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DOE MODERNIZATION: THE OFFICE OF CYBERSECURITY,

ENERGY SECURITY, AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2018

House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Energy,

Committee on Energy and Commerce,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in Room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Upton, Olson, Barton, Shimkus, Latta, McKinley, Griffith, Johnson, Long, Flores, Mullin, Hudson, Walberg, Duncan, Walden (ex officio), Rush, McNerney, Welch, Tonko, Schrader, Kennedy, and Pallone (ex officio).

Staff Present: Samantha Bopp, Staff Assistant; Kelly Collins, Legislative Clerk, Energy and Environment; Margaret Tucker Fogarty, Staff Assistant; Jordan Haverly, Policy Coordinator, Environment; Ryan Long, Deputy Staff Director; Mary Martin, Chief Counsel, Energy and Environment; Sarah Matthews, Press Secretary, Energy and Environment; Drew McDowell, Executive Assistant; Brandon Mooney, Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy;

Brannon Rains, Staff Assistant; Mark Ratner, Policy Coordinator; Annelise Rickert, Counsel, Energy; Peter Spencer, Senior Professional Staff Member, Energy; Austin Stonebraker, Press Assistant; Madeline Vey, Policy Coordinator, Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection; Hamlin Wade, Special Advisor, External Affairs; Rick Kessler, Minority Senior Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and Environment; John Marshall, Minority Policy Coordinator; Alexander Ratner, Minority Policy Analyst; and Tuley Wright, Minority Policy Advisor, Energy and Environment.

Mr. Upton. Good morning, everybody.

Today's hearing will enable the subcommittee to consider the current setup and plans for the Department of Energy's new Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. So the CESER office, as we fondly call it, represents an important new element of the Department with a mission to carry out DOE's energy security and energy emergency functions more effectively.

Throughout this Congress, we have identified key features of departmental modernization. These include the need for sufficient leadership and coordinated attention across the agency's many programs and operations to get ahead of the risks to our modern energy systems.

To underscore this, we move through committee H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act, which would establish permanent Assistant Secretary-level leadership over emergency response and cybersecurity functions. While enacting this into law takes time, I commend the Secretary of Energy for assigning this level of leadership under his authority and for creating the CESER office earlier this year.

And we are reminded weekly of the urgency for getting this leadership structure up and running smoothly. The risks are varied and complex. We have devastating weather events and other natural hazards that can deprive communities of energy supplies. We are seeing increasing risk to our energy delivery systems by nation-states intent on using cyber controls and vulnerabilities to threaten to leave regions of the Nation without power for perhaps weeks at a time. And the work to be better prepared for these risks and to be responsive when incidents occur is as urgent as ever.

There are critical gaps. And we have learned over the past year that energy supplies through pipeline systems to power our bulk electric system may not fully be coordinated within the electric sector to prepare for or respond to cyber or other risks.

So I cosponsored H.R. 5175 to help increase DOE's coordination with other agencies and stakeholders on this front.

The pieces are, in fact, coming together for DOE to confront these risks, and we now have a Senate-confirmed head of the CESER office.

And I am pleased to welcome you this morning.

Assistant Secretary Karen Evans was sworn in about a month ago, but her background in government suggests that she brings some necessary skills to improve coordination across the agency and across the Federal Government.

Prior to her recent work leading the US Cyber Challenge, a private-public partnership to reduce the skills gap in cybersecurity, Ms. Evans served as the top information technology official at OMB during the Bush administration, effectively the Federal Government's chief information officer.

Prior to that, she was the Chief Information Officer at DOE, so she knows the Department pretty well. And I would like to learn today what other pieces are necessary to ensure that the new office can fully carry out DOE's responsibilities.

One important area concerns the Department's role as the specific agency for energy-related emergencies, including cybersecurity threats to our energy systems. It would be helpful to understand CESER's role in carrying out this responsibility and how the Assistant Secretary plans to work with other agencies, especially the Department of Homeland Security. What does DOE bring to the table to enhance the overall Federal effort to guard our energy systems against cyber attacks and provide the resources if those attacks are successful?

In addition, what DOE is learning from recent natural disasters; and what additional steps it plans to take to more effectively respond to energy supply disruptions. We heard in an earlier hearing with the Under Secretary of Energy that the expectations

for what DOE can do in emergency exceeds its authorities. Let's discuss what more DOE can do and work to see if we can address the authorities.

Without question, DOE serves on the front lines in the Federal effort to assure critical energy infrastructure protection from all hazards. It provides the technological, operational, and informational expertise to assist stakeholders and other agencies. I want this hearing to help clarify just what DOE is doing to ensure that we can meet the critical mission.

And with that, I yield to the ranking member of the subcommittee and my friend, Mr. Rush.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]

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Mr. Rush. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you for holding this important and timely hearing. And I want to join with you to welcome Assistant Secretary Evans to the Energy Subcommittee for the very first time.

Mr. Chairman, the issue of cybersecurity is always a permanent component of our mindset among members of this subcommittee, as well as the mindset of the American public, as we have heard of many instances of cyber attacks and cyber probes both domestically and abroad over the past few years.

As recently as April, we heard from the FERC Commissioners that our energy grid is constantly being attacked, almost daily, by state actors as well as by other entities who would try to do us harm.

While we have not yet seen widespread outages due to cyber attacks on our electric grid, it is imperative that we take proactive steps to mitigate the risk of these attacks to the maximum extent possible.

It is my hope, Mr. Chairman, and my expectation that installing Assistant Secretary Evans into her new role as head of the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, or CESER, will go a long way in achieving that objective.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have worked with my colleague Mr. Walberg of Michigan on a bill that codifies the work that DOE has already been conducting when we introduced H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act, back in March. I want to acknowledge my friend Mr. Walberg for his leadership on this issue and convey my appreciation to all of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their support of the legislation that has passed through both the subcommittee and the full committee earlier this spring.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, H.R. 5174 would basically codify this new position by amending Section 203(a) of the Department of Energy Organization Act and establishing

the Assistant Secretary position responsible for cybersecurity and emergency response issues.

The newly created Assistant Secretary will have jurisdiction over all energy emergency and security functions related to energy supply, infrastructure, and cybersecurity. This bill will also authorize the new Assistant Secretary to provide DOE technical assistance as well as support and response capabilities with respect to energy security risks to State, local, or tribal governments upon request.

Mr. Chairman, this legislation, along with the work that DOE is already doing, will go a long way in helping to protect the Nation's electric infrastructure from hackers who would attempt to disrupt our energy grid and cause untold harm to our economy, our daily lives, and to our overall national security.

However, as a letter my office received yesterday, Mr. Chairman, from the American Public Power Association, the Edison Electric Institute, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association urges, we must act in a bipartisan way to get this bill and other legislation addressing cybersecurity concerns out of committee and onto the House floor in a timely manner.

As policymakers, we all want to ensure that we are providing DOE and each of the agencies all of the authorities and resources that they need to comprehensively address the cyber threats that our Nation faces.

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to this hearing. I look forward to Assistant Secretary Evans' feedback on this bill as well as some of her top priorities in her new position.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rush follows:]

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Mr. Upton. Thank you.

The gentleman's time has expired.

The chair would recognize the chair of the full committee, the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Walden, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Today's hearing is an important and timely opportunity to learn about Department of Energy's efforts to protect our Nation's energy infrastructure against cyber threat and physical threats.

Whether it is the constant cybersecurity attacks on our Nation's grid or the physical threats of emergencies such as hurricanes, it is DOE's job to ensure our critical energy infrastructure is secure from all hazards and that energy is delivered to consumers throughout all situations.

Now, Secretary Perry has promised to strengthen the Department's cyber and energy security capabilities. And he followed through with the establishment of a new Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, known as CESER.

I want to welcome our witness today, Assistant Secretary Karen Evans.

Good to have you here.

She was recently confirmed as head of the CESER office. I had the pleasure of speaking with the Secretary last week, when the administration released its National Cybersecurity Strategy.

So it is good to have you here before the committee.

Protecting our Nation's energy infrastructure is critical to maintaining so much of the American way of life. The reliable supply and delivery of energy is vital to our Nation's economy, our national security, and the public health and welfare of our citizens.

With energy systems now massively digitized and interconnected, we know about

the new threats and vulnerabilities that have emerged. So it is a whole-of-government effort. But DOE, in particular, must be vigilant and prepared when it comes to ensuring energy access and delivery through cyber threats, physical threats, and emergencies.

DOE has authority and responsibilities for the physical and cybersecurity of energy delivery systems based upon laws that Congress has passed and that the President has issued through -- has passed and Presidential directives. Congress provided DOE with a wide range of emergency response and cybersecurity authorities, beginning with Department of Energy Organization Act and most recently with the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act.

As the sector-specific agency for energy, Department of Energy has a crucial coordinating role to play in securing our energy infrastructure.

And I know you know that.

Under Assistant Secretary Evans' leadership, we understand that CESER will work to bolster energy-sector cybersecurity preparedness, coordinate cyber incident response and recovery, and accelerate research, development, and demonstration of more resilient energy delivery systems.

When it comes to energy security and emergency response, this new office with analyze infrastructure vulnerabilities, it will recommend preventive measures, and help other agencies prepare for and respond to energy emergencies. CESER's ultimate mission is to mitigate the risk of energy disruptions. So this includes DOE conducting emergency energy operations during a declared emergency or a situation of national security.

So, when it comes to research, when it comes to development, when it comes to the demonstration of more resilient energy delivery systems, Department of Energy's National Laboratories have incredible, tremendous capabilities that can be brought to

bear.

Earlier this year, I had the opportunity to visit DOE's Idaho National Lab, INL, which utilizes cybersecurity researchers in collaboration with a broad range of industries and vendors to develop mitigation techniques and tools. INL also has the unique capability to test cyber and physical security applications on a full-scale electric grid.

And as you know, Madam Secretary, we were able to get some of those experts back here to give us on the committee a classified briefing about the threat and their ability to cope with it.

Our Nation's energy infrastructure is largely privately owned and operated. Because of this, DOE works closely with energy-sector owners and operators to better detect risks and mitigate against them. Specifically, CESER collaborates with government and private-sector partners to develop technologies, tools, exercises, and other resources.

One example of DOE's efforts to strengthen public-private partnerships is through its Clear Path IV regional exercise. In April of 2016, DOE hosted the Clear Path IV energy-focused disaster response exercise in my home State of Oregon. The exercise scenario consisted of a magnitude-9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami occurring along the 700-mile-long Cascadia Subduction Zone, which, of course, would cause catastrophic damage.

This 2-day event in Portland and Washington, D.C., included roughly 200 participants from Federal, State, and local governments as well as the electric sector and oil and gas industries. This exercise provided valuable insights and recommendations for the energy sector on the government and industry sides to help improve policies, plans, and procedures for energy emergencies.

So today's hearing is of the utmost importance because the reliable and

uninterrupted flow of energy impacts every aspect of our daily lives. So I look forward to hearing more about DOE's new CESER office and its role in overseeing cybersecurity, energy security, and emergency response for the energy sector.

And, again, thank you for being here.

And, as a caveat, we have another hearing going on downstairs, so I have to bounce back and forth between the two, as other members may have to do.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of The Chairman follows:]

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Mr. Upton. Thank you.

The chair would recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairman Upton.

I want to welcome Assistant Secretary Evans here today and thank the chairman for holding this important hearing. As a committee, we need a deeper analysis of cybersecurity issues at the Department of Energy so members can truly understand the challenges and threats facing our grid and the energy sector as a whole.

I also continue to believe that the committee should hold a closed-door hearing to look at the cybersecurity risks to our electricity grid. There are classified aspects of this issue that can't be discussed at a public hearing like this, and members should have the opportunity to be briefed on this high-level information in order to ensure we are adequately protecting the grid from threats.

To date, the energy sector has done a good job of guarding consumers against losses caused by a cyber or physical attack. But make no mistake, the threats are out there.

In December 2015, Russian state hackers successfully compromised Ukraine's electrical grid, shutting down multiple distribution centers and leaving more than 200,000 residents without power for their lights and heaters. It was a sophisticated and synchronized attack, and it stands as the only recognized cyber attack to successfully take down a power grid. And we owe it to the American people to ask whether anything about that attack could be replicated here, whether it be the electric system, the gas system or dams, or the railways that carry coal to power plants.

Russia hacked the 2016 election, as we know, and it is clear that the Trump administration is not doing enough to prevent Russia from a repeat performance on

election day this November.

So what are we doing to prevent them from attacking our energy sector the way they did our electoral process just 2 years ago? What are we doing to stop Russia from hacking our energy systems the way they hacked Ukraine's grid? And how can we make our energy sector more secure and utility workers more vigilant of cyber and physical security threats? And these are important questions that this committee must ask.

So I am pleased we finally have an Assistant Secretary in place at DOE to oversee cyber threats to our electricity grid, but I am seriously concerned that the Trump administration does not have a senior official in the White House taking the lead on our Nation's cyber defense.

In May, President Trump eliminated the job of National Cybersecurity Coordinator, and 4 months later, there is still no senior official in the administration coordinating a response to the Russian cyber attacks. While DOE's role in cybersecurity is clearly important, a national response to these coordinated attacks cannot be done agency by agency.

And the administration must not use cyber threats to our Nation's grid as an excuse to abuse emergency authorities in the name of justifying subsidies to favored industries or companies. Too often, officials in this administration have touted the notion that the natural gas system is somehow unreliable or not able to fuel electricity production in as secure a manner as coal. And all forms of electric generation and their fuels are vulnerable to disruption, whether manmade or due to extreme weather and other natural events. Coal piles freeze, and trains derail. A dam with a line carrying power from a nuclear plant can be every bit as vulnerable as a natural gas pipeline or a wind turbine. And there are serious threats we should be looking to guard against. But we shouldn't be questioning the security of the system just to boost plants that are

not economic in the marketplace.

In early May, the committee passed four bipartisan bills to enhance the Department of Energy's authorities with regard to the cybersecurity of our Nation's energy infrastructure. This includes H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act, sponsored by Ranking Member Rush and Representative Walberg. And this bill would formally authorize a DOE Assistant Secretary position with jurisdiction over all energy emergency and security functions related to energy supply, infrastructure, and cybersecurity.

Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed that these four bipartisan bills have yet to receive consideration before the House, and I would like to work with you to pass these proposals before the end of the 115th Congress.

So, again, I look forward to the discussion today, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

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Mr. Upton. Thank you.

The gentleman yields back.

At this point, we are going to hear from our witness.

We appreciate you sending your testimony up. It will be made part of the record in its entirety. And we will let you have 5 minutes to summarize it, at which point we will ask questions. Thank you. Thanks for being here this morning.

STATEMENT OF KAREN EVANS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CYBERSECURITY, ENERGY SECURITY, AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Ms. Evans. Thank you.

Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Rush, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the continuing threats facing our national energy infrastructure.

Focusing on cybersecurity, energy security, and resilience of the Nation's energy systems is one of the Secretary's top priorities. By creating the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, also known as CESER, the Secretary clearly demonstrated his priorities and his commitment to achieving the administration's goal of energy security and, more broadly, national security.

Our Nation's energy infrastructure has become a primary target for hostile cyber actors, both state-sponsored and private groups. The frequency, scale, and sophistication of cyber threats have increased, and attacks can be much easier to launch. Cyber incidents have the potential to interrupt energy services, damage highly specialized equipment, and threaten human health and safety.

The recent release of the President's National Cyber Strategy reflects the

administration's commitment to protecting America from cyber threats. The Department of Energy plays a vital role in supporting the security of our Nation's critical energy infrastructure. As a result, energy cybersecurity and resilience has emerged as one of the Nation's most important security challenges, and fostering partnerships with public and private stakeholders will be of the utmost importance for me as the Assistant Secretary of CESER.

Recently, CESER demonstrated the emergency response function through multiple weather events. The hurricanes activated our emergency response plan, while we also addressed the overpressurization of a Columbia Gas natural gas pipeline with the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council that caused multiple explosions and fires at residential locations in Massachusetts.

However, today, I would like to focus my testimony primarily on the cybersecurity function of the office and how CESER will meet the priorities of the administration and work in conjunction with our Federal agencies, State, local and tribal governments, our industry partners, and our National Laboratories.

DOE's role in the energy-sector cybersecurity is established in statute and executive action. In 2015, Congress passed the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, specifically naming DOE as the sector-specific agency for cybersecurity for the energy sector.

The creation of CESER elevates the Department's focus on the energy infrastructure protection and will enable a more coordinated preparedness and response to cyber and physical threats and natural disasters with the private sector as well as Federal, State, and local government partners. This includes electricity transmission and delivery, oil and natural gas infrastructure, and all forms of generation.

The Secretary has conveyed that he has no higher priority than to support the

national security of our Nation's critical energy infrastructure. The formation of the CESER office enhances the Department's ability to dedicate and focus attention on DOE's SSA responsibilities and will provide greater visibility, accountability, and flexibility to better protect our Nation's energy infrastructure and support asset owners, as well as the overall critical infrastructure response framework as overseen by the Department of Homeland Security.

The energy sector, the core of the critical infrastructure partners, consists of the Energy Subsector Coordinating Council, the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council, and the Energy Government Coordinating Council. The ESCC and the ONG SCC represent the interests of their respective industries. The EGCC is led by DOE and DHS and is where the interagency partners, States, and international partners come together to discuss important security and resilience issues for the energy sector. This forum ensures that we are working together in a whole-of-government response.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss cybersecurity in the energy sector, and I applaud your leadership. I look forward to working with you and your respective staffs to continue to address cyber and physical security challenges.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Evans follows:]

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Mr. Upton. Thank you so much. You are one of the first witnesses that we have ever had that has yielded back some of her time. So thank you. It is a good week.

So, as you know, pursuant to authorities that Congress provided in the FAST Act back in 2015, DOE is, in fact, the sector-specific agency for cyber for the energy sector. And as such, you all are responsible for coordinating with multiple Federal and State agencies and collaborating with critical infrastructure owners and operators on activities associated with identifying vulnerabilities and mitigating incidents that may impact the energy sector.

And as I have listened to a number of different energy-sector firms, they really do believe that there ought to be just one lead cop on the beat. So that is one of the things that we wanted to do when we, on a bipartisan basis, passed the FAST Act.

Can you tell us some of the greatest challenges -- as you all are coordinating with other agencies -- Homeland Security, others -- what difficulties have you had? Have you felt that it has gone pretty well? I mean, do we need to do more? I mean, this is something that we want to make sure that you really are the cop on the beat.

Ms. Evans. Thank you for the opportunity to answer that question. I would say that, based on my tenure to date, which -- I am going to remind everybody this is, like, my fourth week.

Mr. Upton. Yeah.

Ms. Evans. So I have had the opportunity to actually experience this process firsthand, and I have really embraced the priority of the Secretary and all my leadership in the SSA role, which is providing that leadership and making sure that we are the lead person, as you said, the one focal point where the energy sector can come in.

And so I had the opportunity to do that with the hurricanes that came through,

and then at the same time we did have that natural gas pipe explosion. So I got to see all of it and was on the calls. And what has happened is and the way that that works is we are the lead on those calls.

Now, it depends on which one we are talking about. So if we are talking about the ones that are being led by the energy sector, they lead that. And so the electricity subsector is led by industry, and we provide information into that, and we actively engage with them on that.

Our staffs all work together. And every night during that hurricane response, we were on with the CEOs of the companies and providing them, from the government standpoint -- and DHS was with us, and we had other partners in there as well, so that if questions were asked, we led that response coming from us, and DHS then had the opportunity to provide information from cross-sector so that the energy sector could actually do what it needed to do once we moved into a response mode.

So seeing it firsthand, seeing how it works, seeing that they took the lessons learned from last year, and they applied it to this year's response. There were specific things that happened last year, because of the way that this natural event went, the hurricane went, that it was a one-two type of punch -- the event would come and then the flooding -- there was specific planning that was done with the industry partners that reflected those lessons learned. And we had the opportunity, because of the way these calls were done, that we could cross-pollinate across the energy sector.

So it worked well. Right now, I don't necessarily see any gaps, but like I said, I am willing -- I am going to work through this. I am excited to embrace this role. And should we see any gaps, I know I would work with DHS and the other Federal agencies, and we would come forward to our respective committees to ask for that assistance.

Mr. Upton. So I know that, as we look at these disasters -- you know, this

committee sent a number of members on both sides of the aisle down to look at Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands last year after that. And we had members from -- obviously, Mr. Kennedy, who was here earlier, and I suspect he will come back, with the natural gas incident that they had up in Massachusetts. And we have members that, for sure, their districts were impacted by Florence in the last 2 weeks. I would imagine that Members reached out to you all. Certainly, their industry partners did.

Any shortcomings that you see right away based on -- you know, had you known something, perhaps would you all have acted any differently?

Ms. Evans. On this go-around, from what has happened?

Mr. Upton. Yeah, so far.

Ms. Evans. So far, I would say that I have a team that is in place, that the Department has a team that is in place, and I have the honor to actually manage them, that know what they are doing in an emergency response situation. Their responsibilities, our responsibilities as ES-12, when we activate that response plan, they know exactly what they are supposed to do. And when we identify issues that come in through the industry -- because they come in multiple ways. Just like you said, they will come in multiple ways. Our leadership would hear something. It comes in. There are multiple meetings that happen.

But the way that the mechanism is set up right now, there is the ability to catch it at multiple levels so that it does not become an issue or that we at least have the appropriate agency working on what those authorities are.

So, for example, in the recovery, one of the things that was being discussed was the ability to use drones. So everybody has them, but there are flight plans that have to be filed, right? And so there was a working group immediately established so our Secretary knew exactly what was going on in the other sector based on the interaction

that happens across with the Emergency Response and the National Response Framework.

So there are multiple levels that happen. Does communications break down? It probably will. And how we need to respond to that and then take that back in to improve it, that is what we are looking at.

And I know that the lessons learned were done from Puerto Rico. And I have seen how they have actually applied those lessons learned through this response and heard those lessons actually being actually implemented by both industry and the government as we were going through the response this go-around.

Mr. Upton. Thank you.

I yield to Mr. Rush.

Mr. Rush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Assistant Secretary Evans, as I mentioned in my opening statement, Mr. Walberg and I introduced H.R. 5174, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act, earlier this spring. And our objective was to codify most of the work that the agency is currently undertaking and make sure that we have consistency moving forward regardless of which administration is in office.

Are you familiar with the bill? And if so, do you have any feedback regarding any of its provisions?

Ms. Evans. Yes, sir, I am familiar with the bill. And I think the feedback and my presence and the establishment of my office supports the idea of what is envisioned by congressional intent. So whatever gets passed by Congress, obviously, I would be responsible for implementing it.

And so, you know, I, again, am supportive of the leadership this committee shows and the support that this committee has and the trust that you have in Department of

Energy and the Secretary to accomplish the mission for the energy sector.

Mr. Rush. I understand, Madam Secretary, that in your previous position you worked as the director of the US Cyber Challenge, an organization that is dedicated to building up the cybersecurity workforce.

From that experience and that perspective, do you have any concerns that you want to share with the committee regarding the Nation's workforce preparedness when it comes to cybersecurity or the threats to our electricity grid?

Are we doing all that we can to ensure that we have a highly skilled, trained workforce, both presently and in the future, to address cybersecurity issues? And if not, what are some of the recommendations that you may want to share with us to make sure that we have the capability to address these important issues related to our Nation's security and that centers on the area of workforce development?

Ms. Evans. I appreciate that question. It is a passion of mine, and I appreciate being able to talk more about cybersecurity workforce issues.

So, as the President released the National Strategy for Cybersecurity, under pillar 2, it specifically talks about the cybersecurity workforce for America as a whole. And as you know, especially in DOE and its industry partners and in the -- all of this infrastructure is owned by private industry. So when we start looking at the workforce, one of the biggest things is making sure that the workforce has the basic skills that it needs and then, in this particular sector, the specialized skills as it relates to industrial control systems, SCADA systems, and understanding those.

So there are a lot of initiatives that are under way that are out in private industry that can be leveraged. There is work that specifically DOE was doing, that we were watching from the outside and attempting to leverage that in.

So there is a specific competition. I really believe that you can demonstrate this

through competitions. And Congress did pass a workforce act that dealt with allowing to use competitions for people to leverage what they know and to be able to demonstrate it quickly. So CyberForce is a competition that DOE runs with the National Labs, and it is specifically focused on the industrial control systems and the SCADA systems.

So I am really looking forward to really making that more robust and being able to expand that out for all of us to do. Right now, it is focused specifically on college students, but it needs to expand out more than that, because there are a lot of people that are in this workspace that need to have those skills. They need to be able to demonstrate those, and competitions are a way to be able to do that.

So when you ask me if there are areas where you can improve, our education system and the STEM -- and I know we are investing a lot in that -- it does one level of knowledge. And what competitions do and what employers need to have and what the Federal Government as a whole needs to have is that the person, when they start on day one, have the ability to show how they would apply that knowledge.

So if you think of it from a science degree, you know, I go to lecture, but then I go to lab. So the competitions allow for that applied knowledge, so that if I am hiring somebody, I know they have the basic set of skills that I need to have, and now what I have to do is train them up for the delta in my industry or in my specific, you know, company or, in the case of the Federal Government or DOE, specifically in what we are doing as it relates to cyber emergency response type of capabilities.

So there is a lot of promise, there is a lot of work that is happening in the universities. And I really view my job as not to duplicate that but to leverage a lot of the work that is happening nationally and be able to bring it into the Department of Energy as the sector-specific agency and be able to shine a light on that so that the industry as a

whole will be able to take advantage of it.

Mr. Rush. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Upton. Thank you.

Mr. Latta?

Mr. Latta. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Assistant Secretary, thanks very much for being with us today. Appreciate your testimony today.

You might be aware that I chair the Grid Innovation Caucus with my good friend, Mr. McNerney. And we have worked on several pieces of legislation together, and I would like to highlight one in particular, which is the CyberSense Act. And this legislation requires the Department of Energy to establish a voluntary CyberSense program to identify and promote cyber-secure products intended in the bulk-power system. And the bulk-power system includes facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network.

Would you talk about the work you are already doing on this front and how voluntary programs like this one can help open lines of communications between the private sector and the DOE?

Ms. Evans. Thank you for the opportunity to talk about our program, called CyTRICS. It is the Cyber Testing for Resilience and Industrial Control Systems. And it is a pilot project to do some of the work and what you intend in that area. And it is to test component parts that go into operational technology that is used throughout the energy sector. So we are now starting the pilot.

There are a lot of challenges as we start going through this that aren't necessarily the technical challenges but making sure that we have the voluntary participation from

our industry partners as we go through this. We already have some companies that have volunteered to have their products tested.

What we then have to say and how we have to work this out would be: What do we do with those results of the testing? How are we going to share that? How does that fit into an overall risk management framework? How we would roll it up into what we are doing with the C2M2 maturity model that we have so that those results, along with a lot of the other pieces that we are putting together, that a company will be able to look at that and say, okay, you know, here are the products, here are the risks, here is what I have to do to mitigate that risk.

And then the information from these pilots should -- will -- will feed our other research and development efforts so that we can then refine them based on the results that we are getting.

So we really are looking forward and we really are excited about this particular project that we are looking at, because we know that there could be a lot of risks associated with all these different products that are coming into the energy sector, and so we have to make sure that we are aware of what those risks are as we are implementing them.

Mr. Latta. Well, you are talking about trying to get more volunteers in there. How can we encourage more companies to really want to volunteer to be part of that program then?

Ms. Evans. Well, so they could reach out to our office, in particular, and I am happy -- they can come through the sector coordinating councils that they have, because most of them are actively participating in that, and they can volunteer through that as well.

And as we identify and work through the challenges that we have, the idea is then

to have a framework. The whole purpose of my office is to take this research and then be able to operationalize it and to be able to take it out into industry so that they can actually use the results of the research and be able to implement it.

And so the more that we can learn about what types of anomalies there might be from different companies, the faster we will be able to develop that framework, and then the faster it will be able to be implemented and out in the infrastructure.

Mr. Latta. Okay.

Well, through this committee's efforts, DOE was established in statute as the lead sector-specific agency for cybersecurity for the energy sector. This new mandate was included in the FAST Act of 2015.

While the lead sector-specific agency mandate is new, DOE has been engaged in this work for many years. What makes DOE equipped to serve as the lead agency?

Ms. Evans. Well, thank you for that question.

And I would like to say that it is the expertise of the Department as a whole, as well as the ability to leverage the knowledge that is out in the National Labs. And so those are some of the smartest people in the world, and that they work on multiple problem sets as it relates to the energy sector, they are always thinking about what is over the horizon, what is next, and also trying to fix what is actually happening today.

So I believe that the way that the Secretary's priorities are set up, the experience that is there at DOE, and then leveraging what is happening in the National Labs, that is why you trust us to be the sector-specific agency in this area, and that is why we are providing that leadership.

Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much.

And, Mr. Chairman, my time is about to expire, and I yield back.

Mr. Olson. [Presiding.] Thank you.

The chair now calls upon the gentleman from California, Mr. McNerney, for 5 minutes, sir.

Mr. McNerney. I want to thank the chairman for that.

Mr. Olson. You are welcome. We will see if the Astros beat the Dodgers again this year. So --

Mr. McNerney. We will see.

Ms. Evans, I thank you for testifying. And you have only been there a month, so I understand that that presents challenges.

And I want to follow up on my colleague Bob Latta's comment about the Grid Innovation Caucus. And the purpose of that is really to educate Members of Congress about the challenges and opportunities in the grid, but also to put forth legislation.

Bob mentioned one. I am also going to mention H.R. 5240, the Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private Partnerships Act, that provides cybersecurity training to electric utilities and promotes sharing best practices and data collection in the electric sector.

Now, in conversations with utility executives, I have heard that there is a big bottleneck in sharing information, security information, with the utilities because their security people don't have security clearances, and it is taking them a year, year and a half, to get those clearances.

Do you have a plan to expedite the clearances of utility executives and utility security people so that we can get information to them on a timely basis?

Ms. Evans. Well, I appreciate that question on security clearances. And I am going to answer it a little bit differently versus saying that I am going to expedite out the clearance process. Those of you that are involved in that know that that can be quite the challenge, if I were to agree to try to expedite that.

What I really am trying to do and what the vision of this office is is to take information that is informed by intelligence, threat intelligence types of things, things that are classified, overlay it on what is here, and then take it so that it can be actionable out by the utilities.

So you don't necessarily have to have the classified background behind it. A lot of times, especially when you are working out there -- and I come from an ops background -- you really want to know what you are supposed to do; the why can come a little later on. A lot of times, you have to respond immediately in a situation. You want to know what the actions are that you need to take. That doesn't necessarily have to be classified.

And that is what I view my office as being able to reach out, share that information with our partners, and be able to give them the actions that they need to take that is informed by the government-as-a-whole approach.

Mr. McNerney. Okay. That sounds good. How far along are you in that process?

Ms. Evans. I actually have some things I hope within the next 120 days that I will be able to share with industry directly that they can start taking some action. There are some things I am doing that they should be implemented here shortly, and I think that they will be surprised when they see it. And there are some basic things that they can do now in basic hygiene that, when they see the visualization of that, they are going to be surprised.

Mr. McNerney. Well, I look forward to hearing from the executives and utility people --

Ms. Evans. Yes. Okay.

Mr. McNerney. -- what they think of the plan, and I will be glad to share that

with you.

Ms. Evans. That would be awesome. I am looking forward to working with you on that.

Mr. McNerney. Now, how does CESER monitor or plan to monitor cyber attacks?

Ms. Evans. So there are several different things that are already under way that CESER is looking at, as far as the infrastructure. The vision that we have for this office, several of the tools that are already in place, several of the projects that they already have -- which I am sure you are familiar with CRISP. Also included in my testimony we talked about CYOTE, that particular project.

The way that we look at how we are going to do this is, for example, in the operational technology world, you know exactly how things are supposed to respond. So the idea is to manage by exception. So, as you pick up exceptions, then working and putting together a model, you can put sensitivities to that, and that would then show anomalous behavior.

Based on then feeding it with information that is coming from multiple areas, especially intelligence, we will be able to tell if that is something that is just -- so we talked about the supply chain and all these other types of equipment. We will be able to tell by the data if something is actually happening, if somebody is in the network or if it is an equipment malfunction, or what is actually happening, by overlaying this data.

Are we there now? No. We have several of these pieces in place that are --

Mr. McNerney. So you are basically using big data and algorithms, or will be. So that is --

Ms. Evans. We will be. That is why there are different pieces --

Mr. McNerney. Again, I will look forward to hearing more about that.

And I have time for one more question. You may not have time to answer it.

Do you feel confident that our utilities are adequately prepared and protected from Russian and North Korean cyber attacks to prevent massive blackouts or credible enough threats of massive blackouts to make our Nation vulnerable to cyber blackmail?

Ms. Evans. So, since you asked me do I feel confident, the answer would be no.

Mr. McNerney. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. Upton. [Presiding.] Thank you.

The chair now calls upon the gentleman from Secretary Evans' home State of West Virginia, Mr. McKinley, 5 minutes, sir.

Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would be remiss if we didn't go back and remind the chairman, when she was being introduced, that she is a good West Virginia native and graduated WVU and is a staunch Mountaineer fan.

Ms. Evans. Yes, I am.

Mr. McKinley. So thank you. Thank you for coming here to this.

I am curious about a few things primarily dealing with the reliability, because the question you just heard from Congressman McNerney about the capability of meeting the challenges we face. And the President has been wrestling with 202(c) or Defense Procurement Act as a way of addressing that.

Can you give me an update on maybe what is happening in that arena, for everyone to understand that we may be having quite a few power plants shut down prematurely without having 202(c) or the Defense Procurement. So if you could give me a little update, if you could?

Ms. Evans. I actually can. Thank you for that question. Secretary Perry was speaking yesterday about this exact issue. And what he said was that he does not have

anything new to update at this time, that this is still a policy that is being reviewed by the White House.

Mr. McKinley. Okay. But building off that -- and we talked about the ISO New England, the problems they are having there in getting power, not only the importing -- as you are probably familiar, that they are importing from Canada 73 gigawatts of power into New England.

Do you dispute that number? Or do you think that number is -- that is the number that has been published, 73 gigawatts. That is essentially -- for people to understand what that means, that is about 100 power plants that don't exist in New England, as we rely on importing power from Canada.

Is that about correct, the 73 gigawatts?

Ms. Evans. I don't have the exact numbers in front of me. I am happy to take that question back and --

Mr. McKinley. If you would, please.

Ms. Evans. Yes.

Mr. McKinley. Because, you know, we are trying to be energy-independent. And we have a section of the country that has some issues about being able to meet the challenges, whether that is from hacking or internally. So we are depending on now importing.

So let me ask another question, then, with that dependability. And McNerney was just talking about Russia. Isn't it accurate that New England was getting its natural gas this past winter from Russia? From an LNG tanker that was in Boston Harbor?

Ms. Evans. I don't know the answer to that question, sir, and I would be happy to take that back as well.

Mr. McKinley. Well, I have the answer.

Ms. Evans. Okay. There you go.

Mr. McKinley. So, yes, the answer is yes --

Ms. Evans. Okay.

Mr. McKinley. -- it was.

And so it is a matter -- if we are going to be energy-independent and we are going to make sure that we have the power necessary for that New England area, we have two issues: Are we going to continue to import gas from Russia, and are we going to import power from Canada?

So that is why I think it is so important that the White House and others move on this 202(c) or Defense Procurement Act to protect our grid system. Because I think we -- reports we have had from National Energy Technology Lab, NETL, have indicated we are prematurely shutting down too many of our coal-fired power plants, and we are headed into a blackout, possibly this winter, as a result of it.

Do you have anything to update us on alternative measures that might prevent that from happening?

Ms. Evans. No, sir, I don't. But I will take back your concern and elevate it to my leadership so that they know exactly what the issues are that you are bringing up so that I can make sure I can feed into the policy process.

Mr. McKinley. If you would, please, pass that on --

Ms. Evans. Yes, sir.

Mr. McKinley. -- to Secretary Perry, and tell him where it is coming from.

Ms. Evans. Yes, sir, I will.

Mr. McKinley. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. Olson. [Presiding.] Thank you.

The chair wants to remind my dear friend from West Virginia, our witness, Secretary Evans, this weekend the Mountaineers are going to Lubbock, Texas, to play the Texas Tech Red Raiders. And my warning is, they have got this symbol; it is called "guns up." They score a touchdown, they get their guns up. You all are going to see a lot of guns up in 60 minutes in Lubbock, Texas.

The chair now calls --

Ms. Evans. As you know, I am really constraining myself not to respond to that, but that is okay.

Mr. Olson. It is football in Texas. Feel free to fire back.

Ms. Evans. No, that is okay. But we are Big 12. It is good. It is all good. It is okay. We are doing well. Our team is doing well.

Mr. McKinley. Where are they ranked? What, 25th?

Mr. Olson. Twenty-five versus 12. Get your guns up.

The chair now calls upon the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, for 5 minutes of questions.

Mr. Duncan. Go, Tigers.

Secretary Evans, I first want to thank you for your response to Hurricane Florence. I know there was over a million power outages across the Carolinas, and you and your team were extremely responsive both during the preparation and restoration process. Duke Energy serves much of my district, and I have heard from them many positive things about your engagement. So I want to applaud you on that.

I also want to thank you, both you and Secretary Perry, for your leadership in creating the new CESER program. Protecting the grid against cyber and EMP attacks should be a priority. Many Americans fear the potential of an attack given the volatility of players such as Iran, Russia, and North Korea.

Over 5 years ago, the U.S. DOE and the industry, with industry matching over 80 percent of the funds, established at Clemson University perhaps the world's largest, most capable electric grid emulator. This 20-megavolt-ampere facility, called the Duke Energy eGRID, is providing a platform for innovating and validating and testing multimegawatt electric grid components in real grid conditions without the risk to the grid.

This capability is needed to facilitate the rapid introduction of new technologies into our Nation's electrical infrastructure. It is also a prime example of public-private partnership working to develop advanced technologies that protect against evolving threats.

The folks at Clemson worked closely with the utilities. Duke is a partner. They worked close with industry, National Labs, and other universities and the DOE to accelerate the marketing of new technologies.

Are you familiar with the eGRID down there in Charleston?

Ms. Evans. Uh-huh.

Mr. Duncan. Have you visited that in North Charleston?

Ms. Evans. Not yet.

Mr. Duncan. Okay. I want to invite you to do that. And I invited Secretary Perry as well.

I am concerned with the grid being able to withstand attacks such as an EMP or cyber attacks, supply-chain attacks. And I realize you just started at the DOE, but I am interested to know how the DOE plans to address these important critical issues.

Ms. Evans. I appreciate the opportunity to answer that question.

I am in the process of looking at many of the things that are in place. This office was set up specifically to deal with those concerns. And Congress has given us that authority, as the sector-specific agency, to really embrace that and to go full-force into

that.

My office, in conjunction with other offices within DOE, really are looking at how do we need to do that, what are the right investments as we are going forward, what is the right research and development as we are doing that. There are many projects that are already in place with the National Labs. It is my intention to leverage those results and implement them.

And so I am of the mindset that my office is about the implementation and working with industry to get it implemented and then distributed through industry so that they can benefit from the results of all that research and make sure that it is actionable so that it can go out there so that the grid and our energy sector is resilient and then can withstand -- the Secretary has told me that his highest priority and his biggest concern is that, when a natural disaster is happening, that we would also have some type of disruption in the technology and that we would be able to discern between the two if they are related or if it is our adversaries taking advantage.

And that is what I really look at as the highest priority, to be able to implement that technology and be able to provide that information up through the appropriate mechanisms so that the Secretary and DHS and the administration is properly informed so that they can make those decisions.

Mr. Duncan. I used to serve on Homeland Security Committee, and since I have been in Congress, there have been several attempted attacks on transfer stations, substations, different things. We have gotten lucky, in that supposed attackers didn't realize diesel fuel didn't explode, et cetera.

Those type of physical attacks on our electric grid are very difficult to predict and protect against. We can't monitor every substation and what not. What sort of work is DOE doing in that regard?

And we know all about the cyber stuff, but these are physical attacks. It would just take a simple explosive device and -- so have you all thought about that? And what, working with Homeland Security, are you doing about it?

Ms. Evans. So the short answer is yes. And the ISER group that is in my responsibility does exercises. And so we heard a little bit about the Clear Path IV exercise. The idea is to develop different scenarios around those so that, as it is being executed, what are the responses, have we thought about everything.

And so, when you do those exercises -- and there are exercises coming up, like Liberty Eclipse, and there are things we are doing with NERC, as the GridEx. Those exercises, they inform the ability to actually respond. So the idea is, okay, we all have a plan, but you want to exercise the plan before you actually have to do the plan and respond to the plan.

So that is what that group does. The idea is to expand out those exercises. And as we hit the basics, then it is to continue to expand those out so that those lessons learned are there in the response plan and that we share that. That is exactly why we do the exercises with State, local, and our government partners, as well as industry.

And that was the uniqueness of that Clear Path IV, was that industry was involved in that, and it was done out in Washington State. Because it is one thing if you do it in D.C.; it is another thing if you are doing it across the country and involving all the State and local partners as well as the industry. Because those lessons learned, the communications, the issues that you brought up earlier, if we see gaps, we don't want to be in the actual incident when we are identifying gaps that we need your help with.

Mr. Duncan. All right.

Well, my time has expired, but I will remind the committee that things that can affect our grid system can be both manmade and natural.

With that, I yield back.

RPTR ZAMORA

EDTR ZAMORA

[11:17 a.m.]

Mr. Olson. [Presiding.] Thank you.

The chair now calls upon the gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And, Assistant Secretary Evans, congratulations on your confirmation, and welcome to the committee, and thank you for your testimony.

Obviously, we have not faced the full consequences of a cyber attack on the grid yet, but we do continue to experience major electricity outages and energy disruptions due to natural disasters. I want to ask about what you see as the mission and role of your office in the future.

There has been a lot of emphasis on cybersecurity today, and rightfully so, but it is my understanding that the office is also responsible for emergency response, including those from natural disasters. Is that indeed correct?

Ms. Evans. Uh-huh, yes, sir.

Mr. Tonko. And earlier this Congress, Assistant Secretary Walker of the Office of Electricity, testified about the work being done by his office in the wake of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. Now, has CESER played a role in the Maria response or preparation against future energy disruptions in Puerto Rico over this past year?

Ms. Evans. So before -- thank you for the question. And before the CESER office actually was formed, a lot of the functions that we are talking about as the exercise capability that we have as well as the emergency response capability all belonged and were all in one office, which was where Secretary Walker is, in the Office of Electricity. When CESER was formed, those moved over. So my office has cybersecurity, energy

security, and emergency response.

So in the case of Puerto Rico and Maria, my office is responsible for the activities that happen when we activate our emergency response, the RES-12 under the National Response Framework. So, for example, this go-around with the hurricanes, it is my office that goes and mans down in FEMA, that goes out to the regions. We have very specific response capabilities, incident response capabilities that we do in natural disasters.

When we move into the recovery phase, and that is what is happening right now down in Puerto Rico, Assistant Secretary Walker continues that effort. He was just down there for the anniversary, was going -- looking at everything that is there, and he is involved in the recovery aspect.

So when you look at how our offices work together and where that separation is, we do the emergency incident response type of capability. We are down there. We are embedded with the States. We work with FEMA. We are over at the national center there, and all the information goes up. When it shifts, where we are right now, that is when it then shifts back to Assistant Secretary Walker's office.

Mr. Tonko. Okay. Thank you.

And I know that earlier there were questions about Hurricane Florence. So in this cross-pollination between the two offices, have there been lessons learned or experiences from Maria from the Puerto Rico experience that helped in your -- or influenced your responses in some way with Florence?

Ms. Evans. I would say that based on the way that Assistant Secretary Walker handled that, he has been instrumental in bringing up the CESER office. And his interactions of what he has done and how I have been able to be brought up to speed so fast is based on those lessons learned of where they clearly see the delineation between

the two offices.

So, again, this is a secretarial priority. Assistant Secretary Walker and I really have worked that out. We continue to work it out. But we really look at -- his office is very strategic in looking at how you are doing different things; and then my office, it feeds directly into my office for lessons learned impact, and then we implement from a tactical standpoint.

Mr. Tonko. Thank you.

Robust cybersecurity requires significant financial resources and new and advanced technologies. But we know there are many small utilities with limited resources that might not have the same technical capacity as their larger components. Does DOE have a plan, a technical assistance program or funding available to assist these smaller utilities such as a public power authority, a small public power authority, or a rural cooperative?

Ms. Evans. I would like to take that question for the record because I am unaware of the specifics, but -- and I would like to get back to you on that specific question.

Mr. Tonko. If you would, please. That would be very helpful, because they obviously could be impacted by some very severe disasters, and that assistance would play a major role in their responsiveness.

So thank you again for your response to the questions.

Mr. Olson. Thank you.

The chair now calls upon himself for 5 minutes.

And, again, welcome, Secretary Evans. I can assure you there will be no talk about football, Texas Tech versus West Virginia, this Saturday. I won't talk much about cybersecurity. That is important, but I do want to focus on natural disasters and

specifically hurricanes.

As you know, my home State of Texas is a cornerstone of American's energy production and security. The Greater Houston is a cornerstone of this cornerstone. We produce the bulk of the oil that is refined and used here in America, and we also have a launching port through the number one exporting port in America, the Port of Houston, for this energy to head overseas and change the world.

Hurricane Harvey hit us 13 months ago, hit us twice. You know, it wasn't a windstorm. It wasn't a storm surge. It was a rain event, almost 4 feet over all of southeast Texas in less than 2 days.

I know your organization is new. You have been on the job for 4 weeks, but could you talk about what you have all learned with Harvey, Maria, Irma, and now Florence, what those lessons are? And also, after a storm, do you all do some after-action reporting and include all the players, the State, the government there in the State, the counties, the cities, the first responders, and private parties who are involved in the recovery from these storms? What is your sort of plan there, what you have learned so far?

Ms. Evans. Thank you for the question. It is my understanding that after-action reports are done. After-action reports were done after last year's Harvey, and I do know that a lot of the lessons learned were specifically discussed on the coordinating calls with our industry partners.

And it was highlighted very early on, specifically, about that this was going to be a one-two punch very similar to Harvey, and that they were more concerned about the flooding and the aftereffects of the hurricane. And so the utilities as they were on the calls, because of those lessons learned, did preposition over 40,000 workers before the flooding happened because they knew what would happen about the roads and how

things would be. And so that happened.

Additionally what happened because of things that happened there that they applied this year is there were things that dealt with, once the power company went in, they were looking at one set of power lines, and the telecommunication companies then would go in and there was -- they would cut lines because they weren't sensitive.

So what happened this year in this particular case is that information was conveyed. This was a lessons learned. So the utility companies told exactly the telecommunications companies where they were going, what the plans were so the telecommunications companies could follow right behind the utility companies. So as the power came up, communications came up. That was a direct lessons learned from Harvey last year.

Mr. Olson. Well, thanks for that question.

You also brought up drones in a hurricane, natural disaster early in this hearing. Drones played a big role in Harvey as the storm hit, quick recovery. For example, the mayor of Missouri City wanted to fly a drone over -- he had heard a levee was having problems with a bubble in a big subdivision. It was about to burst. There were rumors it didn't, but he was concerned. He couldn't fly his drone because it was -- airspace was controlled by the Coast Guard. It took him 1 day with this levee about to break maybe and flood all these homes to finally be able to fly his drones.

So my question, I know it is not your jurisdiction per se, what is your role in these drones over these disasters? What is DOE's role here? Can they help out Missouri City and have them fly those drones quickly to save people in need in a time of crisis?

Ms. Evans. So as the sector-specific agency, when especially that was discussed as another lessons learned that happened from last year, that the drones would be critical, and then there is a lot of information that we have from our own modeling that

we share with utilities companies.

But that issue was raised early, and because the coordinating councils are co-chaired with our industry partner -- I mean, our industry partners as well as our government partners, as that issue is raised, we have a mechanism then to feed it back in before it becomes a crisis. So the things that you are talking about, there was a working group already established --

Mr. Olson. Great.

Ms. Evans. -- before the incident happened so that they could get approval and be able to use the drones for the recovery mechanism.

Mr. Olson. The final question is about reliability and emerging threats. In Texas, we have had some blackouts in the past. The year -- the big year was 2011. That February we had a blackout because -- rolling blackouts because of two power plants in Dallas area had some water pipes frozen, had to have rolling blackouts. That same August, this extreme heat wave, same thing happened across the State.

As you know, when blackouts happen, even rolling blackouts for a short amount of time, people are exposed to death situations, mostly senior citizens and young kids who can't handle extreme heat or extreme cold, and we have to take this very seriously.

I know they are expecting a thing called the GridEx exercise. Could you talk about your work with industry and NERC on preparing for a grid emergency like we had in Texas in 2011?

Ms. Evans. I appreciate the question. I know that we have the GridEx exercise. Again, that information feeds back into what DOE does, what -- any gaps that they would see in DOE's ability as the sector-specific agency to be able to deal with that. I know that we are -- I am actually getting ready to go out to the NERC event and what they are doing with GridEx again this year, so I will be there. I will have firsthand out at that

group.

Mr. Olson. Great.

Ms. Evans. But there are other things that DOE does that feeds back into what NERC does too as the Electricity ISAC, and so there are tools that we have, there is modeling that we do. We have eagle eye that looks at everything. We also then have the CRISP program that feeds that.

The idea in the long run is to be able to start putting more of this data together so that it can go out through the Energy ISAC that NERC does manage so that they can get that information then down to the utilities. So as you are looking at natural disasters or other types of things, again, I am getting back to we have to give them actionable information that they can share through their partners so that they can take the appropriate actions.

Mr. Olson. Thank you. My time is expired. Enjoy your time watching the football game from Lubbock, Texas.

Ms. Evans. Thank you.

Mr. Olson. The chair now calls upon the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And, Assistant Secretary Evans, thanks for being with us today. Let me try to dodge my colleague here to make eye contact with you.

Decisions made by different agencies across the Federal spectrum can impact our electric grid and specifically impact how our grid operators, generators, and grid-related devices effectively perform and communicate with one another. For instance, the electric utility industry has added and is continuing to add data and networks along its infrastructure to bolster its reliability.

This continual addition of new technologies and communication networks can fall into multiple agencies across the Federal Government and commission jurisdictions, some of which are not typically involved in the oversight of our electric grid. So that is why I am interested in the Tri-Sector Executive Working Group, which is meant to manage risk across energy, telecommunication, and financial sectors. Can you tell me a bit more about this work?

Ms. Evans. Yes, sir. I appreciate the question on the Tri-Sector Working Group. We just held our first meeting all together last week. And so the idea behind that, that was a recommendation that came into the President's -- from the President's working group on that on infrastructure and recognized the complexity of those three and the interdependency.

So from a Federal Government standpoint, you have Department of Transportation, Department of Energy, and Department of Homeland Security representing that. And then we have the utilities, which is also the same group that is leading our Electric Subsector Coordinating Council; and then you have the financial sector, which is also the ISAC for that, which is then JPMorgan is the lead on that as well; and then you have Telecom, which was AT&T.

So we were there. The idea is really to, okay, we need to know what is critical in those areas for what is the basic types of operations we are talking about, the modeling of what it is going to take for the North American grid so that we can deal with these issues and where are the interdependencies, and then utilize that from the government approach back. And, again, that gets back to our original question, if we see that there are any gaps in those authorities, then we will raise those through the appropriate policy mechanism and go to our respective committees.

Mr. Johnson. Okay. Do you believe further communication between different

facets of the Federal Government are needed to ensure that our grid is secure, especially as utilities increasingly look at their own communication networks to add security and up to the second situation on awareness over their infrastructure?

Ms. Evans. I appreciate that question. And as we continue to do this work and as we continue to improve the modeling that we are doing, I am sure we are going to show interdependencies. I believe that the framework that is in place right now allows us -- especially with the President's release of the National Cyber Strategy -- allows us the mechanism if we were to identify those as we do the work to bring those up accordingly through the administration and be able to identify those policy gaps.

Mr. Johnson. Okay. In December 2016, the Department of Energy and the National Association of State Energy Officials cosponsored Liberty Eclipse --

Ms. Evans. Uh-huh.

Mr. Johnson. -- a regional energy assurance exercise to promote State and local level preparedness and resilience for future energy emergencies stemming from a cyber incident. So, Ms. Evans, why are exercises such as Liberty Eclipse beneficial for coordination between Federal, State, and local governments?

Ms. Evans. I find that the exercises are critical. As I mentioned earlier, we believe, when we put together a plan, that we have identified what all the contingencies are. But when you put together a plan, you don't know what you don't know until you actually exercise the plan. And the emergency when it is happening is not the time to exercise the plan.

And so these exercises, Liberty Eclipse, which we are getting ready to do another exercise on that, identify any gaps that are the issues that you are raising right now, either between the Federal Government going across or down with our State and local partners or across with industry.

Mr. Johnson. Were there any lessons learned from that exercise, and have any of them rendered any improvements?

Ms. Evans. There were lessons learned, and it is my understanding that those lessons learned, the plans have been updated, and they are now going to be exercised again in this next exercise of Liberty Eclipse to see if they were adequately addressed and if any new gaps or any other new lessons need to be applied and updated as we go forward. So that is happening in this next exercise that we are doing of Liberty Eclipse at the end of October.

Mr. Johnson. Great. All right. Well, thank you.

Mr Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. Olson. Thank you.

The chair now calls upon the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Mullin, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Mullin. The great State of Oklahoma. Great State.

Mr. Olson. A good State, not the greatest.

Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Ms. Evans, thank you so much for being here. It is always impressive when you see individuals come in here well informed and knowing the issues, so thank you for taking the time to get here.

Recently, there was a tragic explosion in my district at a drilling rig, and I am pretty sure you are aware of it. A question that I have is -- which I really don't like the acronym CESER, but I guess that is how you pronounce it -- what role does CESER have in assisting the U.S. Chemical and Hazard Investigation Board in their investigation and response?

Ms. Evans. So it is my understanding that as a sector-specific agency and the way that we roll things down in an emergency response, that we would provide

information to the appropriate agency and the appropriate board.

Mr. Mullin. What kind of information are you providing for them?

Ms. Evans. What comes up through the channel, if there is concerns that come directly from the industry, if there is types of information. I was not -- I do not have the specifics on that one, but I do have the specifics, well, like, for example, when the Massachusetts one came up. And that is it comes up through us, but Department of Transportation is actually on the call. So they then share the information of what they are working with with their board, and they share it out with the other group, this is the initial findings, this is what we have at this point.

If there is anything that we need to do from an energy sector role, then what we have to do is raise it back, and we either share it with our sector or I have to raise it up to my management if a policy decision needs to be made.

Mr. Mullin. Do you share that information with the public, if there is reason to be sharing, or is that someone else is sharing that information?

Ms. Evans. As a sector-specific agency, we share information with our appropriate sector. Depending on how that investigation is done, so like in the case of the Massachusetts one, Transportation would then share that because they would be the appropriate agency to share the information with the public.

Mr. Mullin. So you are assisting the Transportation --

Ms. Evans. Yes. And so the other thing that I have learned through this is that the biggest thing that all of us have done in this sector is making sure that the information is shared so that there is unity of message so that we all have the same information --

Mr. Mullin. Right.

Ms. Evans. -- so that that way we are not saying different things from a different

vantage point but that the information is consistent.

Mr. Mullin. So who is coordinating that response and that information, the flow of information? Who is gathering it and putting it in the right hands? Is Transportation leading that too?

Ms. Evans. In the case of what happens here in the energy sector, they have associations, and as it relates to what happens and they send it out through industry, we share the information with them and then their industry associations then distribute it.

In the case of the Federal Government, if Transportation is the lead, we would feed into the Transportation type of information that would go up and then that secretary would be the accountable person.

Mr. Mullin. Does that information flow freely or is that only when they specifically ask for the information?

Ms. Evans. Based on my experience and based on the way that I am going to work this office, the information will flow freely.

Mr. Mullin. Freely. So you will have a point of contact?

Ms. Evans. Absolutely. I already have contacts now.

Mr. Mullin. Okay. Great.

As far as the briefings, because we do understand between cyber attacks and vulnerability of our electrical grid and just the oil and gas industry in itself, how often do you brief industry as far as security issues? Do you plan on briefing them, and if so, traditionally how often does that briefing take place?

Ms. Evans. It is my understanding the way that the information flows specifically about what you are asking is that we as DOE provide information -- and this is the question that was asked earlier about our relationship with NERC. And so NERC is directly tied into a lot of the tools in the modeling and the CRISP project that we were

talking about. That information then informs the ISAC, and so they get that. I mean, they are tied directly into that platform, and so we are providing that information to them on a daily basis. Based on that information, they then distribute it down to the energy sector through the ISAC, and that is what the ISAC mechanism is set up for.

Mr. Mullin. Are you doing specific classified briefings with industry when it comes to this?

Ms. Evans. I would have to take that back for the record and find out what is the history associated with what types of briefings that we have done as a sector-specific agency with them.

Mr. Mullin. Appreciate it. I am out of time. Thank you so much for being here. Appreciate it.

Mr. Olson. Thank you.

The chair now calls upon the gentleman from the great State of Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes.

Oh, I am sorry. Mr. Kennedy slipped in behind me. I'm sorry, Mr. Walberg.

The great State of Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy for 5 minutes.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Olson.

Madam Secretary, thanks for being here. I am going to build a little bit off of my colleague, Mr. Mullin's, questions, probably not surprisingly, with regards to emergency response.

I am from Massachusetts. There has been an awful lot going on there in the past couple of weeks. I know you touched on it briefly or it was touched on a little bit earlier in the testimony and I wanted to drill down on this a little bit.

So understanding that circumstances evolving and ongoing, but we had an overpressurized pipe result in rupture over 80 explosions, people that are still displaced

from their homes, and gas that is apparently not going to get fully restored to the area until potentially mid-November, trying to figure out what happened. And it would be helpful for me to get a sense as to what oversight role you play in this, what the status of the investigation is, and what update you can give me to start.

Ms. Evans. Thank you for that question. And what did happen with that and what is our role as a sector-specific agency, so we share this, this is through the energy sector, the energy government sector, so we are partners with the Department of Transportation as well as the Department of Homeland Security on this.

I can say, in that specific incident, because we have the emergency response piece, my staff called me within an hour of being notified of that. We had scheduled -- the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council was also scheduled.

So within an hour of that, Department of Transportation and FMSCA in particular was also on the call because they are the industry part, the government part. We were all on the call. And they were sharing information as they were getting it with the sector and then with the energy -- with the electric sector right afterward, because we had a call with them also because they all wanted to know what was going on.

So as that investigation continues through this mechanism is how the information is then shared out with the community. But Department of Transportation is the lead in this particular case.

Mr. Kennedy. And fair to say, ma'am, just so I understand it, that your role in that is then focused on the emergency response for the immediate triage?

Ms. Evans. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. And so how is it, though, to the best that you can explain, understanding that is not the focus of the hearing but focus for me, how is it that this happens? How is it that firefighters end up going out to all these response -- are

responding to all these explosions? There is a well-publicized case, one firefighter going out, putting out a fire while his own home explodes.

How is it that -- why does it take so long? I understand that this had to be done manually from Columbia Gas, an alert that had to take place to then have somebody actually dispatch a human being down to try to alleviate the overpressurized pump. Is that typical? Is that how this should operate? Is there going to be regulations that come in? Would you suggest additional regulations to make sure something like this -- we can up the preventive measures on this? How should we be thinking about an appropriate response?

Ms. Evans. So what happens in this particular case -- and I appreciate the question because I -- there is a lot of moving parts to the question that you just asked. So the industry, the company would have a response plan. That response plan is also -- then there is a local response plan as well as then a State response plan. And I know this sounds like there is a lot of layers, but the communications does flow up pretty fast.

And so my office, as an emergency response piece, is directly tied into the State and local governments. And so we do get notified. There is a notification that happens when these things happen, and then people's response plans go into play. And so everybody's response plan is then executed.

So I think that that is the focus of what everybody was asking for, do we see gaps when they happen. And I think that is what is still being investigated, and that is what you are trying to understand right now is were those adequate plans, and if not, are there gaps, and then they have to feed back into the process that we have, because if you need a Federal response, it has to come up so that we can be able to respond.

Mr. Kennedy. And I appreciate that. I am also wondering if the scope of the

regulation is such where an accident like this can happen, right, and understanding the -- we are still trying to investigate exactly what happened and how, but that there is going to be people that are without their homes in Greater -- or without heat and hot water in their homes in Greater Boston through mid November if this is done on schedule, should there -- should we allow that? Is that a permissible response to say, it is okay for folks to be dislocated from their homes for 6 to 8 weeks?

And if not, why -- if the company was actually in compliance with the regulatory environment that -- the existing regulatory environment, why is that part acceptable? Because we have got -- I have got two little kids under three. This doesn't affect me, but I would imagine that for a family trying to heat their home with space heaters, that some of these homes that is not even adequate, for 2 months becomes a real challenge.

And Columbia might be doing the best they can to replace hundreds of miles of pipeline, but something fell through the cracks here in a pretty big way without yet a conversation as to how do we make sure that such an incident like this, the consequences are going to be mitigated in the future. And so that is what I would love to get your insight to where we should look and how we should focus.

Ms. Evans. So I would like to say that until the investigation is completed, it is hard to address that question. But you are asking some broader-based questions that are about risk management and what is acceptable from a nation.

So I am going to turn back to the administration's national strategy that they have dealing with critical infrastructure and in some of the things that have already been released by Department of Homeland Security, which is the risk management center.

So a lot of the things that you are talking about fall under risk management and is it acceptable. There are things until this investigation -- the results are actually out is that it is possible that the level of risk associated with the infrastructure there is not

acceptable because of the consequences that the American people are now experiencing because of what happened there.

That data and then our analysis is going to have to feed up through the policy process about what is the right risk management, is it going to take a regulatory change, is it a legislative change, is it an investment, and that is going to be a policy decision, and that is the intent. And that is what my office is focused on being able to do is provide that type of information after this happens so that the right policy can be made so we can answer that question for you.

Mr. Kennedy. Chairman, appreciate your patience.

Look forward to working with you on this issue, Madam Secretary. Thank you.

Mr. Olson. Thank you. I remind my friend too to please talk to FERC about pipelines as well because they are a big Federal agency. DOE has got a role, but FERC is a big one for pipelines.

Mr. Kennedy. I am aware.

Mr. Olson. Yeah. I just want to make sure you talk to FERC.

The chair now calls upon the gentleman from Michigan, the great State of Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Walberg. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the assistant secretary for being here.

Workforce development has become a focus here, I think, in a very positive way in Congress, and having a well-trained, certified cybersecurity workforce is a key component to our overall cybersecurity strategy as a Nation. However, recruitment and retention of cyber workers is a well-documented problem, challenge, frustration, especially in the public sector.

What programs are in place that allow cyber workers in the Department to have

professional development opportunities as well as enhanced skill sets, and what plans do you have to add to that preparation?

Ms. Evans. I appreciate the question on workforce. This is a passion of mine. So I am in the process now of looking at what kind of training and what type of programs are actually available for my own staff to be able to go forward.

I did mention the cyber force effort, that competition that is run by the national labs. That has a lot of promise to be expanded both internally as well as externally and continue to grow beyond the initial view of that, because a lot of what that is focused on is energy specific, and that is the baseline of skills that my team will have to have in order to be able to respond and be able to work with the industry.

So there are a lot of nuances when you go through this. And when you use the term "certified," that means a lot of different things to a lot of different people. I would say right now that what we are looking at within the Department of Energy is the national initiative for cybersecurity education, which is run by NIST, and making sure that our positions and how we are using that framework really aligns.

And so I look at the structure of what we have. I am also looking with the chief information officer and what they have in place, because if they have training programs already in place, the idea is to leverage those as well.

Mr. Walberg. Well, that is so important, and I appreciate that in talking with the private sector and their challenges in the energy industry with cyber. They have been appreciative of the relationship that has developed because of what we have done here of having public-private sharing back and forth together. But to keep the good people that have been trained and to stay in the public sector is so important as well, so I would encourage you, and thanks for your commitment to that.

Ms. Evans, I would like to follow up on Mr. McNerney's question earlier on. You

said you were not confident that the U.S. electric sector can prevent a state actor attack. Would you please elaborate on this a little bit further?

Ms. Evans. For me to have a certain confidence level of that, I want to make sure that I am providing all the information that they need to have so that they can make sure that they have the proper defenses in place. I know based on my experience and the previous work that I have done and the workforce issues that you have brought up, there are a lot of opportunities for the utilities to improve.

And I think a lot of things that are going forward, there are basic things that all of us have to do across multiple sectors as it relates to hygiene. So the more we integrate technology into what we are doing, the higher the risk it becomes. And I think it really does become a risk management type of approach, and the executives of those utilities as well as the workers need to understand what are the risks that they are bringing into their enterprise as they go forward.

I think right now that that is the dialogue that is happening. I think DHS is showing the leadership with the risk management center so that that information can then perpetuate throughout the industry, and then what you are going to see is those interdependencies. Right now, that whole holistic approach is really not understood across the industry.

Mr. Walberg. Thank you.

When the Department of Energy was organized as a Cabinet agency in 1977, the largest energy security concerns were fuel supply disruptions, not electricity disruptions or cybersecurity. As you would expect, the Department's Organization Act reflected those concerns. Times have changed, and we should be thinking differently about energy security and emergency preparedness.

In my bill with Ranking Member Rush, H.R. 5174, we specify functions to include

emergency planning coordination and response. Could you talk about your work to elevate these functions in your new office?

Ms. Evans. I appreciate the opportunity. I am happy to talk about that. I am currently, right now, looking at what we have in place, and we have, as I talked about earlier, the emergency response piece that we have, specifically associated with hurricanes, natural disasters is really robust.

What I really want to look at is the exercises and then how do you continuously improve that to bring in other threat factors that we have been talking about, manmade disasters, cyber disasters, so that same robustness and the same responsibilities that we have as the sector-specific agency and in the National Response Framework as ESF-12 are broadened based on what you envision that this office and what the Department is responsible to do.

So I am leaning forward into that. I am trying to redirect some of the activities that we have right now. I am looking at several of the investments that we have already made to make sure that they capture these other pieces so that we can make sure that we are operationalizing those for the Department.

Mr. Walberg. We wish you well on that and would appreciate any involvement that we could have with you in identifying gaps and assisting in finding solutions to meet those needs.

Ms. Evans. I would be happy to talk to your staff about what we are doing as we continue.

Mr. Walberg. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. Olson. Thank you.

The chair now calls upon the gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here today.

As we change our mix in our grid, we are becoming more and more reliant on natural gas, which means we have more and more natural gas pipelines running across the country which are subject to potential harm or attack. I do think that your agency is the right one to do it. The chairman mentioned a few minutes ago that people need to talk to FERC also, and we may need legislation to make sure that we have coordination going there.

I personally think we have given too much power to FERC as a Congress, and we need to take some of that back anyway. But along those lines, I find it interesting, because I think it would be helpful in this if we looked at some of the new technologies.

As a disclosure, I have a Corning facility in my district and they were showing me a number of their products. They did not make this product in my district, but they have apparently got a fiber that they can put on top of a pipeline that can detect temperature change and vibrations that then shows you on a computer if somebody is driving a truck up near the pipeline, getting out of the truck, walking, starting to shovel. You can tell all of that from the vibrations. And if there is any kind of a leak, so you have got both the bad actor and then just the bad pipe issue, they can also -- because the temperature changes and it can detect the temperature change, it can pick up a pinprick leak.

And I am just wondering why we aren't asking at least on the new pipelines that we are putting in for natural gas that we don't have some kind of a technology like that so that we can observe if somebody's trying to do something untoward or observe if there is just an accident about to happen. I think it would behoove us to do some of that.

Have you all looked at any of that or is that something you would be open to?

Ms. Evans. I would be open to doing that. Based on my previous experience, I

was a partner in a venture capital firm so I understand a lot of what you are talking about with the new technologies. I would say that trying to be a little disruptive that a lot of the models that are currently being looked at right now are from the center going out, kind of the command and control piece. And what you are really describing is from the outside in.

Mr. Griffith. Yeah.

Ms. Evans. And so that is going to change the architecture. And I view that that is what my role is is to be able to say, hey, if we agree on this, here is an architecture that we are recommending so that we can then talk to industry about it.

Based on that, and we are looking at it from a national security standpoint, it is my understanding the way this is supposed to work -- so you guys can correct me here -- is is that then that would feed into the FERC process, which then could then do and address some of the things that you are talking about, because we would show this is the modeling, this is how it works, here is a voluntary way that you can do it and can then be built into the standards process, which would then be overseen by FERC.

Mr. Griffith. Well, and that may be, but I am not sure that they are completely on board with all of this, and so I would be more than happy to work with you all to see if we needed legislation to just say this is where we are going to go. You have to figure out first how you want to change that architecture, but it does seem to me that that is probably a better way to go instead of from the central office out, have the information coming in and --

Ms. Evans. And I will be happy to brief you as we continue to do this work.

Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am. And I appreciate that. I also should probably note that while I have seen this one product by one manufacturer, I am sure there are competing interests and I don't care which one gets picked. I just want to make

sure -- because I have a lot of constituents right now with two pipelines coming through the area, one through my district, and one through the neighboring districts.

There are a lot of people who were concerned about problems like we heard about from the Senator from Massachusetts and pumping stations, and they are worried about the safety of their communities and their homes, and it just seems like we probably could put their minds to ease.

I know when I have talked about this technology with those folks, they said, if only they were doing that, I would feel a lot better about it. They would still probably have some reservations, but they would feel a lot better that, you know, 20 years from now they weren't going to have a major problem. I thank you.

And I yield back.

Mr. Olson. I thank the gentleman.

And seeing there are no further members wishing to ask questions, I would like to thank Secretary Evans for joining us today. And I just want to remind you, if you go out to Texas Tech this Saturday or sometime in the future to watch a football game between the Red Raiders and the Mountaineers, enjoy Lubbock, Texas.

Two things you should do out there: first of all, The Shack BBQ, The Shack BBQ, 2309 Frankford Avenue, Lubbock, Texas, the best barbecue in the Panhandle of Texas, much better than -- sorry -- West Virginia barbecue, Virginia barbecue, North Carolina, Kansas City. We got the best.

Also, if you want to see a real tornado, Texas Tech has this thing called the National Wind Institute. They have this machine that generates small tornados just to study a tornado. So it is kind of cool. Go see that tornado. Enjoy Lubbock, Texas. You have to go out there.

Before we conclude, I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit for the

record the following documents: a report from DOE's Office of Energy Delivery and Energy Liability; number two, a letter from the committee to send to Secretary Perry; number three, response letter from DOE to the committee; number four, a letter to Speaker Ryan from EEI/NRECA and American Public Power Association.

Without objection?

Mr. Rush. No objection.

Mr. Olson. No objection. So ordered.

[The information follows:]

***** COMMITTEE INSERT *****

Mr. Rush. Mr. Chairman --

Mr. Olson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rush. -- I just want to say this to Secretary Evans. It has really been refreshing to hear your testimony this morning. You certainly have an understanding and broad knowledge of all the areas, and you have taken the time to really answer in a very effective way the questions that the members may have. And I just wanted to ask you to don't get tainted by the Republicans. I thought you were a very refreshing witness, and we look forward to working with you.

Ms. Evans. Thank you, sir. I look forward to working with you as well.

Mr. Rush. Thank you.

Mr. Olson. Thank you. Amen.

In pursuit to committee rules, I remind members that they have 10 business days to submit additional questions for the record. I would ask the witness to submit her response within 10 business days upon receipt of those questions.

Without objection, this subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]