948 after-action report. We do -- we are doing a similar exercise. 1949 We participate with the state side. 1950 But we also have them participate and critique our work so 1951 that we can make improvements and we do that after each event and 1952 we memorialize those lessons learned so that as we incorporate 1953 that into our training going forward we are able to make those 1954 improvements. 1955 Mr. Johnson. Okay. All right. 1956 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 1957 Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman's time has expired. 1958 The chair now recognizes Dr. Ruiz from California for five 1959 minutes. 1960 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ruiz. 1961 I want to throw out a compliment to my colleague from Ohio 1962 who just asked those questions. Those are very good questions, 1963 very insightful. Thank you for asking those questions. 1964 I want to continue on that line in terms of coordination and 1965 some local flexibility problems that I saw when I went to Puerto 1966 Rico myself that was an unscripted visit. 1967 I went on my own accord and I visited a lot of locations 1968 impromptu so I can get the real story and not the script that folks 1969 would like to give you, and I had great assistance when I was on 1970 the ground as well. 1971 And by way of background, I am an emergency medicine

1972	physician trained in public health and also trained in
1973	humanitarian disaster response from the Harvard Humanitarian
1974	Initiative and other locations.
1975	We talked about coordination. Let me just ask an open-ended
1976	question. Mr. Lopez, who is running the show in Puerto Rico? Who
1977	is who is really in charge?
1978	Mr. Lopez. So, understandably, we are under a command and
1979	control structure, as we mentioned. Again, FEMA makes the
1980	mission assignments.
1981	Mr. Ruiz. Okay.
1982	Mr. Lopez. So mission assignments are handed out by FEMA.
1983	Mr. Ruiz. So you would say FEMA is in charge?
1984	Mr. Lopez. Through our command and control structure.
1985	Mr. Ruiz. Yes.
1986	Mr. Lopez. That that is again, as we interact we take
1987	mission assignments from FEMA
1988	Mr. Ruiz. Okay.
1989	Mr. Lopez and we work with our headquarters in our
1990	regional offices for support.
1991	Mr. Ruiz. Okay. And how are you coordinated? Where
1992	like, how does that information get down to the EPA folks that
1993	are in the field?
1994	Mr. Lopez. So we have a command and control structure and
1995	in our region we have an incident coordinator.
1996	Mr. Ruiz. Yes, and where is that incident coordinator

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2021	All the different agencies are working in silos. They
2020	of San Juan. Very top-down heavy information is being sent out.
2019	We are using a spoke and hub model that is basically run out
2018	I didn't see that in Puerto Rico.
2017	about, and everybody in a very flexible rapid response group and
2016	in all the all the local players, as Mr. Coleman was talking
2015	leadership, in roles and responsibilities, and having to bring
2014	when I was there the number-one thing you need is clarity in
2013	Mr. Ruiz. Okay. So, you know, the point I am making is that
2012	some staff
2011	Mr. Lopez. So we have staff embedded there. We also have
2010	Mr. Ruiz. Okay.
2009	Mr. Lopez. San Juan.
2008	Mr. Ruiz. And where else are they embedded? In San Juan?
2007	Mr. Lopez. And also out of San Juan.
2006	Mr. Ruiz. Guaynabo.
2005	Mr. Lopez. Guaynabo.
2004	Mr. Ruiz. Where were exactly are they embedded?
2003	island. So
2002	is critical for Puerto Rico we also have staff embedded on the
2001	Mr. Lopez we also have staff and this is this
2000	Mr. Ruiz. In New Jersey.
1999	
1998	Mr. Lopez. He is in Edison, New Jersey. We also have staff
1997	located?

86 2022 weren't even communicating with each other. So there is things 2023 like you mentioned, obstacles in being able to reach certain 2024 geographic locations. 2025 I worked with the 82nd Airborne closely in Port-au-Prince Those -- those men and women can move 2026 right after Haiti. 2027 mountains to get supplies anywhere in the world and I didn't see 2028 that kind of coordination on the ground to get those supplies, 2029 to get the people where they needed to go.

So here is what I am proposing, and I am speaking to every else, is, you know, the challenges of Puerto Rico are very different than the challenges in Houston and Florida.

You don't have a large concentration of population with an infrastructure that is intact -- electricity and communication. You still have the majority of people without power. You still have the majority of people who have difficulty finding that clean water. And you say some of the -- some of the water systems are operational.

What does that mean, operational? Because I have been into some hospitals they say are operational but that is only one floor of the five floors of the hospital, but yet people want to tout them as operational.

So what we need to talk about is capacity and what is the capacity of the infrastructure to reach how many people.

Oftentimes, gentlemen, we get -- we get the reports of how many people on the ground, how many water bottles, how many systems.

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2047 But that is not the way that you manage or that you count 2048 accountability in a disaster response. We have to talk about 2049 So what is the capacity of the different agencies and 2050 the different infrastructure systems to provide the much-needed 2051 services? 2052 And you are right, Mr. Lopez. Agua es vida -- water is life 2053 and so tell me, is there a water task force in Puerto Rico with 2054 different stakeholders and where is that water task force -- how 2055 is that water task force managed and who are the stakeholders in 2056 that task force? 2057 Mr. Lopez. So it is a small group. So we have, again, FEMA. 2058 We have mission assignment. Our offices -- we work with the EQB 2059 -- environmental quality -- and with the state health -- excuse 2060 me, the territory health department. 2061 So those are the principal actors. 2062 Mr. Ruiz. Okay. 2063 And just, Congressman, if I may, we are on track Mr. Lopez. 2064 on a regular basis. We do regular meetings with the island --2065 conference calls and interdiction of --2066 My proposal is to have field command Mr. Ruiz. Great. 2067 posts with all the different stakeholders to address local issues 2068 with local mayors and NGOs and the Puerto Rican government, the 2069 federal government, and other agencies working together -- pretty 2070 much what Mr. Coleman talked about that is occurring in other 2071 locations but have that in Puerto Rico more in the field so that

2072	you can have better decision making, coordination, and
2073	responding.
2074	Your role is to test and monitor and to track changes. But
2075	then that needs to get translated to actual implementation in a
2076	much more rapid way so that goods and repairs can be made in a
2077	transparent and prioritized way on the ground.
2078	And so that is my time is up so that is my that is
2079	my recommendation, given my experience and I think that we need
2080	to move forward in trying to implement some of those.
2081	Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Dr. Ruiz. I agree.
2082	We had a very similar hearing like this on the Energy
2083	Subcommittee and the question I asked, well, who's in charge.
2084	Mr. Ruiz. Yes, and
2085	Mr. Shimkus. I would have loved for
2086	Mr. Ruiz and right now we heard FEMA but then when I
2087	was on the ground FEMA said Puerto Rico
2088	Mr. Shimkus. I I
2089	Mr. Ruiz and Puerto Rico says FEMA.
2090	Mr. Shimkus. I don't disagree and I I wish that the
2091	administration would have just parachuted 82nd there
2092	Mr. Ruiz. I would have loved to have seen that.
2093	Absolutely.
2094	Mr. Shimkus to some of the very small villages and I
2095	think we all would have been better best served. Then we could
2096	have worried about who is responsible later. But you need to get

2097 service there immediately. 2098 Mr. Lopez. Chairman, if I -- just briefly, too. And not 2099 last but not least, there is a joint field operations center there 2100 and we do have EPA incident commanders and we have branch leaders 2101 in Puerto Rico. 2102 So there is an incident command center there. Those other 2103 agencies are embedded but --2104 See, when you say that, though, Puerto Rico is Mr. Ruiz. 2105 big, you know, and you leave us with the impression that it is 2106 somewhere. 2107 But where exactly, and are they in the different 2108 municipalities and do we have the right people working in a group 2109 out in the field in those different municipalities, because when 2110 I was there they didn't exist. 2111 FEMA told me they didn't have field command posts. DMAT did 2112 not have field command posts. I spoke to different agencies that 2113 did not -- they said that this would be a good idea and something 2114 that they would be very willing to work with and actually I am 2115 meeting with HHS later today to address this concept. 2116 Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. Thank you very much. Great. 2117 The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 2118 Flores, for five minutes. Speaking of HHS, that is going to be my 2119 Mr. Flores. question. 2120 2121 I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for the --

2122 for holding this hearing. I want to thank the panel for joining 2123 us today. 2124 Under Emergency Support Function Number 8, the Department 2125 of Health and Human Services, or HHS as it is commonly called 2126 around here, is the primary agency for ESF Number 8 and includes 2127 support for potable drinking water, solid waste disposal, and 2128 other environmental issues related to public health. 2129 I have got a question -- this question for Mr. Lopez and Mr. 2130 Coleman, starting with Mr. Coleman. Number one, have you worked with HHS to carry out this function regarding providing potable 2131 2132 water and also solid waste and debris removal in communities 2133 affected by hurricane damage this season. 2134 Mr. Coleman. Yes, sir. We do work with HHS. 2135 2136

As specific to Hurricane Harvey, as the state and FEMA determined the specific federal assistance that is necessary. In this particular response, that role of HHS was somewhat limited because of, A, the state capacity was quite extensive and we had done a lot of coordination work with them, but embedded with my staff I have three members from the Centers for Disease Control and they coordinate and have reach back capability to both the CDC headquarters and HHS in general as any issue comes up and we are able to quickly address those and provide the support as requested by the state.

Mr. Flores. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Coleman.

Mr. Lopez, do you have anything to add regarding

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2147 Mr. Lopez. The only thing I would say, again, is that HHS 2148 is part of the unified command structure so that they are immersed 2149 in that conversation. 2150 Our local engagement has been with the Puerto Rico Department 2151 So, ultimately, we do have the representation of of Health. 2152 health interests. 2153 Mr. Flores. Okay. 2154 Mr. Glenn, do you have anything to add? 2155 Mr. Glenn. No, sir. It's part of that structure and we have 2156 been working with them. 2157 Mr. Flores. Okay. 2158 Mr. Shaw, you gave us a breakdown of TCEQ's costs for dealing 2159 with the hurricane response and you indicated that the funds to 2160 reimburse you would be coming from FEMA. Has FEMA been a good 2161 partner in working with the state of Texas and dealing with the 2162 response and recovery efforts? 2163 Mr. Shaw. Yes, and there is sort of various aspects of how 2164 We have, in the initial public assistance that operates. 2165 reimbursement from FEMA, about \$700,000 anticipated for that cost 2166 and that is the initial travel and what have you, working with 2167 the initial response. We also have a \$15 million authorization from FEMA for us 2168 2169 to work with EPA in dealing with the field operations, which includes a lot of our command and control -- our assessment and 2170 2171 location of containers displaced and what have you in the field operations.

So \$700,000 for the initial component and \$15 million to work with EPA on those field operations.

Mr. Flores. Okay. What can be improved upon in terms of that process? It sounds to me like it has worked pretty smoothly. Do you have any suggestions for improvement?

Mr. Shaw. It is working well. Communications is the primary issue and we have a lot of lessons learned. So yes, I think we will learn more but I think the key thing is to point out one of the issues, for example, are lessons learned. We work very closely with EPA. In this event, we were able to very quickly deal with things such as fuel waivers that took weeks in past events and took hours in this event and that allowed us to focus on those critical issues, making sure we got water, wastewater, and immediate harm issues addressed quickly.

Mr. Flores. Okay. In this process, have you come across anything where Congress can help in terms of making statutory improvements to the Stafford Act or any other related federal statutes to deal with catastrophes like this?

Mr. Shaw. There are -- there is room for improvement and the challenges, quite frankly, Congressman, are going to be those tradeoffs because, you know, as you look at -- and this is sort of outside of my lane -- but one example is dealing with the repairs on the recovery side of that to homes, for example, and I think there's opportunities to be able to get that done much more quickly

2197 and to do permanent repairs as opposed to something that is 2198 temporary. 2199 The reason that I am interested in that is because getting 2200 those folks back into their homes has such a huge health and 2201 environmental impact because the longer it takes to get those 2202 homes repaired the longer you have those health issues associated 2203 with debris with people that are outside or displaced from their 2204 housing and then the economics associated with all those. 2205 So there are room for improvement. A lot of those have to 2206 do with making sure that Congress is making the types of decisions 2207 about how to improve the efficiency of getting those repairs done 2208 as well as making sure that they're ensuring that those funds are 2209 expended properly and you avoid -- there is going to be foul play 2210 involved and that becomes a huge issue as how much you balance, 2211 making sure you get the funds out there but you minimize the money 2212 that is fraudulently spent. 2213 Mr. Flores. Okay. 2214 Thank you for your responses. Again, I thank the panel for 2215 joining us. I yield back the balance of my time. 2216 Mr. Shimkus. Gentleman yields back. 2217 The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Colorado, Ms. 2218 DeGette, for five minutes. 2219 Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks 2220 to the witnesses for coming.

Mr. Glenn, before Hurricane Irma, you and the other leaders

2222	in Region 4 increased staffing of the Regional Emergency
2223	Operations Center, the deployed on-scene coordinators to the
2224	state emergency operations center, and you provided a Region 4
2225	liaison to the FEMA Regional Coordination Center. Is that right?
2226	Mr. Glenn. Yes, ma'am.
2227	Ms. DeGette. And do you can you estimate how many senior
2228	leaders were deployed prior to the hurricane's landfall?
2229	Mr. Glenn. Prior to the landfall, as far as our executive
2230	leadership I, myself, went down and we had two other senior leaders
2231	that worked directly for me went to south Florida, and then some
2232	individuals from headquarters were also down in Florida.
2233	Ms. DeGette. Okay. Were you the most senior person down
2234	there before landfall or was there someone more senior to you?
2235	Mr. Glenn. Prior to landfall, I was the most senior person
2236	in the Region 4 down there.
2237	Ms. DeGette. Okay. And, you know, it is like Mr. Coleman
2238	was saying, there was a lot of coordination with the state and
2239	local officials down there. Is that right?
2240	Mr. Glenn. Absolutely. Yes, ma'am.
2241	Ms. DeGette. So, Mr. Lopez, I want to I know you didn't
2242	arrive on the scene until September 28th but I want to ask you
2243	the same question, if you know.
2244	Before Hurricane Irma hit Puerto Rico, did the leaders in
2245	Region 2 increase staffing in the Regional Emergency Operations
2246	Center?

2247	Mr. Lopez. So, again, I started actually on October 11th.
2248	Ms. DeGette. Oh, okay.
2249	Mr. Lopez. But
2250	Ms. DeGette. So do you do you know what kind of staffing
2251	was increased?
2252	Mr. Lopez. I would have to I would have to get back with
2253	you for detail.
2254	Ms. DeGette. Okay.
2255	Mr. Lopez. I have some assessments but I don't want to be
2256	inappropriate with a response. So I'd be happy to respond.
2257	Ms. DeGette. Okay. And so the questions you'll probably
2258	need to get back to me on the staffing, the onsite coordinators,
2259	and who the senior leaders were who were there prior to landfall.
2260	The anecdotal evidence that we have is that whereas in Region
2261	4 they were all there before it hit, in Region 2 what happened
2262	was they were all rushed aside from the people who were already
2263	embedded there that you testified about before that we were
2264	already behind the curve because we had to send a lot of people
2265	in. So if you can get me that information that would be really
2266	helpful.
2267	And I want to ask you again to continue, Mr. Glenn, now,
2268	on September 12th there were 12 field hazard assessment teams
2269	conducting facility assessment support at chemical and oil
2270	storage facilities. Is that right?
2271	Mr. Glenn. Yes, ma'am.

2272	Ms. DeGette. Now, Mr. Lopez, do you know how many field
2273	assessment field hazard assessment teams were operating in
2274	Puerto and the U.S. Virgin Islands two days after Irma made
2275	landfall?
2276	Mr. Glenn. I can't tell you the number of teams but I can
2277	tell you that teams were on the ground so
2278	Ms. DeGette. You don't can you get me that answer,
2279	please, of the number?
2280	Mr. Lopez. I can get you the number, of course.
2281	Ms. DeGette. And how about Maria? Same thing?
2282	Mr. Lopez. I will have to get you the same thing. Again,
2283	the sites
2284	Ms. DeGette. Okay.
2285	Mr. Lopez as I mentioned in my testimony, were assessed
2286	prior and afterwards. So there have been assessments ongoing.
2287	But I can't tell you the number.
2288	Ms. DeGette. Right.
2289	But, again, you know, in Region 4 they had 12 teams on the
2290	ground two days after. So what I want to know, and as several
2291	of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have said, is Puerto
2292	Rico is a lot larger physically and more complex because of
2293	transportation needs and other issues.
2294	So I am just wondering two days after landfall in Puerto Rico
2295	and the U.S. Virgin Islands how many teams did we have and what
2296	were they doing.

2297	Now, Mr. Lopez, I bet you can't answer this either.
2298	Mr. Lopez. I will do my best, ma'am.
2299	Ms. DeGette. Do you know how many teams did Region 2 have
2300	in making boots on the ground assessments of Superfund sites two
2301	days afterwards after Irma?
2302	Mr. Lopez. As I mentioned, the
2303	Ms. DeGette. If you can get me that information, too.
2304	Mr. Lopez. We will get you the specific numbers.
2305	Ms. DeGette. Sure.
2306	Mr. Lopez. But just to be clear, Congresswoman, there was
2307	a presence
2308	Ms. DeGette. Uh-huh.
2309	Mr. Lopez and folks were on the ground assessing before
2310	and after.
2311	Ms. DeGette. I am certainly not trying to imply there was
2312	no presence.
2313	Mr. Lopez. I understand. I just don't have the correct
2314	number.
2315	Ms. DeGette. But like Mr. Glenn correct me if I am wrong
2316	Region 4 had six teams on the ground on September 12th that
2317	were making boots on the ground assessment of Superfund sites.
2318	Is that right, Mr. Glenn?
2319	Mr. Glenn. Yes, ma'am.
2320	Ms. DeGette. So that is what I am wondering, Mr. Lopez, and,
2321	frankly, I am a little concerned that you don't know. I realize

2322	you didn't come in until October. But we need to know how robust
2323	and how quick the response was and the very fact that we are having
2324	this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and they can't answer any of these
2325	questions for Region 2 Region 4 has it Johnny-on-the-spot
2326	just goes to the concern that we are all that we are all
2327	expressing today and if I can get your answers maybe
2328	Mr. Lopez. Sure.
2329	Ms. DeGette maybe my concerns will be alleviated. But
2330	I fear that they will not.
2331	Thank you. I yield back.
2332	Mr. Shimkus. The gentlelady yields back her time and I thank
2333	her for those questions. It just goes to my point of a standard
2334	operating procedure and why are regions different when there is
2335	a disaster heading in a certain area.
2336	Ms. DeGette. Why is it one thing in one region and another
2337	thing in another region?
2338	Mr. Shimkus. Right. So thank you very much.
2339	The chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
2340	Hudson, for five minutes.
2341	Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
2342	the witnesses for being here today.
2343	Mr. Glenn, I particularly want to say welcome to you.
2344	Obviously, Region 4 includes my home state of North Carolina. I
2345	look forward to getting to know you better and working with you
2346	in the future.

2347 While the damage in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 2348 is significant, Region 4, including Florida, sustained 2349 substantial damage from Hurricane Irma on the heels of rebuilding after the 2016 hurricane season. 2350 2351 There were several reports after Hurricane Irma of issues 2352 with drinking water systems and several communities under boiled 2353 water advisories. 2354 What is the status, Mr. Glenn, of drinking water systems in 2355 Are there still people without access to safe drinking 2356 water? The information I have is that all drinking water 2357 Mr. Glenn. 2358 systems are operational in Region 4. We are not aware of any 2359 people served by a system that are without access to potable 2360 drinking water. 2361 What about right after the storm? Mr. Hudson. Great. How 2362 did the drinking systems fare during the hurricane? 2363 Mr. Glenn. Well, as you know, any time a storm like this 2364 comes through it has impacts. It has immediate impacts, and so 2365 almost every municipality that was in the path of the storm did 2366 experience some type of impact at varying levels. 2367 The impact you've heard today -- physical damage, power 2368 outages, personnel, chemical supply interruptions, and the like 2369 -- so almost every system was impacted and --2370 Mr. Hudson. In terms of water systems -- drinking systems? 2371 Yes, sir. Drinking systems. Mr. Glenn. Correct.

2372 Well, just on your assessment, are there any 2373 improvements to the drinking water systems that we could look at 2374 to help in future situations like this? 2375 Well, as you know, we operate under the 2376 permission authority of the Stafford Act and we will continue to 2377 do so and fulfill whatever authorizations are provided for in that 2378 act. 2379 Mr. Hudson. Got you. For everybody, the whole panel, in June 2016 the National 2380 2381 Infrastructure Advisory Councils recommended FEMA consolidate 2382 federal emergency response roles and responsibilities for water 2383 into a single ESF within the annex of the national response 2384 framework to improve coordination and reduce confusion and 2385 improve the information sharing and communication. 2386 The 2016 recommendation repeats an NAIC recommendation from 2009 that declared DHS should elevate water services to its own 2387 2388 ESF within the NRF to achieve higher prioritization of water 2389 systems during emergency response that opens up to at least 2390 everyone from FEMA. 2391 And Dr. Shaw, you're welcome to join in too, but do you 2392 believe making this change is a wise move? I would just ask the 2393 FEMA regional folks to chime in. 2394 So with regards to that recommendation, we Mr. Coleman. 2395 think that and my personal experience is that water infrastructure 2396 is extraordinarily important. It essentially sets the basis for

2397 when people can repopulate an area. 2398 So, you know, I think it is very important. I don't have 2399 a specific opinion on if it should be its own emergency support 2400 function but I think that working very closely with the state 2401 governor's office, et cetera, to make sure that in a response you 2402 restore service as soon as possible is the most important thing. 2403 Mr. Hudson. So you don't -- you don't want to say whether 2404 making its own ESF would help with that coordination? 2405 Mr. Coleman. I actually -- from my personal experience the 2406 coordination with the governor's office and the local officials 2407 is the most important coordination that needs to take place and 2408 when that takes place you're able to actually get the right 2409 equipment, infrastructure, or support to bring those systems back 2410 online. 2411 Mr. Hudson. Got you. 2412 Dr. Shaw, I see you are chomping at the bit. 2413 Mr. Shaw. And I am going to be supporting what Mr. Coleman 2414 said as well and that is that I think the key point is in my state 2415 it may be difficult for me to assess whether that -- what that 2416 need would change because we have such a focus on water and 2417 wastewater as our initial response in that. 2418 I am thinking back through the days before, during, and after 2419 the landfall and I don't -- I have not identified the place where 2420 that would have changed things because we work cooperatively and 2421 our mission is first and foremost to get out and assess those

2422 issues that are immediate harm and key among those are water and 2423 wastewater systems and getting those back online. 2424 We have partners such as with Texas -- I always get this wrong 2425 -- the Texas American Waterworks Association -- our TXWARN system 2426 which helps us to bring together different resources from 2427 different services that are available to get equipment in places. 2428 Those things are all working very well. And so my only concern 2429 with changes is making sure we don't lose what's working well 2430 because it is working well in the state of Texas. Obviously, you 2431 want it quicker, but those are tweaks as opposed to major 2432 overhauls. 2433 Mr. Hudson. Got you. 2434 I have got a little over 10 seconds. Do either -- Lopez or 2435 Glenn, do you have an alternate opinion? 2436 Mr. Lopez. Just to reinforce, I was a local official and 2437 I was also on the ground during Irene and Lee. The issue of 2438 communication is really the critical issue. 2439 So whether it is a single function or a coordinated function, 2440 you really need to be in the heads of the plant operators who know 2441 exactly what they need and how to get up and running. So if you 2442 can penetrate to that level quickly, that is really what you need. 2443 Mr. Hudson. Great. 2444 Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I will yield back. 2445 Thank you. 2446 Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time.

2447 We want to thank this panel. You can tell -- we know you've 2448 travelled far and there is still a lot of work to do and so we 2449 are very appreciative of your efforts. And there are some members who have asked questions for you 2450 2451 If you can do so in a timely manner, that would also to respond. 2452 Thank you for what you do and now go back to your be appreciated. 2453 regions and get to work. 2454 And with that, we will dismiss this panel and ask for the 2455 second panel to join. 2456 Okay. Vamanos. Let us go. You Texas Aggies, get out of 2457 the hearing room. 2458 [Laughter.] 2459 Olson, let's go. Hallway. 2460 We want to thank all our witnesses for being here Okay. 2461 today, taking the time to testify before the subcommittee. 2462 second witness panel for today's hearing includes Mr. Mike Howe, 2463 executive director and secretary treasurer for the Texas Section 2464 of American Waterworks Association; Mr. Mark Lichtenstein, chief 2465 of staff, chief sustainability officer, State University of New 2466 York, College on Environment Science and Forestry; Ms. Lyvia N. Rodríquez del Valle, executive director of Corporacion del 2467

> So you were able to be here for the -- obviously, the first panel. This will be a smaller group but still as important as

Proyecto ENLACE del Caño Martín Peña; and Mr. Trent Epperson,

assistant city manager administration, City of Pearland.

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2472 we get your statements into the record.

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There will be some of us who will be here to ask the questions, as you saw in the first panel. We do appreciate you being here and with that we will start with Mr. Howe. You are recognized for five minutes and your full statement is submitted for the record.

You are recognized, sir.

2479 STATEMENTS OF MIKE HOWE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TEXAS SECTION OF 2480 AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION, ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN WATER 2481 WORKS ASSOCIATION; MARK LICHTENSTEIN, CHIEF OF STAFF AND CHIEF 2482 SUSTAINABILITY OFFICER, SUNY COLLEGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND 2483 FORESTRY; LYVIA N. RODRÍGUEZ DEL VALLE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 2484 CORPORACIÓN DEL PROYECTO ENLACE DEL CAÑO MARTÍN PEÑA; TRENT 2485 EPPERSON, ASSISTANT CITY MANAGER, CITY OF PEARLAND, TX 2486 2487 STATEMENT OF MR. HOWE 2488 Mr. Howe. Thank you much and good afternoon, Chairman Shimkus and members of the subcommittee. 2489 2490 My name is Mike Howe, the executive director of the Texas 2491 Section AWWA and we manage the Texas Water/Wastewater Agency 2492 Response Network, or TXWARN. 2493 The mission of TXWARN is to provide emergency preparedness 2494 disaster response and mutual aid assistance for water and 2495 wastewater utilities. TXWARN began after Hurricane Katrina when 2496 it was apparent that the coordination and prioritization of water 2497 utility needs was disjointed under the existing national response 2498 framework. 2499 2500 a utility-to-utility mutual aid system.

We in the water sector realized that we needed to develop a utility-to-utility mutual aid system. AWWA spearheaded the WARN initiative and collaborated with other stakeholders to facilitate the growth of WARN from the two-state program in 2006 to the 50 programs we have nationwide today.

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2504 Membership in TXWARN is free and is available to all public 2505 and private utilities in Texas, making it the largest 2506 utility-to-utility mutual aid program in the country with more 2507 than 1,200 utility members that provide services to 78 percent of the population of the state of Texas. 2508 2509 The Texas Section AWWA manages TXWARN and receives partial 2510 funding from the TCEQ via the state revolving fund program to 2511 facilitate training and exercises. 2512 Hurricane Harvey made landfall as a Category 4 hurricane in 2513 Nueces and Aransas Counties on August 25th and, as you know, 2514 meandered to the northeast over the upper Texas coast for four 2515 days. It presented water utilities with unique challenges. 2516 2517 storm approached, we activated the TXWARN system on October --August 23rd. We first began preparing support teams for the 2518 2519 inevitable aid requests. 2520 Ground zero for Hurricane Harvey was the small coastal town 2521 of Port Aransas. At daylight after the storm the local water 2522 utility manager assessed the damage to the community and the water 2523 system. 2524 The power was out for the water pumps, one of the water supply 2525 lines from Corpus Christi was out of service, and the majority 2526 of the community's water systems were leaking. 2527 As Harvey crossed Aransas Bay, it brought significant

similar damage to Rockport's water and wastewater system.

2528

The

2529 first major request for TXWARN came early Sunday morning on behalf 2530 The water system had to be operational before of Port Aransas. 2531 authorities could bring the population back. 2532 TXWARN contacted the San Antonio Water System, or SAWS, 2533 little more than two hours away from Port Aransas and its 2534 management agreed to send equipment and manpower to Port Aransas. 2535 In less than 24 hours, SAWS had deployed 20 field staff and by 2536 Friday of that week they had completely restored service. 2537 SAWS also responded to Rockport, performing repairs to it 2538 water and wastewater systems. TXWARN arranged to relief SAWS 2539 crews after 10 days from this grueling work with crews from the 2540 Austin water utility. 2541 During the nearly two-week response period TXWARN was full 2542 activated, we managed more than 50 similar requests for large and 2543 small systems. We are very pleased with our response operations 2544 during Harvey but there is always room for improvement. 2545 Specifically, I would like to call your attention to how the 2546 needs of the water sector are prioritized and coordinated as part 2547 of the national response framework, or NRF. 2548 The current organizational structure of the NRF largely reflects the 1992 federal response plan prepared by FEMA. 2549 2550 was 25 years ago. The experiences of the water sector since then 2551 suggest that this current model requires a thorough review and 2552 update.

The loss of drinking water and wastewater services compounds

2554 the complexities of all response activities and impacts the 2555 ability of first responders to sustain shelters, hospitals, and 2556 other first responding units. 2557 Therefore, prioritizing the recovery of water and wastewater 2558 service is essential to bringing normalcy and commerce back to 2559 any community. 2560 The disaggregated approach under the national response 2561 framework means that no single entity at the federal level has 2562 total responsibility for the water mission. This is our issue, 2563 and others at the federal level has also recognized this. 2564 In 2009, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council 2565 recommended the Department of Homeland Security elevate water services to its own ESF category within the national response 2566 2567 framework. 2568 Seven years later, the NAIC recommended that DHS direct FEMA 2569 to consolidate federal emergency response roles and 2570 responsibility into a single ESF. 2571 Implementing these recommendations will be consistent with 2572 the approaches applied for similar critical infrastructure such 2573 as transportation, communications, and energy. 2574 We urge Congress with its oversight jurisdiction and 2575 responsibilities to direct FEMA to reconsider how the NRF is used 2576 to support disaster response and recovery. This is vital for 2577 protecting public health, the environment, and all the 2578 communities we serve.

2579 And thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Howe for 2580 2581 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*INSERT 5\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

2582 Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, sir.
2583 And now I would like to recogni

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And now I would like to recognize Mr. Mark Lichtenstein from the State University of New York. You are recognized for five minutes.

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2586	STATEMENT OF MR. LICHTENSTEIN
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2588	Mr. Lichtenstein. You pronounce my name better than I do.
2589	Thank you.
2590	Chair Shimkus, Chair Walden, Ranking Members Tonko and
2591	Pallone, and honorable subcommittee members, thank you for the
2592	opportunity to participate.
2593	Having just returned from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands,
2594	I have many observations and concerns. But today I am only going
2595	to focus on disaster debris.
2596	I have more than three decades of waste management experience
2597	including with disasters. I am employed by the State University
2598	of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry ESE
2599	in Syracuse. It is a different ESF than we have been talking
2600	about.
2601	As immediate past president of the National Recycling
2602	Coalition, I helped create a task force on sustainable disaster
2603	debris management immediately after Harvey.
2604	I have helped address issues in the island since 2009,
2605	working with colleagues like my partners to the left, and I and
2606	a member of the board for Island Green, a U.S. Virgin Islands
2607	nonprofit.
2608	I have been working with local people to devise a sustainable

approach for the storm debris. Some U.S. government responders are appreciated.

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2611 However, there is concern from some residents and other 2612 experts regarding the potential ecological and human health 2613 impacts of a disaster debris management method of choice of the 2614 Army Corps of Engineers -- air curtain incineration. 2615 ACI is a past practice of FEMA and the Corps in these 2616 situations and they have proposed it for the Virgin Islands and 2617 possibly Puerto Rico as well. 2618 This would add insult to injury, especially considering that 2619 much of the debris is clean vegetation. There are better ways. 2620 During Superstorm Sandy in New York City, the Corps planned 2621 to use ACIs continuously for four months but they stopped after 2622 one month because they could not get them to function properly. 2623 Air quality was exceeded during days of high humidity and 2624 this was November in New York City. Humidity is routinely 2625 extremely high on the islands. Local people and others are 2626 concerned that ACIs will emit pollutants that could cause 2627 pulmonary aggravation, particularly for individuals with asthma 2628 or cardiac diseases. Diesel and gasoline generators, which you have heard about 2629 2630 already today, and exposure to indoor mold are already aggravating 2631 existing respiratory conditions. 2632 If burning moves forward in any manner, appropriate agencies 2633 should be asked to address potential health issues, especially regarding existing conditions. The agency for toxic substances 2634 2635 and disease registries should be requested to do a review of the

2636 health impacts of burning before it commences. EPA should be 2637 asked to establish air monitors downwind of the burners and 2638 burning should not commence until monitors are established and 2639 EPA immediately shares results with the public. 2640 Much of the topsoil has been lost through storm water. They 2641 have been hammered with rain since the hurricanes. 2642 critical that the vegetative debris remain to help replenish the 2643 soil that the plants of the islands need. When considering options like burning, it is essential to 2644 incorporate externality costs -- costs for which it is hard to 2645 2646 calculate an immediate number like climate change, the impacts 2647 of depleted soils on the ecosystem, or health effects of air 2648 pollution. 2649 These impacts can be reduced through other viable options 2650 and this is one reason groups like the National Recycling 2651 Coalition have opposed ACIs. 2652 FEMA and the Corps have said they will take the governor's 2653 Many in the Virgin Islands have asked their governor to lead. 2654 oppose incineration. Experts from Puerto Rico, the Virgin 2655 Islands, and stateside have worked to develop a viable alternative including recovery of hardwood and then mulching and composting. 2656 2657 This all could be done safely and efficiently. 2658 Composting is a process that nature has perfected over millions of years. It has been successful in many locations at 2659

large scales and with other disasters like Superstorm Sandy.

2662 sustainable plan. Providing a valid option to incineration can 2663 serve as a positive framework for other disaster-impacted areas 2664 in the future and that is key, and it represents a new sustainable 2665 scheme for debris and waste on the islands, going forward. 2666 This is a once and done opportunity to get a leg up on 2667 acquiring the infrastructure needed for management of the 2668 island's long-term organic waste problem, which is about 50 2669 percent of the island's normal waste stream. This gets to the questions about landfills earlier. 2670 2671 To help this sustainable option move forward, assistance could come in the form of a waiver of the matching funds 2672 requirement for the next 18 months while the islands build towards 2673 2674 this more resilient and future-focused infrastructure. Right now, FEMA is requiring the debris management solution 2675 2676 to be fully implemented in 180 days and this is considered 2677 unrealistic for composting or burning. 2678 The residents and visitors of Puerto Rico and the Virgin 2679 Islands deserve our focused attention. They deserve clean air 2680 and a healthy ecosystem. 2681 The hurricanes were certainly not desired, but this is a great opportunity to build a more resilient and sustainable future 2682 2683 so that the islands can come back better than before. 2684 Thank you on behalf of my institution, ESF, and SUNY, and 2685 we stand ready to assist the subcommittee as it continues its work.

Puerto Rico officials are working towards a similar

2689	Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
2690	Next, we would like to turn to I don't know if it is Señora
2691	or Señorita. Señor? Rodríguez del Valle.
2692	You are recognized for five minutes.

2693	STATEMENT OF MS. RODRÍGUEZ
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2695	Ms. Rodríguez. A disaster within a disaster
2696	Mr. Shimkus. One moment, please. There is a just press
2697	a button there. You'll be fine.
2698	Ms. Rodríguez. Thank you. I will start again.
2699	A disaster within a disaster that is what the eight
2700	densely-populated communities on the Caño Martín Peña and others
2701	that were already under environment distress prior to Irma and
2702	Maria have been experiencing since the hurricane struck.
2703	The 25,000 U.S. citizens living on the eastern half of the
2704	Martín Peña tidal channel already feared rain. They knew about
2705	flooding. An average of twice a year heavy rainfall translated
2706	into severe floods with wastewater.
2707	Accounts of raw sewage coming out of the shower and toilets
2708	or of waking up in the middle of the night to a wet bed and water
2709	to your knees and waste were common.
2710	They knew having to dry a wet mattress in the sun to have
2711	somewhere to lay down to sleep at night. They also knew disease.
2712	The prevalence of gastrointestinal disease in the Cano was of 31
2713	percent in three months, compared to 20 percent in a full year
2714	for Puerto Rico.
2715	Forty-four percent of the children five years of age and
2716	under living close to the Caño had asthma. People had experienced
2717	the dengue fever, zika, and chikungunya epidemics. There have

2718 been reports of leptospirosis, a disease transmitted mainly by 2719 contact with the urine of rats and other animals and which can 2720 be fatal. 2721 The Martín Peña channel stretches for 3.7 miles across San Juan, connecting San Juan Bay, where Puerto Rico's busiest port 2722 2723 is, to the inland San Jose Lagoon to the east, vital for the 2724 stormwater management of the adjacent Luis Muñoz Marín 2725 International Airport. It is part of the San Juan Bay, recognized 2726 by the EPA for its national significance. 2727 From a 200- to 400-feet wide navigable channel, today it is 2728 barely five feet wide in some areas. Adjacent communities lack 2729 sewer systems and the stormwater system has collapsed. The San 2730 Jose Lagoon has lost superficial area and depth, increasing the 2731 risk of floods at the airport and other communities throughout 2732 San Juan. 2733 If historic -- if history were to repeat itself, almost a 2734 century ago after two major hurricanes and in the midst of an 2735 economic depression, persons migrated to San Juan and the wetlands 2736 around the Caño became home. 2737 Prior to Maria, the barrios which survived decades of 2738 eviction and gentrification were already a symbol of resiliency, 2739 empowerment, and grass roots organization. 2740 Residents engaged in an unprecedented participatory 2741 planning process that led to the creation of the comprehensive

development ENLACE Caño Martín Peña project.

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Since then,

2743 together with the public and private sectors, they moved forward 2744 an agenda of long-term resiliency that has the potential of 2745 transforming the city by reconnecting its navigable bodies of 2746 water. 2747 Recovering the Caño with participation means healthier and 2748 safer conditions for the residents without fear of gentrification 2749 thanks to a community land trust recognized last year with the 2750 United Nations World Habitat Award. 2751 And then Irma and Maria struck. Close to 1,000 families lost 2752 totally or partially the roofs to their homes. Approximately 75 2753 homes were totally destroyed. The communities experienced 2754 another severe flood with raw sewage, only that this time around 2755 it lasted for four days. 2756 Approximately half of the trees along the Caño fell and 2757 together with the debris from the destroyed houses further blocked 2758 the Caño and the storm sewers. 2759 Since Maria, it only takes 15 minutes of rain for floods to 2760 It even floods on a sunny day. We already have had two 2761 significant floods in the past two months, which have been 2762 affecting other areas of San Juan as well. 2763 Since Maria, water quality throughout the estuary has 2764 significantly worsened. The disturbance of the Caño and 2765 uncollected debris from streets caused a rat infestation and

approaching people's homes. Tarps and Corps-installed blue

augmented the risk of mosquito-borne diseases. Alligators are

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2768 roofs are already in place. However, there is mold and water 2769 filtration. 2770 Fifteen years of organizing allowed for ENLACE, the 2771 grassroots G-8, and the land trust to work with partners and bring 2772 However, the crisis is far from over. aid. 2773 Now, imagine living in a state of never-ending crisis and 2774 trauma -- whole families sleeping on the floor on the room that 2775 does not get wet after sleeping under the rain for many days in 2776 the capital city of Puerto Rico, San Juan. 2777 Using federal recovery funds to support initiatives like the 2778 ENLACE Caño Martín Peña project presents a unique opportunity for 2779 an emblematic recovery process that increases Puerto Rico's long-term resiliency and sound economic development. 2780 2781 Investing in the ecosystem restoration of the Caño 2782 infrastructure and related acquisitions and relocation supports 2783 equitable development and participatory democracy. 2784 There is already a credible and proven institutional and 2785 policy framework in place and engaged community and partners, 2786 shovel-ready projects and NEPA compliance for the ecosystem 2787 restoration piece elaborated under the Water Resources 2788 Development Act of 2007. Due to the current crisis, the Caño cannot keep waiting for 2789 2790 ordinary processes to occur. At a time of severe political, 2791 economic, fiscal, and financial challenges, support from the U.S. 2792 federal government is crucial.

2793 That is why I urge Congress to pursue the inclusion of this 2794 project and all of its components in any upcoming disaster 2795 recovery bill for Puerto Rico. 2796 This project is necessary and should be a priority due to 2797 serious repercussions in the San Juan Bay Estuary, public health, 2798 and safety. 2799 And finally, I want to stress the importance of ensuring that 2800 any funding related to Martín Peña or other communities in a 2801 similar situation promote on-site resilient recovery rather than 2802 displacement and gentrification and for assistance policies to 2803 be context sensitive to allow for a just and equitable disaster 2804 recovery. 2805 2806

We are concerned that FEMA individual assistance programs requiring families in need for housing to leave outside the flood plain can make families in desperate need to leave their communities.

When this happens in areas where resilient onsite alternatives are visible and that have been under pressure of displacement and gentrification due to their strategic location, those who have struggled for their lands for decades can end up being uprooted.

No person should leave fearing the rain and no community should be displaced when there is an alternative at hand. your support, long-term solutions that also keep Puerto Rico face -- help Puerto Rico face its economic crisis such as this project

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2818	will become a reality.
2819	An official visit to Puerto Rico I do invite you to come and
2820	visit the work we've done. Thank you.
2821	[The prepared statement of Ms. Rodríguez follows:]
2822	
2823	************************************

2824	Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.	
2825	Now I would like to turn to Mr. Epperson.	You are recognized
2826	for five minutes.	

STATEMENT OF MR. EPPERSON

Mr. Epperson. Good afternoon, Chairman, and members of the subcommittee.

My name is Trent Epperson. I am the assistant city manager with the city of Pearland in Texas and I am pleased to be invited here today to present to you the effects of Hurricane Harvey as it occurred in the city of Pearland, especially as it relates to critical water and wastewater infrastructure and the need to make that infrastructure resilient and redundant.

The city of Pearland is a suburban city of about 120,000 residents just south of the city of Houston. It has been one of the fastest growing communities in the nation over the past 15 years.

We have grown from a population of about a little over 30,000 in the year 2000 to today over 120,000 to where we are the third largest city in the Houston Metro area.

During Hurricane Harvey, with its unprecedented flooding, Pearland experienced structural flooding affecting over 1,700 residents, 50 businesses, and flooding to critical infrastructure including two wastewater treatment plants.

Most of the flooding occurred along Clear Creek, which, germane to this subcommittee is a 303D-listed impaired water body for bacteria. With a 500-year storm event, it is -- it was estimated before this storm that about 7,000 residents in the

2852 Clear Creek watershed would flood. I believe we saw that or more 2853 in Pearland and the downstream communities. 2854 There is, however, a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers drainage 2855 project that has been on the books since the '60s but yet to be 2856 funded. 2857 Based on the studies associated with that project, 2858 approximately half of those residents that flooded in the 2859 watershed would likely have been spared during Hurricane Harvey. 2860 Additionally, critical infrastructure within the watershed 2861 would not have flooded and failed as well. Although the city of 2862 Pearland has grown rapidly, our new development and our new 2863 infrastructure follows current codes and standards. The result was that in those newer areas we experienced very 2864 2865 minimal flooding and that is in areas where we have added tens of thousands of new rooftops over the past 15 years. 2866 2867 So we see that along with the completion of the Clear Creek 2868 drainage project what is needed is funding for continued sound 2869 investment and resilient and redundant critical infrastructure, 2870 especially to bring the older infrastructure to current 2871 standards. 2872 The most critical of those infrastructure pieces are water, 2873 wastewater, and the automated systems that control that infrastructure. 2874 It is a critical life safety issue for any city 2875 to have the ability to deliver clean safe drinking water during 2876 a disaster.

2877 For Pearland, this critical infrastructure must have 2878 adequate generator power, flood proofing, and adequate elevation 2879 to survive a minimum of a 500-year storm as well as able to 2880 withstand Category 4 hurricane winds. 2881 During Hurricane Harvey, our water system performed very 2882 well with only one water well sustaining minor damage due to power 2883 surging. We never lost pressure and we were always able to 2884 deliver that clean safe drinking water. 2885 Unfortunately, some of our adjoining communities and the 2886 smaller water systems around us were unable to do that and did have to issue boil water notices. 2887 2888 Additionally, continuity of service in treating wastewater 2889 is critical for citizens sheltering in place and the return of 2890 evacuees when they return -- when they come back to their homes. 2891 We must ensure that wastewater is adequately treated and not 2892 released during a flooding event because that can affect the 2893 downstream water quality in our streams and bayous. 2894 In our area, wastewater facilities are often located in 2895 low-lying areas near the stream that they outfall to, making them 2896 vulnerable to flooding, and therefore a lot of them are in need 2897 of the same resiliency and redundancy criteria applied to our 2898 drinking water facilities. 2899 During Harvey, unfortunately our wastewater system did not 2900 fare near as well as our wastewater system. Our Longwood 2901 wastewater treatment plant, which was originally built in the

2902 1960s and is sited in one of the old oxbows of Clear Creek, was 2903 inundated with flood waters and inoperable for up to 72 hours 2904 during the event. The estimated damage to the plant is about a 2905 million and a half dollars. 2906 But due to the proximity of the plant to the creek, instead 2907 of making those expensive repairs on a plant that is vulnerable 2908 to the next flood, this facility should have its flows redirected 2909 to an adequate plant to mitigate any future damage or loss of 2910 service. 2911 One final critical piece of infrastructure to our utility 2912 operations is the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 2913 System, or SCADA. What SCADA is is it is basically a system that allows us to 2914 2915 monitor and control our critical water and wastewater facilities 2916 remotely. 2917 These systems must be redundant and resilient to provide 2918 continuous connectivity to those facilities throughout an 2919 emergency event. 2920 SCADA is indispensable to ensure the plants and the lift 2921 stations are operational and properly functioning when we cannot reach those facilities due to high water or debris. 2922 2923 During Hurricane Harvey, for three days we could not 2924 physically access 18 wastewater lift stations which are critical 2925 to getting the wastewater to the plants. Due to a lack of SCADA 2926 redundancy, we were also unable to monitor many of these

2927 facilities remotely. 2928 The city of Pearland, although challenged, fared relatively 2929 well through Hurricane Harvey and will recover stronger than we 2930 were before the disaster. 2931 As we rebuild, we look to ensure our critical infrastructure 2932 is able to withstand flooding, high winds, and other potential 2933 disasters. 2934 To do this, we must have adequate recovery and mitigation funding available so that we do not just rebuild our critical 2935 2936 infrastructure to its original state but we rebuild resilient 2937 redundant infrastructure ready for the next disaster. 2938 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 2939 [The prepared statement of Mr. Epperson follows:] 2940 2941 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*INSERT 8\*\*\*\*\*\*

Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opening statements. I want to start by then recognizing myself for five minutes for a round of questioning.

And I have some here prepared in front of me but I really want to go off script a little bit, and if you would hit the time, too, Jerry.

The -- you sat in on our -- the first panel, which was long with a lot of extensive questioning and I think there was a consensus by my colleagues on both sides that maybe we are just not organized right and I think it addresses all three of your kind of positions because, one, it deals with, you know, the debris management issue, who makes the decision and for what purposes.

Obviously, the estuary and the river systems, but we also want to make sure that if we go in this direction how do we not -- it was mentioned in the first panel -- how do we not stumble on them having a centralized government get involved in things that are working, right.

So let me -- let me go and turn to each one of you and, Mr. Howe, my questions were going to be -- going to be totally directed to you but I really would like everyone's response because this is kind of similar to the energy hearing where in some places there is mutual agreements and when you have states or local service areas you can coordinate and you can send folks to. Obviously, islands much more difficult, as we saw with the Energy Subcommittee.

2967 So what would be a structure by which -- I think your 2968 testimony was there are things that are working -- be careful not 2969 to screw those up if there was a change in the -- in essence, a 2970 change of the Stafford Act in some delineation of responsibility. 2971 In speaking to what I spoke in my remarks on the Mr. Howe. 2972 written testimony, also the issue of the multiple ESFs that water 2973 is under. 2974 Now, for lack of a better term, under the WARN program across 2975 the country we have done a workaround. The WARN programs are 2976 utilities supporting utilities and most of those programs are 2977 operated independently of the state regulatory agency or the state 2978 operation center, even though as you saw from Mr. Shaw earlier 2979 we cooperate with them directly. 2980 We are partially funded and we are unique to this, by the 2981 The Texas -- the TXWARN program is partially funded by the way. 2982 So we work very closely with them and the state operations TCEO. 2983 center. 2984 But we have identified an issue that occurs in the state 2985 operations center because they are broadly looking at public works 2986 and the totality of it -- that even though we are in touch with 2987 them and coordinating with them, they are not necessarily always 2988 paying full attention to the water/wastewater side. 2989 So during Harvey we had situations where we would loop back 2990 to them and have conversations and we would have to go through 2991 a complete refresh --

2992 Mr. Shimkus. I wonder if I can jump in so I --2993 Mr. Howe. Yes, please. 2994 Mr. Shimkus. So your position is that, and I am learning 2995 these acronyms as we go through the hearing, it should be raised 2996 to an emergency support function level and that would help? 2997 In other words, it is disaggregated now. Mr. Howe. 2998 was under one, then I think, as I've said to somebody before, that 2999 then those in emergency management would have the same red light 3000 flashing on water/wastewater as they do on lifesaving and 3001 everything else that they do because it would be a single support 3002 function and we know from the industry that there are -- you know, 3003 we have only talked about three essential services -- police, 3004 fire, and EMS. But without electric, water, and wastewater the 3005 first three can't function. 3006 Mr. Shimkus. Okay. Let me go to Mr. Lichtenstein. 3007 Mr. Lichtenstein. It is a dichotomous thing. I drove all 3008 around the islands -- Saint John, Saint Thomas, Puerto Rico, 3009 So need for plans ahead of time, clearly. Vieques. 3010 Standard operating procedures -- we talked about those 3011 earlier. But this is definitely a matrix thing. Can't be top 3012 It is not linear but yet there is a critical role for the down. 3013 U.S. government. What I saw, this dichotomous thing, was some 3014 unbelievable local efforts of stepping up to the plate. On the 3015 island of Viegues, and I don't know if you're familiar with that 3016 island but that is an island on the --

3017 We used to debate it a long -- couple years Mr. Shimkus. 3018 ago all the time. 3019 Mr. Lichtenstein. Yes. So here's a story about 3020 The U.S. Coast Guard, while Maria was still kind of 3021 hanging out, the captain there used initiative and sent some 3022 cutters over to Vieques before anybody else was there for days. 3023 So how do you -- how do you value that and how do you enhance 3024 that kind of activity to help the locals? Clarity of leadership 3025 is key. 3026 Mr. Shimkus. Right. 3027 Mr. Lichtenstein. What I saw was lack of clarity of 3028 So this is matrixed and it is something that we are leadership. 3029 going to have to figure out how to structure and how do you value 3030 these local people that are just stepping up to the plate? 3031 Mr. Shimkus. And speaking of local people, Ms. del Valle 3032 -- Rodríguez del Valle? I have to totally agree with Mark 3033 Ms. Rodríquez. Yes. 3034 Lichtenstein's remarks. In our case being a community in San Juan 3035 basically the after -- right after Maria it was the residents the 3036 ones that took care of themselves and the institutions that have been working with them for a very long time came in the next day 3037 3038 and that was the only outside help that they received in 3039 practically a month and this was San Juan with a lot of partners 3040 -- previously built partnerships. 3041 So the other thing that is helpful is for the -- in the case

3042 of the federal government it was very critical for us to have 3043 people on the ground that actually were able to listen, because 3044 sometimes you design a program that you think is going to work very well everywhere and not necessarily all the circumstances 3045 3046 are the same. 3047 So we were able to establish those relationships and improve 3048 dramatically the type of help that was being brought to the 3049 communities, particularly with the project of the blue roofs and 3050 other assistance that we finally got from FEMA and the federal 3051 government. 3052 Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. 3053 And let me, with my colleagues' permission so I can get Mr. Epperson on the record, Texas, local community -- how do we be 3054 3055 careful that we are not part of the problem and, you know, we are from the federal government -- we are here to help, and then we 3056 3057 end up not being helpful? Mr. Epperson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 3058 3059 It is a very local response and effort from the beginning, 3060 and with the experience of Hurricane Harvey we really could not 3061 get out, could not get in for several days where we are located. 3062 We did -- we did -- we do have other local government contacts 3063 throughout Texas that were able to send high water rescue vehicles 3064 that were able to help out. 3065 So I think that initial response it is very local and how 3066 you have to deal with that, and then once the flood waters recede

3067	and we start talking about projects to the enhancement projects
3068	and projects to make sure that the next time we have the high wind
3069	event or the high water event, I believe that is where we can
3070	partner with FEMA and the federal government and the other
3071	agencies.
3072	Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much, and I appreciate my
3073	colleagues allowing me to go a few minutes over.
3074	Now I would like to turn to Mr. Tonko for five minutes.
3075	Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
3076	Ms. Rodríguez del Valle, where water systems are now working
3077	in Puerto Rico are there still concerns with water safety?
3078	Ms. Rodríguez. Yes. Yes, and the people are being told to
3079	boil the water before consumption. But when you have no power
3080	at home, you know, and the gas is limited it is very hard to comply
3081	with those basic health measures.
3082	Mr. Tonko. I have heard that there are over 200 independent
3083	water systems on Puerto Rico but they serve a very small percentage
3084	of the population.
3085	Can you characterize the types of communities or people
3086	served by independent non-PRASA water systems?
3087	Ms. Rodríguez. Well, I am not an expert in this. But from
3088	my knowledge, these are areas particularly in the mountain side
3089	of Puerto Rico where it was very difficult to provide formal
3090	services.
3091	So the families did community aqueduct systems decades ago

3092 and they have been living on those for a long time. 3093 Mr. Tonko. Thank you. 3094 And Mr. Epperson, your testimony mentioned that you need to 3095 make \$1.5 million worth in repairs to your water -- your wastewater 3096 treatment plant. How important is it to protect your community's 3097 investment by making sure that that facility is more resilient 3098 to future flooding? 3099 Mr. Epperson. I think it is very important, you know, that 3100 we do have the plant up and running with temporary repairs. 3101 Those are the more permanent repairs and -- but because of 3102 the location of that plant we really are going to look at an 3103 enhancement type project with that -- with that plant to send those 3104 wastewater flows to one of our other plants, expand that plant, 3105 because it is situated and located in a location less vulnerable 3106 to the rising waters that we experienced at this plant. 3107 Mr. Tonko. And are there currently sufficient federal 3108 funding opportunities to help the communities assess and mitigate 3109 future vulnerabilities to their water supplies or water systems? 3110 I believe there are opportunities. Mr. Epperson. 3111 certain that they are sufficient. You know, we are exploring what 3112 those opportunities are right now and moving through that process. 3113 Mr. Tonko. Thank you. 3114 And Mr. Howe, I am interested in how FEMA can improve its 3115 emergency support functions for the water sector. How does it 3116 compare to other critical infrastructure sectors?

3117 I think the difficulty we have is because it is 3118 spread out over multiple ESFs there is not a nationwide or entirety 3119 of a single operating system so it can vary from region to region, 3120 area to area. 3121 As I mentioned, we were -- we were successful in Texas because 3122 we've almost -- we have made it happen that way. But it is not 3123 -- it is not consistent. So there needs to be a consistent 3124 structure of how that works and we believe under a separate ESF 3125 that would happen. Thank you. 3126 Mr. Tonko. 3127 And Mr. Lichtenstein, what types of pollution occur -- can 3128 occur from burning debris? Mr. Lichtenstein. Clearly, particulates or smoke. 3129 3130 that is the question that we want to answer -- what else is 3131 happening. 3132 So if it is a lower temperature burn there -- and if plastic 3133 -- I saw plastic tangled up with the debris and if that is burned 3134 it can potentially have dioxins, furans, polyaromatic 3135 hydrocarbons and other chemicals. But that really needs to be 3136 looked at. 3137 Mr. Tonko. Thank you. 3138 And I imagine that space is at a premium in areas like Puerto 3139 Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. What is the current state of 3140 the landfills there and what particular challenges exist because 3141 of the land challenge itself?

3142 I can't speak with authority to the Mr. Epperson. Yes. 3143 landfills but I do have some knowledge. Some of them are really 3144 exceeding capacity and exceeding federal regulations. are well run and doing fine. 3145 3146 The main island of Puerto Rico, of course, has more land than 3147 the other islands. In the Virgin Islands there are serious 3148 issues. There are only two landfills -- one on Saint Croix and one 3149 3150 on Saint Thomas. Both have capacity issues and operational 3151 So that is a big concern on those islands. 3152 Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And Ms. Rodríquez del Valle, if you had one recommendation 3153 3154 to this subcommittee or to the committee in general, what would 3155 it be in regard to what you see right now in Puerto Rico? 3156 I think disasters kind of bring out the best Ms. Rodríquez. 3157 of the -- of the society and also the institutional flaws, and 3158 we are seeing a little bit of that currently in Puerto Rico, not 3159 only regarding the way in which we have been able to address the 3160 crisis. 3161 It has brought the best of the Puerto Rican people and its 3162 capacity to organize and do a great job when nobody else was doing 3163 But it has also brought to light issues regarding the way it. 3164 in which disaster relief was organized, particularly during the 3165 first days.

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It seemed to many of us living there that there was a lot

3167 of disorganization and some of the decisions actually delayed 3168 assistance to the people who needed it the most. 3169 I also wanted to add one point regarding Mr. Shimkus' 3170 question and it has to do with federal government aid. 3171 being able to be culturally sensitive is something as simple as 3172 having FEMA officers visiting people's homes to speak Spanish 3173 because most people in Puerto Rico do not understand English and 3174 sometimes decisions were being done regarding the type of aids 3175 that these families received with a language barrier in the 3176 middle. 3177 So perhaps that curtailed the ability of many of them to be able to actually get the help they needed. 3178 3179 Mr. Tonko. Thank you very much. 3180 And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chair. 3181 Thank -- the chair thanks the gentleman. Mr. Shimkus. 3182 The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Olson, 3183 for five minutes. 3184 Mr. Olson. I thank the chair. 3185 I am going to open with the praise and Texas brag about a 3186 friend and leader back home in Texas 22, Trent Epperson. 3187 Trent, I should give you a proper Aggie greeting -- howdy, my 3188 friend. Welcome. Trent is the assistant city manager of Pearland, Texas, as 3189 3190 he mentioned. Pearland is the largest city in Brazoria County 3191 with over 120,000 people and growing, rapidly.

3192 Trent helps to run their half a billion dollar capital budget 3193 as well as overseeing both the city's public works and utilities 3194 department. 3195 Chair, we are so proud of Pearland and Brazoria County's 3196 response to Hurricane Harvey. Please tell the committee how many 3197 people died in Brazoria County because of Hurricane Harvey. 3198 Mr. Epperson. There were no people that died in Brazoria 3199 County during Hurricane Harvey. 3200 Mr. Olson. Zero. Nada. Nil. No deaths. That's 3201 amazing, despite five feet of rain in parts of Brazoria County. 3202 Is that correct? 3203 Mr. Epperson. Yes, sir. Okay. Now the fun stuff -- the questions. 3204 Mr. Olson. 3205 What kind of help did you get immediately after Harvey hit 3206 outside of Brazoria County from the federal government, from the 3207 EPA, maybe from FEMA, from other states, other entities? 3208 What would you change about the storm response lines of 3209 communication now to the next storm that is coming? We know it 3210 is coming. 3211 Mr. Epperson. As far -- as far as immediate help, I think 3212 it was mostly locals that were able to do the -- all of the 3213 immediate response needs. We have been working with FEMA, meeting with them on a weekly 3214 3215 basis since then. I believe that process for the immediate needs 3216 and the debris removal and developing our damage assessments is 3217 | moving forward.

One of the areas where I think that moving forward we want to improve as well as working with the feds improve is a buy-out program where we -- it has in the past been a -- kind of sporadic when there is a disaster.

We move forward with a buy-out program. It occurs several months to maybe more than a year after the actual event itself. And so we see a need for accelerating that. There are people that are out of their homes right now and don't know whether to repair those homes and make those repairs because they don't know whether there is a buyout opportunity or not.

So I think the ability to accelerate that and have that as an ongoing program even when there is not a disaster that just occurred would really help from a local's perspective.

Mr. Olson. Anything else you wish from Washington -- what we could do better to help you guys get through that? Because you guys were awesome but we can help you I think a lot more, much more -- much quicker.

I mean, it just seemed like over and over people calling me up, I can't get somebody to come out to my house to, you know, look at my house and assess the damage.

For example, Pearland had five large -- four large dump trucks go in that heavy water. Three are flooded out. You are down to one dump truck. And so I guess, you know, we are trying to get resources to you.

3242 Anything we can improve on here in D.C.? Because you all 3243 do great but we want you to do better. We can help, I think. 3244 Mr. Epperson. Yes, sir. I think any of those resources 3245 would help. 3246 The previous panel, Trent, talked about planning Mr. Olson. 3247 scenarios with TCEQ and EPA. Has Pearland been involved in any 3248 Just -- have you been involved at that level planning 3249 for another hurricane like Harvey? Have you been involved in that 3250 or are you sort of outside looking in? 3251 Mr. Epperson. We work, you know, with our local county 3252 emergency management as well as with the Texas Department of 3253 Emergency Management. But we haven't had any direct contact or 3254 work with those folks prepreparing for emergency. 3255 Have you had to adjust your plans for an 800 years Mr. Olson. 3256 flood as opposed to a 500-year flood or a 100-year flood? I mean, 3257 how much have you adapted to what happened in August with Hurricane 3258 Harvey? 3259 I think the big thing we have recognized is Mr. Epperson. 3260 that our newer infrastructure designed to current standards fared 3261 very well even with the unprecedented flooding and that it is our 3262 areas that have been there for many decades that were designed 3263 to other standards or before standards were in place that were 3264 mostly affected and that those are the areas we want to concentrate 3265 on for future drainage improvement projects as well as other 3266 resiliency projects to make sure that those areas also are able

3267 to withstand the same type of flooding. 3268 Of greatest importance to that is the Clear Creek project 3269 which is a project sponsored by the Harris County Flood Control 3270 District and I believe that project has been submitted for federal 3271 funding to move forward after this event. 3272 Mr. Olson. I am out of time and I want to say Gig'em my 3273 friend. Thank you. 3274 Mr. Epperson. Gig'em. 3275 Mr. Shimkus. The chairman now turns to another Texan, Mr. 3276 Green, for five minutes. 3277 Well, I appreciate it and I married into the 3278 My son and our son-in-law and my two grandchildren Aggie family. now think they are going to be in the Corps Cadets. 3279 3280 But be that as it may, Mr. Howe, in your testimony you know that some of the city of Houston's wastewater operations were 3281 3282 overwhelmed during Harvey. 3283 Can you describe in detail on what locations? Was it mainly 3284 upstream, Buffalo Bayou? Because every creek and bayou I have 3285 in my area in east Harris County were out of their banks. 3286 it was mostly the city of Houston and Buffalo Bayou that the 3287 wastewater treatment plants were overwhelmed? Mr. Howe. 3288 Yes, sir. It is my understanding on the west side 3289 of Houston the wastewater plant was flooded out. Part of that 3290 was due to controlled flooding out of the Addicks Reservoir, as 3291 you are familiar with that area over there. They currently --

3292 I don't represent it but I am familiar with it. 3293 Mr. Howe. Yes, I understand. The -- I understand from the 3294 city of Houston water utility they are currently dealing with a 3295 wastewater line that is in Buffalo Bayou where the bayou is 3296 sloughing off continually. 3297 They have a wastewater line that is on the side of that. Ιt 3298 is an ongoing issue. Obviously, there needs to be a coordinated 3299 response on how that gets rebuilt and how their line gets 3300 reinforced or moved. 3301 So it is these ongoing issues. The water system operated just fine. They were able to put coffer dams around the northeast 3302 3303 water filter galleries to keep the water system operating fine 3304 but wastewater, by its very nature, as Mr. Epperson mentioned, 3305 are built in lower level areas and they had some significant 3306 flooding, particularly in Houston's lift stations, too. 3307 Mr. Green. We have untold number of water districts outside 3308 the city limits of Houston or Pasadena and I know they -- because they are built on the bayou close to where they're -- they treat 3309 3310 the effluent and it goes -- they have permits to go into the bayous. 3311 Do you have any idea on how many of those were also impacted? 3312 Mr. Howe. I don't have specific numbers. The difficulty 3313 for -- in our response during Hurricane Harvey, obviously, was 3314 that there was a delayed response. No one could do an assessment until the flood waters went down. 3315 3316 Many of those operations were, obviously, shut down when the 3317 flooding started but it doesn't mean there wasn't a pollutant. 3318 I don't have specific numbers, though. 3319 Okay. Well, I have the eastern part of the Mr. Green. county and, like I say, I could give you the watersheds from the 3320 3321 bayous and -- but Buffalo Bayou and the shipping port of Houston 3322 actually runs right in the middle of our district, and whether 3323 it be Brays or Sims, Sims Bayou looked like it was the one that 3324 didn't flood as bad as Brays and on the north side I have Greens 3325 Bayou, Carpenters Bayou in channel view, Hunting Bayou and --3326 I grew up in Houston. I am familiar with all 3327 these. All these -- and all of them were and these were 3328 Mr. Green. 3329 multiple flooding experiences and we continue to work with the 3330 Corps of Engineers and, of course, our Harris County Flood Control District -- that a lot of our neighboring counties don't have flood 3331 3332 control districts but in Harris County we pay property taxes to 3333 be able to have drainage ditches and, you know, take care of our 3334 bayous along with the partnership with the Corps. 3335 So it is a big challenge. Your -- Mr. Howe, in your testimony 3336 you said that the city of Houston was overwhelmed. What part of 3337 the city did they -- did they shut down the wastewater system or 3338 did --It is my understanding --3339 Mr. Howe. 3340 -- what part of the city was impacted? 3341 Mr. Howe. Excuse me. I am sorry.

3342 On the west side of Houston they did have one of their 3343 wastewater plants completely flooded out. It was out of service. 3344 They were advising people not to flush, those who were still in their residences, and they were -- they had the resources to get 3345 3346 that plant back online in three or four days, once the water --3347 the water receded. 3348 You know, as you may be familiar, most of Houston's 3349 wastewater system is with forced mains or lift stations and they 3350 have a significant number of those and I know a number of those 3351 were flooded out. 3352 Houston proper was pretty resilient and a lot of that, much 3353 like some of the other cities around there. So I don't have 3354 specific details as to how they came back but they were very 3355 resilient on their own. 3356 Since Hurricane Ike they have built up a lot of resiliency 3357 within the city of Houston. 3358 Mr. Green. Well, in Harris County also many years ago, 3359 because you recognize we were subsiding, the city of Houston is 3360 now almost totally on surface water and they have surface water 3361 rights. 3362 I know Pasadena I represent complains about having to pay 3363 high water rates for the city of Houston. So we have a central location for surface water so we don't 3364 3365 continue to subside. Do you think there is -- should be an effort 3366 to try and create mega wastewater treatment facilities and partner

3367 with an untold number of water districts that we have and see how 3368 that would work? You know, obviously, sir, that is a local 3369 Mr. Howe. The first thing, when you said it, that popped in my 3370 head was the -- an example of the Trinity River Authority in the 3371 3372 Dallas-Fort Worth area, which is a mega wastewater operation 3373 without regard to issue. 3374 You know, most of Houston's water comes from the discharge 3375 in the Trinity River from TRA. That might be a possibility. 3376 mean, there are any number of small package plants in the muds 3377 that you spoke of outside of the Houston area. 3378 There might be an effort to look at consolidating those in 3379 a system that would be more efficient. There are enormous costs 3380 involved in doing that and getting to that, you know, rerouting sewer lines and everything else. But it is those sort of options 3381 3382 I think everybody needs to look at. 3383 Mr. Green. Well, and I am already over time, but with the 3384 amount of money we are going to have to do to redo those plants 3385 and also the houses and the businesses downstream who are in danger 3386 of, you know, because of that effluent being in their houses and 3387 their -- in their businesses. 3388 So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 3389 Mr. Shimkus. I thank my colleague. 3390 I want to thank the colleagues who stayed and participated 3391 in the second panel. I personally really appreciate it.

3392 observation is that these disasters that we are talking about in 3393 this event, if you noticed -- for the panelists, those of us who 3394 have been through them really kind of the same type of story. 3395 I do think there is an opportunity for us to work collectively 3396 and look at the Stafford Act. This is multi-jurisdictional, 3397 This would be a long-term, five, six years trying to get 3398 a response. 3399 I am -- you know, I just -- I keep thinking about big piles 3400 of stuff and how do you separate them. I am a big trash energy 3401 I would like to see more of that. We have some locally that quy. 3402 I have toured. 3403 Buy-out programs -- we just had a flood five years ago. People are just getting their checks now. So there is a lot of 3404 3405 ways these things can be fixed so we do appreciate your testimony. 3406 I also want to tell my -- to the committee that we have five 3407 legislative days to submit opening statements. I forgot to do 3408 that at the beginning of this. 3409 I want to thank you all for being here and pursuant to 3410 committee rules, I remind members that they have 10 business days 3411 to submit additional questions for the record. If you get those, if you would reply we would appreciate it 3412 3413 and I ask that you submit your responses within 10 business days 3414 upon receipt of the questions. 3415 Of course, if your -- can't use your electric stuff because 3416 you are in a place where there is no electricity that might be a challenge. But we do appreciate you being here. There is a lot of work for us to do.

Thank you for your time and with that, I will adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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