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Introduction

Thank you, Chairman Latta, Chairman Guthrie, Ranking Member Pallone, Ranking Member Castor, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor to testify before you today as a representative of the Department of Energy (DOE).

Priorities

Under President Trump and Secretary Wright's leadership, the Department of Energy and the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response—CESER for short—has been hard at work implementing President Trump's agenda of restoring American energy dominance, lowering energy costs for Americans, and strengthening our national security.

CESER

The Secretary has conveyed that strengthening the security and resilience of our Nation's energy infrastructure and, by extension, our national security, is a top priority. This vital work—as well as many of the pieces of legislation discussed here today—falls under the CESER office. CESER was established during the first Trump Administration to strengthen the security and resilience of our Nation's energy infrastructure.

As the Director of CESER and Acting Under Secretary of Energy, I am honored to work on this critical mission with the Committee. At CESER, we advance policy, partnerships, and technology solutions that protect critical energy infrastructure. We also support national security and ensure that Americans can count on an affordable, reliable, and secure energy supply under every circumstance. For CESER, this means providing timely and actionable

information to the energy sector, developing world-class security technologies, hardening U.S. energy infrastructure, and responding to and recovering from incidents.

We are at a moment when the stakes for energy security could not be higher. The challenges we face are clear. The Defense Intelligence Agency's 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment notes that nation-state actors have conducted cyberattacks against our critical energy infrastructure. The U.S. energy grid faces persistent threats from nation-state actors with campaigns such as Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon. These are not hypothetical scenarios; they are deliberate, systematic threats targeting our economy, military readiness, and public health and safety.

All of this is taking place against a backdrop of a rapidly changing domestic energy landscape. After years of relatively flat demand, the U.S. is experiencing explosive load growth—potentially on the order of over 100 gigawatts over the next five years—driving an urgent need for new generation capacity, along with all of the supporting transmission and distribution infrastructure. Winning the AI race, while advancing and reshoring manufacturing, are all driving today's demand. That means we need to build a lot of new infrastructure faster than we have ever done, but that new infrastructure must also be built with security in mind.

To confront these challenges, DOE is undertaking a three-part energy dominance strategy: stabilize, optimize, and grow. The first is to stabilize the existing system, the second is optimize what we already have, and the third is to grow the energy system to meet future energy demand. Under the decisive leadership of President Trump and Secretary Wright, we are ushering in a new era of U.S. energy dominance. We look forward to continuing to work with the Committee to fine tune these bills into final versions that will best protect the nation's energy infrastructure. The Department is providing preliminary views and look forward to providing additional comments and working with the Committee as these bills are introduced. In addition to the following comments, I would also like to take this opportunity to urge Congress to pass a reauthorization of the Cyber Information Sharing Act of 2015.

Energy Threat Analysis Center (ETAC) Reauthorization Act of 2025

As the U.S. energy sector continues to evolve and grow, cybersecurity threats and risks persist. Various threat actors—nation states, criminals, and other malicious actors—pose increasingly significant challenges to U.S. energy security.

As the Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA) for the energy sector, CESER works closely with public and private sector partners to secure the nation's critical energy infrastructure. DOE's Energy Threat Analysis Center (ETAC), a public-private partnership that is managed by CESER, plays an important role in this effort. ETAC convenes experts from the federal government and industry to identify, analyze, and mitigate threats to America's critical energy infrastructure. The private sector plays a pivotal role in securing our nation's energy security and prosperity. ETAC integrates real-world industry insight with government intelligence to help disrupt threats to the energy sector.

The ETAC Reauthorization Act promotes improving operational collaboration between the government and industry, securing critical energy infrastructure from cyber threats, and protecting information sharing, thereby strengthening the Nation's energy security. The Department looks forward to working with the committee on the details of this bill once it is introduced.

Energy Emergency Leadership Act

Under President Trump's leadership, DOE is committed to ensuring that the energy system—the backbone of our country, economy, and national security—remains reliable, resilient, and secure. How we as a country respond to energy emergencies, including cyber and physical attacks to U.S. energy infrastructure and natural disasters impacting energy availability, is of the utmost importance to DOE and the Trump Administration. President Trump clearly articulated the importance of coordinating with state, local, Tribal, and territorial partners to ensure the resilience of energy infrastructure through Executive Order 14239, "Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness".

The Energy Emergency Leadership Act aims to clarify the leadership required to carry out the Department's energy emergency and energy security functions and improve the coordination performed with relevant Federal agencies. This language amends the DOE Organization Act to include the Department's energy emergency and energy security functions as those assigned to one of the eight Assistant Secretary positions. In addition, the legislation will permit the Department to provide technical assistance to energy sector entities, as well as state, local, and tribal governments upon request "to protect against, detect, and respond to energy security threats, risks, and incidents." We look forward to the Committee's continued efforts in the preparation of this bill.

RMUC Reauthorization Act

DOE actively supports cybersecurity improvements for the 3,000 electric public power and cooperative utilities across our country. We know, in part based off the 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment, these utilities are targets for cyberattacks and that many of them struggle to defend against the advanced capabilities of nation-state adversaries, often due to a lack of funding and/or personnel.

The Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity Program (RMUC) seeks to strengthen the cybersecurity and resilience of public power and cooperative utilities. So far, the RMUC Program has assisted more than 500 eligible utilities, providing targeted investments in cybersecurity technologies used to defend and respond to attacks, and strengthening skills and policies to ensure short-term investments result in long-term improvements.

Sophisticated attacks on rural utilities illustrate the critical need for DOE to accelerate improvements in cyber readiness while also closing the rural resources gap. This is a policy problem that we look forward to solving with the help of the Committee.

Securing Community Upgrades for a Resilient Grid Act (SECURE Grid Act)

To maintain America's national security, we must strengthen our energy security by hardening U.S. electric grid infrastructure. The Trump Administration is committed to empowering state, local, Tribal, and territorial governments to play a more active and significant role in energy resilience and preparedness. This will help States mitigate risks posed to the electric grid by empowering them to fully assess, review, and respond to risks from cyber and physical attacks, severe weather, and other vulnerabilities.

State Energy Security Plans (SESP) help enable states to examine and respond to weaknesses in their own energy infrastructure. By authoring a plan, the State Energy Office (SEO) creates avenues to improve risk posture in their own backyard. States must consult with owners and operators in the private sector, whose innovation powers more than 80 percent of the country's energy infrastructure. Subsequently, SEOs rely upon these plans to leverage funds from the State Energy Program to implement government programs and provide support to private industry.

All 56 states and territories have completed a SESP. While SESPs are already required to consider vulnerabilities, including cyber and physical attacks, this legislation formalizes the inclusion of additional data to these reports. It requires states to consider a variety of factors, including but not limited to, threats posed to local facilities, increasing grid demands, and vendor maintenance.

Americans need a reliable, resilient, and secure grid to keep the lights on. In an increasingly complex cyber and physical threat landscape, we must continue to collaborate and create a Federal policy that keeps states safe.

Pipeline and LNG Facility Cybersecurity Preparedness Act

America's economy, security, and the safety of our citizens depend upon the reliable and uninterrupted supply of fuels and electricity. Pipelines are the key conduit for transporting energy across the country. America's pipeline infrastructure is a vast network responsible for transporting natural gas, liquid fuels, and other commodities for use in homes and businesses, including airports, power plants, farms, and refineries. As automation drives pipeline owners and operators to rely on an increasingly complex web of interconnected devices to run their business and operational systems (e.g., industrial control systems), they must also implement security measures to protect their pipeline operations from evolving and emerging cyber risks.

This legislation authorizes DOE to coordinate a voluntary approach to make pipeline systems more reliable, resilient, and secure. As the Sector Risk Management Agency

for the energy sector, DOE works closely with all parts of the energy sector to prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents. DOE coordinates closely with other agencies for an all-of-government response to emergencies. DOE will continue to work with the Committee on requests related to this legislation.

Conclusion

DOE is adept at deploying innovative solutions to complex problems and will continue to do so in service to the American people, ensuring the U.S. energy sector becomes more reliable, resilient, and secure. Our approach continues to yield positive results while also unleashing American energy dominance and strengthening our national security and recognizing that the private sector plays a pivotal role in securing our nation's energy security and prosperity.

We appreciate the Committee's steadfast support in providing CESER with the authorities and resources to strengthen the security and resilience of U.S. energy infrastructure. The scope of this challenge grows by the day, whether from advancing AI technologies to guarding against cybersecurity and physical security threats to our energy infrastructure.

As this legislation continues to be refined, CESER and the Department stand ready to provide technical assistance to ensure the legislation meets Congressional intent and rises to the challenges posed by today's threat landscape.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to working with you and your respective offices so that we can continue to strengthen American energy dominance and lower costs for hardworking American families. I look forward to your questions.